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i  
Abstract 
English local government exists in a turbulent financial environment with increasing customer 
demands but tighter finances.  It has a history of metrics benchmarking and was required to 
benchmark as part of the Best Value regime.  Literature suggests that the public sector undertakes 
benchmarking both as a tool for improving performance and to gain legitimacy.  The local 
government legitimacy paradigm is not a constant and has changed from New Public Management 
(NPM), with its expectations of competition and a private sector ethos, towards a new paradigm of 
New Public Governance (NPG).  This thesis questions the approach to benchmarking as a tool for 
performance improvement, and the factors driving the way in which it is delivered in the public 
sector.   
Literature about performance measurement in the public sector is reviewed together with historical 
analysis on the theory of benchmarking.  The research is informed by Neo-institutional theory as a 
framework for studying organisational change.  The concept of legitimacy is probed on the 
conforming elements of compliance and convergence of structures, cultures, and strategies.   
The research questions are investigated using an exploratory case study employing 19 semi 
structured interviews with council officers, supported by documentary evidence, in a purposive 
sample of 18 district councils in England.  The research took place during the administration of the 
Coalition government (2010-2015).  The aim of the research being to provide a rich analysis of the 
methods used and the influences of coercive, mimetic, and normative forces on benchmarking 
practice.   
The thesis details the public sector environment and ascertains the detailed factors which constitute 
the isomorphic pressures on the councils.  The research finds that metrics benchmarking, as a tool 
of efficiency, relates to directly provided services during the legitimacy paradigm of NPM, but 
observes that the coercive pressures of that time have sedimented into the current organisational 
culture.  The case study shows that isomorphic forces are present, but their influence is mitigated 
by benchmarking and organisational cultures, and the pressures to comply with coercive and 
normative forces is stronger than for mimetic forces.  Evidence shows that councils are not 
converging in their structures and their benchmarking practices show some regional variations. 
The study is exploratory and further research could be undertaken into the ways the wider public 
sector undertakes the measurement and assessment of performance improvement and how it 
manages the delivery of legitimacy under the new NPG paradigm. 
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1  
1 Background to the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
This section introduces the study and outlines why this research is valuable both 
as contribution to theory and to practice.  The context, timeliness and geographical 
location of the study is defined, and a review of current literature is provided.  The 
research methodology is detailed and justified, and the structure of the dissertation 
is given.   
1.2 Research Context 
The context of this research is contemporary local government in England.  As in 
most western countries, English local government provides a range of services 
categorised by Wilson and Game as ‘Need’ services (e.g. education, personal social 
services, housing benefit); ‘Protective’ services (e.g. community safety, emergency 
planning); ‘Amenity’ services (e.g. highways, street cleansing, planning, refuse 
disposal); and ‘Facility’ services (e.g. housing, libraries, refuse collection, 
recreation) ( 2011, p. 132).  Appendix A(i) provides a schedule of types of local 
authority and the services for which they are responsible.  Outside of the 
metropolitan areas, i.e. mainly rural areas of England, municipal services are 
delivered in a two-tier system of County and District councils and this research 
specifically focusses on the district or second tier level.  District councils are 
democratically elected bodies delivering a range of statutory and discretionary 
services such as planning, refuse collection, housing and leisure and they are the 
level of public administration that is nearest to citizens (Economic and Social 
Research Council and Forum of Federations, 2013).  This tier is of research interest 
because the timing of the reductions in government grant funding following the 
2010 Spending Review had an earlier impact on that tier of local government 
(Appendix A(ii); (National Audit Office, 2014)).   
This research examines the approach to benchmarking, which has been defined for 
public sector practitioners as “a process of measuring your service’s processes and 
performance and systematically comparing them to the performance of others in 
order to seek best practice” (Foot, 1998), during the period 2010 to 2015 when 
central government was a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition.  Primary 
research was undertaken to explore the current approach to benchmarking and 
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2  
whether the approach taken by district councils to use benchmarking as a tool to 
improve performance could be explained by Neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).   
The researcher's personal motivation to undertake this study is based on a career 
in local government, most recently at a high performing district with a nationally 
recognized record of innovation, combined with previous study of benchmarking 
in procurement.  It was observed that some councils are making changes to their 
practices and structures, for example sharing services or sharing senior 
management, but these changes are not common to all.  Some councils have 
outsourced services but other, similar sized, councils have not; some are making 
small changes whereas others are adopting new initiatives more quickly and to a 
much deeper level; there is no apparent homogeneity of approach whereas external 
factors would suggest that adoption of practices that had delivered improvements 
elsewhere would be beneficial.  The rate and scale of adoption of innovative 
practices was inconsistent, even in a sector which has proved adept and resourceful 
in adapting to previous exogenous changes.   
A requirement for councils to compare their performance with others ‘for example 
through benchmarking clubs’ (DETR, 1998, p. Part 3 S. 7.20) was initiated as part 
of the Best Value regime (Local Government Act, 1999) introduced by the Labour 
Government following the 1997 General Election.  As local authorities had been 
compelled to undertake benchmarking in the late 1990’s as a central government 
requirement this prompted an interest in exploring whether councils were 
continuing to undertake that activity and, if so, in what way did current practice 
differ – if at all – from the previous mandatory regime, and, further, how the 
consequences of that regime were impacting on current practice.  Further, to 
determine if benchmarking was currently adopted as a technique and to examine 
whether or not it was used in aspiration to deliver 'best in class' services and 
structures, or whether the tool was now seen as a performance 'fad promulgated by 
consultants' (Watts and Mead, 2005, p. 15) that had faded from popularity.   
The research is timely because, until 2010 and the start of the coalition 
government, the main focus on performance measurement in district councils came 
from the Audit Commission, a body funded by central government that was 
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responsible for the collection of a national dataset (National Indicator Set NIS) – 
a set of performance indicators from every council.  The coalition government in 
2010 disbanded the Audit Commission and, from 2012, transferred responsibility 
for auditing to private sector auditors.  Research will address the extent to which 
this change in performance measurement has impacted on drivers for performance 
improvement. 
The Localism Act gained Royal Assent in 2012 and gave new powers to local 
authorities e.g. Community Right to take over local authority services (Community 
Right to Challenge), social housing tenure reform, and greater power for 
neighbourhoods to control planning matters (Plain English Guide to the Localism 
Act  (DCLG, 2011)).  In addition, local authorities were granted a general power 
of competence to 'do anything – provided they do not break other laws' (DCLG, 
2011, p. 4).  The stated aim of the legislation is to give 'councils more freedom to 
work together with others to drive down costs' and 'to do creative innovative things 
to meet local people's needs' (DCLG, 2011, p. 4).  Under Localism, the 
performance regime changed to a model where the development of benchmarking 
and target and standard setting were the responsibility of the sector as opposed to 
central government, though government ministers retained the power to intervene 
(Hughes, 2012). 
Local Government in England continues to come under fiscal and political 
pressures.  Central government funding is reducing (see Appendix A(ii)) but 
pressures to maintain services at a high level are increasing (Ashworth et al., 
2013).  Although they share the current turbulent fiscal environment and have 
different political make up, district councils have significant freedoms over the 
way their services are delivered.  Against this background any tool or business 
practice that would enable services to be delivered at less cost or, perhaps, better 
services for the same inputs would appear to be worthy of attention.  The sector is 
facing increasing pressures to deliver 'more with less' as it faces diminishing 
government funding and increasing expectations to increase performance (Dalton, 
2016).  The performance regime has changed but the allegation that the regime of 
'locally imposed targets, central reporting, Government office monitoring and 
external inspection has now largely been dismantled' (Carolyn Downs in 
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Economic and Social Research Council and Forum of Federations, 2012, p. 5) will 
be examined to see the extent to which that statement is perceived as true within 
the sector. 
1.3 Outline of Study 
The thesis commences with an outline of the research problem and specific 
research goals and then examines the current literature and exposes the gap in 
research in a specific branch of the public sector.  Historical links to performance 
measurement regimes in the public sector are examined as a means of linking 
current attitudes towards performance improvement.  The chosen research method 
is outlined and justified, together with the specific methods used to gain evidence.  
The practical issues involved in gathering data are explained together with the 
ethical issues that were addressed and the difficulties that were encountered and 
resolved during the research.  The findings from the empirical research are 
examined at the level of organisational culture found at the research locations, and 
the examination of benchmarking practices through the lens of Neo-institutional 
theory.  The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which current 
approaches to benchmarking can be said to converge or show compliance and are 
thus explained by neo-institutional theory.  Finally, the findings are examined for 
practical application for future performance improvement within the public sector. 
1.4 Contribution to Knowledge and Practice 
The research brings a unique contribution to knowledge because it builds on 
existing knowledge into both benchmarking (Bowerman, Ball and Francis, 2001; 
van Helden, 2005; Tillema, 2007) the convergence and compliance discussion 
from Neo-institutional theory (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007) and, also, 
the concept of sedimentation of isomorphic pressures (Cooper et al., 1996).  It will 
explore in depth, using an interpretive perspective, how the technique of 
benchmarking is undertaken and how the practice has evolved and become 
embedded within the organisational culture of district councils.  Further it will 
examine the approach to benchmarking in the light of conformity to the changing 
legitimacy paradigm in public administration.  The research will probe the drivers 
behind the use of benchmarking and attitudes towards performance improvement 
against a background of organisational change. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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From a practitioner perspective the research is valuable because it will give a better 
understanding of the perceptions of the value of benchmarking as a technique 
which would guide benchmarking initiatives towards greater efficacy.  The in-
depth comparison of methods and attitudes will form a useful benchmark of the 
way other councils approach this activity.  The effectiveness of wider sector-led 
initiatives on performance improvement will be studied for their perceived value 
in delivering better efficiency, effectiveness, or legitimacy.  Where any barriers to 
benchmarking are exposed the reasons are examined to identify ways of removing 
such barriers and releasing potential to use the tool for performance improvement.   
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The structure of the dissertation starts with a review of the literature which covers 
two distinct theoretical areas.  The literature has been reviewed to ascertain how 
benchmarking has been treated within the context of public sector performance 
improvement, and also evaluates how the published research demonstrates that the 
approaches to benchmarking and the motivation for using that technique for 
performance improvement could be explained by Neo-institutional theory.   
Chapter 2 begins with a review of the literature relating to performance 
measurement approaches and benchmarking in the public sector.  The chapter 
encompasses a review of public management and tracks the underlying themes or 
paradigms of delivery of public services from Public Administration, through New 
Public Management (NPM) towards the theoretical perspective of New Public 
Governance (NPG), (Osborne, 2006; Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013) or Public 
Governance (PG) (Hyndman et al., 2014) as a means of operating public sector 
management.   
The chapter explains the tool of benchmarking with its genesis in the private sector 
and its transfer to the public sector and consequent role in NPM.  Literature is 
examined for evidence of the sector specific understanding of the concept of 
Legitimacy and a review of the legislative changes that have contributed to the 
legitimacy themes in the public sector.   
Chapter 3 continues the review of the literature by exploring more specifically the 
reasons why organisations may be undertaking performance improvement 
measures.  Neo-institutional theory and the concept of mimetic, coercive and 
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normative isomorphic pressures are examined as a theoretical framework to 
explain the organisational behaviours that are taking place.  The chapter 
incorporates an assessment of the rationale for using Neo-institutional theory as a 
tool for investigation of these issues but also offers a critique of the theory as a 
suitable framework for this context.  The concepts of convergence and compliance 
are examined, within the local government environment, as requirements for 
legitimacy.  The concept of Legitimacy and theories explaining how this is 
managed are covered in depth.  This is followed with an examination of research 
into the way that isomorphic pressures settle into the culture and practice or 
organisations in the process of sedimentation.  The response of organisations to 
organisational change pressures and the theory of unfreezing and freezing into new 
structures is also reviewed.  The chapter concludes with the conceptual framework 
and outline of questions that emerged from the review of literature. 
Chapter 4 presents the chosen methodology of an exploratory case study for this 
research and considers the alternative research methods that were assessed for their 
appropriateness but rejected in favour of the case study.  The case study 
methodology is justified as the appropriate method for this research and 
explanations are provided to reinforce why that method was chosen in preference 
to other design pathways.  The potential risks and limitations of the methodology 
are discussed, and reference is made to the de-limits of the work.  The scale and 
application of the study is outlined, and the scope and coverage of the fieldwork is 
explained and justified.  The chapter explains in detail the method used and the 
ways in which assurance can be given of the external validity of this approach.  
The arrangements made to overcome the difficulties that were encountered in the 
fieldwork within English district councils are explained.  Finally, the method for 
data handling and analysis of the results of the fieldwork are detailed. 
Chapter 5 provides the findings of the study and how these answer the research 
questions.  These have been analysed within a framework of isomorphic pressures.  
The chapter sets the scene for the research with an in-depth analysis of context of 
the fieldwork covering the political environment, the role of elected members and 
the perceptions of customers in these public sector organisations.  There is an 
assessment of differentiation between public and private sector organisations.  The 
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financial setting of the organisations is also highlighted.  The findings initially 
show how benchmarking is undertaken in the districts then further sub analyses 
the constituent elements of the current exogenous isomorphic pressures as 
observed in the fieldwork at the sampled organisations, as seen through the lens of 
Neo-institutional theory.  Following forensic examination of the factors making up 
the isomorphic pressures, the chapter gives an assessment of how these pressures 
were impacting on the organisations, provides examples of their responses to them 
and an assessment of the extent to which councils are undertaking benchmarking 
to display legitimacy.   
Chapter 6 examines how the previous organisational responses to isomorphic 
pressures have sedimented into the culture of the organizations and more 
specifically into their benchmarking culture and the impact these have on the way 
benchmarking is currently carried out.  This provides an analysis of how the 
process of sedimentation of the isomorphic pressures has occurred and how this 
affects performance measurement and organisational change. 
Chapter 7 discusses the research findings and provides the facts on how this study 
has contributed to theoretical knowledge and to current professional practice.  This 
final chapter also reflects on the limitations and weaknesses found in the study and 
makes recommendations for further research. 
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2 Historical Context to Performance Improvement in the Public 
Sector 
2.1 Introduction 
Local government was an early adopter of the technique of benchmarking, but its 
approaches have been affected by governmental pressures and been presented as 
comparisons of metrics, specifically in the field of management accounting, or 
delivering indicators for obligatory comparisons that have not achieved 
performance improvement (Bowerman, Ball and Francis, 2001; McNair and Watts, 
2006).  This chapter provides a review of literature from published sources on 
performance management within local government starting with an explanation of 
the underlying themes or paradigms found in the public sector and moves on to 
expand on the use made of benchmarks and the practise of benchmarking for best 
practice to improve performance.  The concept of benchmarking is examined both 
in the private sector and its manifestations in the public sector.  The chapter traces 
the influences on benchmarking from the early adoption as a tool of performance 
improvement; traverses the regime of New Public Management and the variety of 
externally imposed coercive assessment routines that have shaped modern day 
perceptions of the tool of benchmarking.   
This section also examines the historical underpinning of benchmarking in the 
broader public sector and goes on to develop the issues that may explain how the 
contemporary approach to benchmarking is viewed and which led to the 
conclusions that local authorities have not made the transition from indicator 
benchmarking to ideas benchmarking (Tillema, 2010), nor developed comparison 
with structures and processes with other administration in the British Isles (Downe 
et al., 2010), and that local authorities are an outlier when it comes to 
benchmarking (Economic and Social Research Council and Forum of Federations, 
2013; Grace and Fenna, 2013).   
Statutory requirements to produce a comprehensive set of Performance Indicators 
(BVPI) were imposed on local government as key element part of the Best Value 
regime (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007) but these are no longer required 
in that format, however a new regulatory framework exists from the current audit 
regime which requires evidence of value for money and financial resilience. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
9  
2.2 The Public Administration Themes 
The nature of legitimate behaviour in public administration has evolved over time.  
Osborne (2006) suggests a time-line from the late Nineteenth Century to the late 
1970s when the dominant mode for the public sector was based on Public 
Administration which had theoretical roots in political science and public policy 
and where the key features were values based on the public sector ethos, with an 
emphasis on policy implementation.  This paradigm shifted in late 1970s to 1980s 
with the move to the New Public Management (NPM) model.  The new paradigm, 
codified by Hood (1991), introduced the management techniques such as 
competition, that had previously been associated with the private sector and with 
them an inherent assumption that the private sector management methods were 
superior to those traditionally used in the Public Administration model (Osborne 
and Brown, 2011).  The doctrines required under NPM were introduced because 
of a perceived lack of customer orientedness of public policy.  Government 
bureaucracies were not seen to be adopting innovative behaviour in adopting 
managerial techniques (Verhoest, Verschuere and Bouckaert, 2007).  NPM brought 
in the concepts of disaggregation of public services to their basic units and a focus 
on cost management and a regime described as 'management by numbers' (Hood, 
2012).  Hyndman et al (2014) writing in a context of accounting reforms in central 
governments, noted that NPM stressed the need for accruals accounting, (which 
had been adopted by the local government sector many years earlier (Jones, 1985), 
as well as output and performance oriented systems.   
Under NPM the public sector was expected to embrace markets, competition and 
contracts, and this new paradigm worked on the value base of 'Efficacy of 
competition and the market place' (Osborne, 2010, p. 383).  Advocates of NPM 
expected that the new requirements would transform bureaucrats into managers 
and this would result in better management (Hyndman et al., 2014).  NPM was 
intended to 'embed private sector practices within a public sector context so as to 
make the organisations more customer focussed' (Brunetto and Farr-Wharton, 
2008, p. Abstract) (they continue by suggesting that their findings found that 
practice was contrary to that aim), and implied 'that government organizations 
would perform better if they behave like private organisations that compete with 
rivals to meet consumer demands' (Walker et al., 2011, p. 707).  That phase of 
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NPM with the focus on market orientation was transitory.  Increasingly the 
achievements and legacy of the NPM reforms is being questioned 'in terms of 
outcomes, and there is an ongoing movement away from the implicit requirements 
of NPM at the turn of the 21st century towards the new theory of New Public 
Governance (NPG) (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013) but also referred to as Post-
NPM (Christensen, 2012), or Public Governance (PG) (Hyndman et al., 2014). 
Walker et al (2011) noted that the market orientated reforms of NPM have been 
adopted and institutionalized in the public sector, and, similarly, Ashworth et al 
(2013) have identified that the sedimentation of previous pressures have led to 'a 
hybrid model of public service governance where forms of bureaucracy, market 
and network operate simultaneously' (2013, p. S12) which is described as Public 
Governance (Hyndman et al., 2014).  Osborne, however, presents an alternative 
view and posits that the traditional models of PA and NPM are 'failures' and not 
able to 'capture the complex reality of the design and delivery of management of 
public services in the 21st century' (Osborne, 2009, p. 5).  Lapsley criticises the 
NPM more strongly saying that 'in terms of outcomes, the failure, generally of 
NPM, makes it a cruel disappointment' (Lapsley, 2009, p. 2).  Lapsley is 
particularly critical of the costs of the oversight regime of NPM in local 
government.  
NPG is considered to answer the needs of a more diverse society and 
acknowledges the increasing complexity of public sector objectives.  The Local 
Government Act 2000 introduced a new ethical framework for Local Government 
with new obligations regarding the conduct of elected members, obligations 
regarding declarations of members interests and a requirement to appoint a 
Monitoring Officer to oversee standards (Cowell, Downe and Morgan, 2011).  The 
cultural implications of this change to the introduction of new themes such as 
public consultation, citizen engagement, learning and partnership; co-operative 
networks (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002).  Consultation is now taking place on a 
revision to that legislation relating to ethics (Committee on Standards in Public 
Life, 2018).  Other writers have added the requirement for a new focus on service 
effectiveness and outcomes and inter-organisational relationships (Osborne, 
2006), and a 'more value based management using ethical guidelines and a greater 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11  
employee commitment to the public cause' (Christensen, 2012, p. 647).  However, 
Hyndman et al (2014) present a different slant by suggesting that the new 
requirements of NPG do not replace the previous discourses but 'supplement rather 
than supplant them' (Hyndman et al., 2014, p. 388) and this concept of 
sedimentation of management ideologies will be addressed in a later chapter. 
Understanding the historical background to performance measurement and 
assessment is important in viewing how the approach to benchmarking has been 
shaped by imposed regimes. 
2.3 Development of Performance Management within English Local 
Government 
Within the public sector, Callanan (2010) explains that performance measurement 
has three aims: 
• to inform service users and citizens about the service(s) provided by 
democratically elected bodies; 
• to provide politicians and management with information to inform strategy 
and decision making; 
• to satisfy needs of external regulatory bodies e.g. central government who 
wish to monitor performance. 
However, these aims suggest that the public sector is not measuring performance 
with the explicit aims of improving that performance, but rather to both inform 
internal and external decision makers and to satisfy regulators.  This latter view 
suggests there is ambiguity in the drivers for performance measurement and 
questions whether organisations are undertaking the performance regimes 
motivated by a desire improve performance or solely to conform with norms 
promoted by the state as a means of presenting their legitimacy (Ashworth, Boyne 
and Delbridge, 2007).  However, they were basing their conclusions on local 
government activity under the Best Value and they may no longer apply as the 
performance regime has changed.  The issue of performance is also increasingly 
complex from the perspective of delivery because local authorities are now 
delivering services through other providers rather than direct provision (Walker 
and Boyne, 2009) meaning that service users such as tax payers will be judging 
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the local authority on services provided by other agents. 
2.3.1 Development of comparative performance techniques in the Public Sector 
Comparison of performance information is not a new activity in the public sector.  
The Treasury used comparative data from the Ministry of Education as a 
benchmark for the schools building programme in the 1950's (Cutler, 2013).  The 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) was co-ordinating 
comparative statistics for the public sector in the 1970's and thus pre-dates 
comparisons driven by New Public Management and the centralised collection of 
performance metrics under the auspices of the Audit Commission.  Groups of 
financial professionals in geographical areas would collate metrics for their area 
for comparative purposes in informal benchmarking networks and clubs (Audit 
Commission, 1995; Bowerman, Ball and Francis, 2001).  Benchmarking, with its 
roots in management accounting (Siverbo, 2014), was described as a re-branding 
of old techniques and giving a modern name to well established local authority 
practices (Bowerman, Ball and Francis, 2001).  However, the early comparative 
work and informal clubs were voluntary within the sector and not introduced as a 
tool of central government assessment until the Best Value initiative.   
2.3.2 Central Government Assessment 
External examination of local authority performance (Callanan, 2010) began in the 
1970s with the Value for Money regime which encompassed the three E's 
(Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness), through Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering [for services such as refuse collection] (CCT) (1980s) and Best Value 
reviews (1990s).  The concept of Best Value was included in the Local Government 
Act 1999 (s.3.1) (Grubnic and Woods, 2009) as a duty 'to make arrangements to 
secure continuous improvement in a way in which its functions are exercised 
having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (Local 
Government Act, 1999, p. s.3 (1)).  The Best Value initiative expected that the 
regime would lead to changes in structure, culture and the processes and content 
of strategies and was a major driver in the plans for modernisation of local 
government (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007).  Local councils were 
expected to shift away from traditional rigid structures and become less 
bureaucratic, more decentralised and move to flexible structures that were more 
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responsive to citizens' demands (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2005) whilst at 
the same time improving relations between managers and staff (Ashworth, Boyne 
and Delbridge, 2007).  Relations between central and local government at that time 
were tense, with perceptions that central government did not trust local 
government and was imposing ‘top-down’ bureaucratic control and councils were 
seen as resisting reforms where they conflicted with local priorities (Döring, 
Downe and Martin, 2015).   
Central government assessment of local government performance continued until 
2010 when the Tory Lib-Dem coalition ended the external regime.   
2.3.3 Sector Led Performance Initiative 
In 2011 the Local Government Association (LGA) launched their sector led 
performance and improvement offer, the Corporate Peer Challenge (CPC).  This 
scheme followed consultation within the sector to set up a form of self-regulation 
and improve upon some of the weaknesses seen in the previous centrally imposed 
regimes (Local Government Association, 2011).  Although the requirements of the 
CPA were not popular, the ready adoption of this CPC initiative suggests that 
practices have become embedded in the culture of local government (Döring, 
Downe and Martin, 2015).  Under the initiative, a team of peers from local 
government (officers and elected members), and in some cases someone from the 
private or voluntary sector, facilitated by the LGA, would visit a council and give 
feedback on their current situation and make recommendations for further 
development.  The aim of the initiative is to focus on the future, and was designed 
to meet a need from councils for assurance about their plans in the absence of other 
external checks (Downe, Martin and Döring, 2014).  The aim of the CPC team is 
to act as ‘critical friends’ to the council.  Reports are not graded or scored, and do 
not assess comparative performance but focus on more strategic issues such as 
leadership and corporate capacity.  Comparative performance assessment is 
considered to be particularly important where there is a 'vertical fiscal imbalance' 
i.e. where those governments or other agencies such as business, are not directly 
aligned with the citizens or other recipients of those services (Grace, 2013). 
The CPC is continuing with a greater focus on leadership of Place, and financial 
sustainability; a Finance Peer review, described as a Financial Health check, was 
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introduced in 2014.  The challenges, which are highly regarded within the sector, 
are optional, but a review of the scheme undertaken on behalf of the LGA in 2017 
recommended that every council should have a CPC (or a Finance Peer Review) 
every four or five years (Downe, Bottrill and Martin, 2017).  Although the CPC is 
said to be valued it is significant that some councils still have not had a challenge 
visit (Local Government Association, 2018) and the reasons for this are unclear.  It 
would be worth further research into understanding whether the lack of take up is 
based on active decisions and whether these are driven by Members or by Officers,  
Similarly, further research would be useful from an institutional perspective, to 
determine whether councils regard the Peer Reviews are undertaken because they 
are the expected norm for the sector, or whether the recipients inherently value 
them and want to participate in the Challenges. 
In the wider context of sector led improvement, a survey for the LGA (BMG 
Research, 2018), showed there were significant differences in attitudes towards 
sector led improvement being the correct approach in the current context, with 
Chief Executives (88%) in agreement, but only 66% for Chairs of Scrutiny 
suggesting that further research into the reasons underlying these differences could 
be worthwhile.   
2.4 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking as a tool for performance improvement has its roots in the 
manufacturing sector (Francis and Holloway, 2007) and the definition provided by 
Camp describing work at Xerox was 'a continuous process of measuring our 
products, services and practices against those of our toughest competitors or 
companies renowned as leaders' (Camp, 1993 p. 24).  Camp (1993) identified four 
major types of benchmarking: internal, functional, generic and competitive.  He 
described the features of these four distinct types in the following way: 
• internal, meaning within the organisation where different departments 
compare their similar practices to bring standards up to those of the best; 
• functional, where an organisation compares their processes against other 
organisations doing similar tasks or functions; 
• generic, where the whole processes of the organisation are compared to 
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those in unrelated industries; 
• competitive, where practices and methods are compared with those of 
direct competitors. 
Watts and Mead (2005) offer a similar taxonomy: 
• internal – focussing on the elimination of activities that do not add value 
for the customer; 
• direct competition – identifying the strengths of the competition and using 
that to plan future strategies; 
• industry – developing the competitive advantage by comparing with 
organisations that show best practice; 
• best in class – using businesses in different sectors by separating the 
business from the product. 
The direct competitive type of benchmarking has been considered as more 
applicable to the commercial sector where organisations note the weaknesses of 
competitors to enable them to build their competitive strategies; industry 
benchmarking where organisations would be looking for trends and aiming to 
improve against industries producing similar products or providing similar 
services, and finally the 'best-in-class' where an organisation will benchmark 
against a similar product from a separate part of the industry (McNair and Watts, 
2006).  McNair and Watts (2006) compare the progression of these four steps of 
benchmarking to a journey from simple functional benchmarking to a strategic 
focus on achieving world class status.  Significantly, these writers, though not 
specifically focussing on the public sector, have used an institutional theory in 
analysing the drivers and motivations for organisations to undertake benchmarking 
and this model will be used as a framework for understanding benchmarking in 
district councils. 
2.5 Benchmarking in the Public Sector 
The technique of benchmarking transferred to the 'white collar' parts of the service 
sector and it became a popular management tool, with Zairi and Al-Mashari (2005) 
noting that it was in use in Health services, Education and government.  
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Internationally it has been used as an improvement tool for schools in the USA 
(Schober, 2013); children’s services in Canada (Thomson, 2013), and in Australia 
(Fenna, 2013).   
There are two approaches or drivers that have encouraged or exerted pressure on 
the public sector to undertake benchmarking exercises to assess their comparative 
performance or improve their practices, processes and structures,  Firstly, an 
approach at a micro level as learning aimed at improvement described as ‘bottom-
up’ benchmarking which Marques and de Witte (2010) call 'bottom up 
benchmarking'.  The second, or macro, approach, is defined as ‘top-down’ 
benchmarking, and comes from controlling or regulatory bodies who define and is 
imposed as a means of hierarchical control. 
Karkatsoulis (2000) suggested that benchmarking stands a better chance of 
succeeding in public administration in 'Anglo Saxon countries where there is a 
stronger tradition of competition and where the state is more subsidiary in 
character' (Karkatsoulis, 2000, p. 468).  The potential for generalising his 
statement to English councils is rather limited as the tradition of formal 
benchmarking only started in the UK following the end of the CCT requirements 
of the 1980’s. 
 Camp's taxonomy of benchmarking has been suggested for the public sector as: 
• internal – internal comparisons 
• functional – with other councils 
• generic – similar processes regardless of industry or sector 
• comparisons with competitors 
Source: Association for Public Service Excellence (APSE) (Hughes, 2012) 
Within the UK various public sector organisations and professional groups have 
organised benchmarking and benchmarking clubs e.g. CIPFA, the Planning 
Advisory Service (PAS), Housemark for social housing, Society for IT Managers 
(SOCITM) for IT services (Hughes, 2012).  However, the motivation for 
benchmarking in the public sector is different from that in the private sector 
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because, generally, the competitive dimension is missing (Kouzmin et al., 1999), 
even though NPM encouraged local authorities to act in a competitive way.   
Boyne (2002) noted that critics of NPM felt that the differences between public 
and private organisations were so great that business practices should not be 
transferred to the public sector.  Under the theme of Public Governance Hughes 
(2012) suggests that the focus of benchmarking should be changing away from the 
cost comparisons towards a greater focus on the demands and requirements of 
citizens which seems at variance with the requirements of austerity when extra 
effort would be expected on economy of inputs and efficiency of outputs, however 
he stresses that benchmarking has to cover ‘outcomes, policies and objectives’ as 
well (2012, p. 7).  In a series of papers for the Forum of Federations Grace et al 
advise that public sector benchmarking should be an active tool that not only 
compares services to others, or one's own sector over time but should be ‘coupled 
with the intention to learn and improve’ (Grace, 2013, p. 7), suggesting that in the 
post NPM era the motivation to benchmark should shift from the extrinsic imposed 
narrow model of responding to indicator requests, to an intrinsic desire to improve . 
Within the public sector it might be expected that, with an absence of direct 
competition, sharing and transparency of performance information would be 
simplistic, however the propensity of local authorities to divulge information that 
enabled comparisons is questioned by Bovaird and Davis (1999) who, in the 
context of strategic benchmarking, noted that some authorities were unwilling to 
share more sensitive information and they advanced the concept of an 'information 
exchange', where an authority wishes to have access to certain more sensitive 
information, it should be required to deposit an amount of its own information in 
exchange.  In their research (Bowerman and Ball, 2000a) observed the political 
risks that followed benchmarking where their interviewees feared that Members 
and senior staff would use the results of benchmarking exercises to cut costs or use 
the results in staff appraisals. 
Bowerman et al (2001) suggest that the underlying driver from central government 
was to compare local authority performance with that of alternative providers, but 
the Labour Government in the early 21st century, 'New Labour', was overt in 
encouraging benchmarking to improve services.  Bowerman and Ball (2000a) 
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describe the aim of benchmarking from the local authority perspective to 'provide 
reassurance that things are being done well and promoting a feel good factor', 
which suggests a fundamental difference in ideology between local and central 
government.  Despite their suggestions that benchmarking was just done for 
‘reassurance,’ local government performance under the Best Value regime did 
improve, though there was criticism of the costs involved in driving that 
improvement (Bovaird, 2000). 
2.5.1 Barriers and Risks to Benchmarking Effectiveness 
Explanations given to explain why benchmarking has been slow in the public 
sector have included difficulties in finding other benchmarking partners 
(Longbottom, 2000), and staff resistance and confidentiality (Hinton, Francis and 
Holloway, 2000).  Historically, the drivers for benchmarking in the public sector 
have been influenced by the requirements for CCT and the results of defensive 
actions to the Best Value and CPA regimes (Dunne, 2016).  This legacy of using 
mechanisms based on government collected data or measures focussed on an old 
Audit Commission regime that is no longer relevant for the demands of their 
citizens suggests that the sector is not using comparative arrangements that are 
sufficiently active and high frequency to suit the demands of the modern local 
government paradigm, as Hughes explains 'little use proving you have the best 
apples if citizens need oranges' (Hughes, 2012, p. 5).  In his statement, Hughes 
captures the disparity between delivery of performance that meets the first two of 
the VFM ‘3Es, efficiency and effectiveness, but fails to meet effectiveness or 
equity in citizen focussed objectives.  The suggestion from Hughes could also be 
interpreted as applying to a measurement only of the current position and is not 
sufficiently forward facing as a technique. 
2.5.2 Moving towards the average 
A further criticism of benchmarking in the public sector is that instead of building 
on performance to become 'best in class' there is a tendency to converge towards 
the means of national performance bands' (Davis, 1998, p. 264) or 'cluster around 
the mean' (Francis and Holloway, 2007, p. 183), and looking at reasons for 
[comparative] discrepancies in performance rather than improving performance 
(Bukh and Kjaergaard, 2009).  In the health care sector, it is questioned whether 
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government set targets, are motivating organisations to improve, or having the 
unintended consequence of organisations aspiring to the 'average' performance 
(Northcott and Llewellyn, 2005).  Referring to research into the local authority 
administration of UK elections, James (2013) found that election officials noted 
that the standards ‘encouraged them to drop their performance to being at the 
standard’ (James, 2013, p. 51).  Bowerman and Ball also observed the local 
authorities in their study were only 'doing what was achievable, rather than what 
is ideal' (Bowerman and Ball, 2000a, p. 36).  Their research did not pursue the 
reasons why local authorities stopped at the ‘achievable’ and were not motivated 
to apply more effort to get to ‘best in class’.  Further deterrents to benchmarking 
are the demoralising effect of seeing a large and unbridgeable performance gap 
between the organisation and 'best - in - class' and, for that reason, organisations 
could be better comparing with 2nd or 3rd best (Fedor, Parsons and Shalley, 1996). 
Contrary to expectations from a mechanism aimed at improving performance, 
evidence from Sweden suggested that the weaker performers blamed flaws in the 
mechanism, and excellent performers 'used results to reduce performance' 
(Knutsson, Ramberg and Tagesson, 2012, p. abstract).  Knuttson et al subsequently 
refers to the risk that, paradoxically, benchmarking may create a norm of 
performance 'thus levelling performance rather than enhancing it' (2012, p. 28).  In 
a similar observation, it has been argued that 'benchmarking only allows 
organizations to catch up with the leader, not to leap-frog them' (Cox and 
Thompson, 1998, p. 11).  Seddon puts the case more strongly saying 
'Benchmarking is the fastest way to mediocrity' (Seddon, 2012, p. 29).  Despite 
these apparent demerits, central government continued with benchmarking for 
improvement as a recommendation under the CPA regime. 
2.5.3 Importing the private sector model 
Research has warned against a simple import of the private sector benchmarking 
model into the public sector because the relationship with customers in the public 
sector differs from that in the private sector, as for most, but not all, services, local 
authorities are not in direct competition with each other for customers (Marques 
and De Witte, 2010) (though there is a contrary view that local authorities might 
want to attract in more businesses (Villadsen, 2011)), simply because the public 
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sector works differently from the private sector (Bukh and Kjaergaard, 2009).  
However, this latter study covered utility undertakings, which are the 
responsibility of local government in some countries in Scandinavia and northern 
Europe, and does not fully identify the reasons that might justify a different model 
of benchmarking for the UK public sector.  
In Camp's examples (Camp, 1998), benchmarking took place with organisations 
from other sectors, but there is little evidence of this in the public sector.  
Bowerman and Ball (2000a) noted that most initiatives to benchmark were either 
internal or with similar authorities and they note that the local government practice 
of benchmarking was 'rather more modest in its scope than the industry best 
practices in Camp's definition' (Bowerman and Ball, 2000a, p. 36).  This view was 
supported by the article written by the Chief Executive of the Association for 
Public Excellence advocating the use of benchmarking but pointing to its value as: 
“...allow local authorities to test their service performance against 
other comparators within the sector.....  enables councils to share 
intelligence in order to learn from each other”  (O’Brien, 2013) 
[researchers emphasis] 
Likierman encouraged the use of benchmarking for service areas across industry 
boundaries advising  'And, if others in your sector won't exchange information, go 
outside – it's astonishing how many service functions in dissimilar industries have 
similar problems' (Likierman, 2006, p. 76).  Whilst Likierman acknowledges that 
the points are also applicable to the public sector it is a limitation of his work that 
he doesn’t explore that application in detail.  Considerations of commercial 
advantage inhibited the use of benchmarking in the public sector (Francis and 
Holloway, 2007) and this was particularly true in the era of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) as in an example given by Bowerman and Ball: the 
link to CCT mitigated against some external benchmarking with a competitor with 
one authority explaining 'For me to tell CSL [a potential competitor] what we do 
would be suicide' (Bowerman and Ball, 2000b, p. 24).  The work by Bowerman 
and Ball reinforces the point that CCT was based strictly on a criterion of cost and 
not quality measures.  Under that legislation the authority was obliged to contract 
the service to the lowest bidder.  Where the council put in the lowest bid they would 
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be awarded the contract.  Some writers have suggested that savings from in-house 
contracts did not arise from efficiency, an approach that might have suggested 
benchmarking, but from employees pay and conditions (Wilson and Game, 2011). 
2.5.4 Economic Risk to Benchmarking 
There is a risk to associated with benchmarking where it used to reduce costs and 
thus resources leaving organisations with no 'slack' that could be used to generate 
future innovations or provide organisational resilience (Kouzmin et al., 1999).  
This issue is reinforced by explaining that an organisation, following budget 
pressures, had large staff reductions but had 'few staff left to innovate, even when 
innovation was deemed essential' (Kouzmin et al., 1999, p. 311).  A similar 
phenomenon was observed in the Danish power industry where practitioners 
opined 'you could save yourself to death if they kept the cost level too low' (Bukh 
and Kjaergaard, 2009, p. 19).  These studies, however, suggest two issues that need 
to be addressed within English local government: the staff reductions and impact 
on innovation.  Firstly, the evidence confirms there have been staffing reductions 
as the staffing in local government has reduced by 21% from 2010-11 to 2016-17 
(National Audit Office, 2017), though this may not be fully explained by reduced 
numbers as some services that were previously in-house may have been outsourced 
and now count as service costs.  Further, there is no evidence to explain whether 
the reductions came from benchmarking or from any of the other market related 
performance improvement measures.  Secondly their report of the risk to 
innovation is not supported by the evidence from sector as seen in the case studies 
on innovation publicised by the LGA. 
2.5.5 Post Coalition Government 
The current nature of collaborative benchmarking includes benchmarking clubs 
organised by professional bodies such as CIPFA which has a range of membership 
clubs which have been running for a decade (Grace, 2012).  Evidence from 
Adebanjo and Mann (2008) covering Benchmarking clubs in New Zealand and the 
UK, however, showed that the networks tended not be sustainable over long 
periods due to changes in personnel within member organisations, and perceived 
cost compared to value received.  Although informal networks may not be 
sustainable in the long term the Association of Public Sector Excellence, and more 
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recently, the LGA have introduced benchmarking arrangements (LG Inform) 
which may resolve short-termism.  Grace (2012) comments that these groups offer 
'an approach emphasising professional front line leadership of service 
improvement' (Grace, 2012, p. 52) though he does not overtly address the 
perceptions of cost and value.  Studies based on the evidence from Best Value and 
CPA do not address the perceptions of cost and value of the sector led networks in 
the time of austerity, and it would be worthwhile investigating the opinions and 
perceived benefits of the LGA offer.  
2.6 Performance Assessment 
Performance measurement grew in the UK public sector during the 1990's with 
Government using it as a goad to efficiency and effectiveness (Bird et al., 2005), 
though other writers, possibly writing with the insight of a longer period of CPA 
experience, have pointed to the ineffectiveness of that compulsory initiative 
(Wilson and Game, 2011).  Public sector organisations that were not in competition 
with each other for customers were expected to collaborate (Nutt, 2000).  The 
nature of benchmarking during that decade became associated both with the 
'compete' element of the Best Value regime and a desire to defend the authority’s 
performance when compared to others, rather than using it to improve 
performance.  The Audit Commission had power to 'intervene' where a local 
authority was perceived as failing to meet its statutory obligations and this link 
between intervention and compulsory benchmarking did not encourage its 
voluntary use.  This led to a growth in performance measurement described as the 
emergence of a ‘performance measurement industry' (Johnsen, 2005, p. 9).  The 
inspection heavy approach to performance assessment and the cost of providing 
the required information was a major criticism of the central government Best 
Value initiative (Wilson and Game, 2011). 
In 1998 the Local Government Management Board proclaimed that 'benchmarking 
is the most frequently proposed method for [performance] comparisons' (Davis, 
1998, p. 260).  In that decade there were a number of benchmarking initiatives 
such as the Local Government Benchmarking Reference Centre; the Inter 
Authorities group and Core Cities Group (Davis, 1998) and benchmarking was 
undertaken widely in the public sector (Triantafillou, 2007).  Benchmarking was 
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more popular within some professional areas, particularly those that had been 
subject to Compulsory Competitive Tendering, Davis (1998) noted that in areas 
where professional membership was weak, such as economic development, 
benchmarking and other collaborative approaches were less likely to take place.  
At the end of the 20th century, before the spread of shared services, outsourced 
delivery models and other responses to financial austerity pressures, UK public 
sector organisations were more similar in structure and practices and this 
homogeneity meant that comparison of benchmarks was a good method of 
highlighting relative efficiency.  As Berg (2007) stated: 
“metric benchmarking quantifies the relative performance of 
organisations.......and identify performance gaps” (Berg, 2007, p. 2); 
though it should be noted that his research related to the public utilities which had 
a more homogeneous structure than the district councils under Localism. 
Collection of national local government performance indicators began within the 
advent of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment regime in 2002 (Grubnic 
and Woods, 2009).  This was the latest initiative from central government to 
improve the performance of local government following the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms (Hood, 1991), (though Hyndman et al (2014) note 
that instruments such as performance measurement were on the public sector 
agenda before NPM), has been described as a set of doctrines as a response to 
perceived lack of results and customer orientedness in the public organisations that 
delivered services to the public, and to force public sector managers to innovate 
by competing with private sector for operation of services (Verhoest, Verschuere 
and Bouckaert, 2007). 
Performance was shown to be an important factor in senior management turnover 
in local authorities (Boyne, et al., 2010; Boyne, et al., 2011).  Pollitt identified 
performance targets and standards as one of 'the six core features of NPM driven 
reforms' (Pollitt, 2000, p. 183) and continued that external inspection is a loss of 
faith, by politicians and public, in the traditional forms of bureaucratic and 
professional control.   
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2.6.1 Effectiveness of Performance targets in enhancing performance 
Performance targets have had a mixed effect on service improvement.  Whilst the 
early CPA rounds detected the poorest performance they did not have much effect 
in driving up performance from councils who were already performing well, and 
they were criticized for having a low degree of sensitivity towards the local context  
(Downe et al., 2010).  Despite the great activity on performance assessment, the 
overall satisfaction (from a citizen's perspective) fell by 11% between 2001 and 
2006 (DCLG, 2007).  By themselves, the CPA rounds and performance assessment 
mechanisms do not appear to have had the intended effect of driving up 
performance to the standard of the best, but the CPA did not take place in times of 
stasis and other factors were continuing to impact on the abilities of local 
authorities to improve their services such as; changing service needs; economically 
deprived populations; changing political and managerial leadership (Andrews, 
Boyne and Enticott, 2006).  Changing organisational structures also impacted on 
performance levels, and research by Andrews and Boyne suggested that structural 
change was likely to be associated with 'a dip in organizational performance' 
(Andrews and Boyne, 2012, p. 299).  Their research was undertaken at county 
councils, but it seems likely that similar performance changes would happen in 
other authority types, but further research would be required to test the time-scale 
and magnitude before the performance levels would be restored, and the extent to 
which organisations factor in the potential for performance loss when planning 
their organisational changes.  Political incentives for local authorities to improve 
their performance depended on the base line performance level.  Although 
performance assessment was a high priority for central government at the time of 
CPA, there is evidence that enhancing performance that was already good did not 
influence voters (James and John, 2006).  There was a negativity bias with an 
incentive for administrations that were performing badly to move to good 
performance but there was no electoral reward for high performance (Boyne et al., 
2009).  The lack of strong justification for using performance measurement, 
particularly externally imposed measurements implies that another force that 
might explain the adoption of performance indicators.  In 1993, prior to the 
imposition of central government selected performance indicators, research found 
that although there were pressures on local government to perform, the emphasis 
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was actually on enhancing accountability rather than driving change (Sanderson, 
2001).  This perverse effect of government imposed performance information is 
not limited to the UK; Mimba, Helden and Tillema (2013) observed that local 
governments in Indonesia were concentrating more on completing performance 
information reports and ensuring that deadlines were met, rather than actively 
using the information to improve performance.  Watts et al (2010) undertook 
research in Australia and argue that 'performance indicators were adopted as a 
symbolic gesture to satisfy the needs for externally conferred legitimacy' (Watts, 
McNair and Baard, 2010, p. 6).  It could be argued that under the Best Value 
initiative a council would have lost legitimacy if they failed to produce a statement 
of their performance indicators, it seems unlikely that the simple act of producing 
the numbers achieved much legitimacy gain. 
The overall effectiveness of any of the 'management by numbers' initiatives 
including targets and rankings is now being questioned (Hood, 2012).  The 
potential ineffectiveness of performance measurement can be summed up by a 
quotation, referring to the Best Value regime: 
“At the end of the day we say to councillors that we need to make 
presentations on these kind of things to keep the auditors happy.  
There is an audit compliance strategy rather than striving for 
excellence” (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008, p.38). 
NPM, which was the dominant discourse from the late 1980's to the early 2000's 
(Hyndman et al., 2014), was intended to reform public management and deliver a 
results-oriented approach focussing on performance indicators and performance 
management (Boyne and Walker, 2010) but was not without criticism; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2000) challenged the effectiveness of the approach, whilst Power 
(2010) refers pejoratively to 'the audit society’.  With the movement to NPG in the 
21st century it is suggested that a new type of performance information will be 
required; Bovaird and Loffler (2002) refer to this as a new generation of 
governance benchmarking (2002, p. 20). 
2.6.2 The Role of the Audit Commission 
The Audit Commission was established in 1983 (Local Government Finance Act 
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1982), and although Kouzmin et al (1999) suggested that it was difficult for public 
sector organisations to identify 'best in class', the Audit Commission attempted to 
do this when they developed the concepts of 'Best Value' and Beacon councils.  
The four features of Best Value were to compare, challenge, consult and compete, 
and it was this legislation that introduced benchmarking as an official 
recommendation to local government with a White Paper advising: 
 “Authorities will be expected to compare their performance with the 
best using national performance indicators and, for example through 
benchmarking clubs” (DETR, 1998) 
The Best Value regime had expectations on the type of organisational forms that 
authorities were expected to follow with the expectation that those structural 
changes would bring about improved performance.  Under the framework 
authorities were able to bid to become pilot sites and benchmarking was part of 
the bidding criteria.  The Audit Commission's endeavours to develop Performance 
Indicators were not without criticism (Bovaird and Davis, 1999), and a 
consequence of the audit driven regime was that benchmarking became associated 
with accountability and a blame culture rather than inspiring performance 
improvement (Bowerman and Ball, 2000b). 
CPA, operated through the Audit Commission, collected performance indicators 
from all councils in both absolute performance measures and an assessment of 
expected future performance ('direction of travel').  Councils were assessed in one 
of five categories (poor, weak, fair, good or excellent, but subsequently amended 
in 2005 to a star rating with 4* meaning excellent) (Grubnic and Woods, 2009).  
This rating of performance gave rise to comparative positions seen as league 
tables.  The assessment regime was criticized by Luton (2007) for a lack of 
objectivity particularly in the context of aggregation and weighting of index scores 
into an overall measure.  CPA was a very complex regime described as 
'unprecedented level of sophistication, complexity, formal structure and 
prescription' (Haubrich and McLean, 2006, p. 271) and was originally intended to 
provide high performing authorities with greater freedoms (greater autonomy and 
light touch inspections) but these did not materialise.  Chief Executives had, 
however, seen a positive benefit to the CPA regime because of the insight it gave: 
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“[Chief Officers]…..ask where they can share ideas and insight now 
they have lost the formal structures like the Audit Commission and 
CPA for reporting success, failure and improvements”  (Zurich 
Municipal, 2016, p. 3). 
CPA ceased in 2008 (Haubrich and McLean, 2006) and was replaced by the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) – a more subjective measure that 
compared public assessment of the municipal provision in their area on a three-
yearly basis.  CAA was abolished in 2010 by the newly elected coalition 
government (Hughes, 2012). 
2.6.3 Efficacy of Performance Indicators in accurately reflecting Performance 
The scale of collection of performance indicators (PIs) in the UK increased 
significantly during Best Value and CPA.  Governments have invested much time 
and money (quoted as £2.5 billion excluding the costs incurred by local authorities 
themselves (Haubrich and McLean, 2006, p. 272)) in collecting performance data 
with the expectation that it will improve performance (Moynihan and Pandey, 
2010). The cost of auditing local government was quoted as 2.1% of the 
expenditure audited (Haubrich and McLean, 2006), and, writing some decades 
earlier, Power ( 1994) warned of an ‘explosion of audits’.  The impact of the 
growth in performance measurement activities led to the suggestion that 'delivery 
of services is undermined by the time, effort and management expertise deployed 
to cope with ever more elaborate forms of NPM' (Carvalho et al., 2006, p. 166), 
and there is some scepticism about their accuracy in reflecting the true position of 
public sector performance and their usefulness in driving up performance.  The 
power and influence of [regulatory] audits was considered a threat that might 
'distort the behaviour of managers as they seek to be seen to discharge their duties' 
(Lapsley, 2008, p. 89).  Andrews et al, (2011) in researching performance measures 
concluded that many surveys were: 
“designed by public management researchers and therefore 
(implicitly or explicitly) reflect their values about what constitutes 
good or bad performance...and not the aspects of service that they 
[the managers] would prioritize” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker, 
2011, p. 4). 
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A further criticism of the regulatory regime came from Freer (2002) who 
questioned the doctrine of inspectoral infallibility pointing out the danger that the 
inspectors [of performance] may not necessarily be correct in their assessments.  It 
has also been suggested that there was a tendency to over report performance 
achievement (Andrews, Cowell and Downe, 2011). 
2.6.4 The impact of League Tables 
The efficacy of league tables and performance standards in inspiring organisations 
to improve is doubted, and research has found that they can actually conspire 
against the process of improvement and learning (Hinton, Francis and Holloway, 
2000; Northcott and Llewellyn, 2005; Haubrich and McLean, 2006; Tillema, 2007; 
Local Government Association, 2011).  However, their studies do not go into depth 
in determining the ideology behind the promotion of league tables and the 
implications they had for the governance and trust relationships between central 
and local government (Bevan and Wilson, 2013; Fenna, 2013).  The value of 
league tables can also be questioned on a practical level because knowing the 
organisations position in a league table does not explain how better performers 
gained their status or how to move up the table (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; 
Kouzmin et al., 1999; Northcott and Llewellyn, 2005; Francis and Holloway, 
2007).  Ball, Bowerman and Hawksworth (2000), identified the paradox that if 
league tables are intended to inspire better performance, the results of the league 
tables are not available until after the performance has been recorded.  The 
contradiction of comparative position in performance league tables is that relative 
positions cannot be exactly determined by performance activity because the 
organisation's position in the table is affected by the actions of others.  An example 
from the Danish power sector has 'if a company improves its cost structure, its 
ranking in the benchmarking is evidently influenced by the performance scores of 
other companies that might or might not attempt to minimize costs' (Bukh and 
Kjaergaard, 2009, p.20).  Their research captures a frustration arising from league 
tables as performance improvement mechanisms, and similarly, the reaction in UK 
local government was also negative in that league tables and quartile positions seen 
under CPA failed to help underperforming councils and discouraged collaborative 
working (Local Government Association, 2011). 
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Northcott and Llewellyn (2005) are also critical of the league tables imposed by 
regulatory bodies believing that they promote the activity of indicator 
benchmarking at the expense of ideas benchmarking and thus demote the potential 
of creativity.  In their research of the health sector they refer to the expectation 
from central government that league tables would inspire poorer performing 
organisations [Trusts] to 'raise their game' and improve their performance up to 
those of better performers, whereas the practical results tended to be hospital 
managers seeking to justify their positions on the league tables and emphasising 
the 'differences rather than the deficiencies' (2005, p. 426).  The concept of 'beacon 
hospitals' as paragons of exemplar practice, that were intended to serve as target 
performers for weaker organisations, only led to the 'Tall Poppy Syndrome' 
articulated in the NHS Modernisation Agency 2002 as ' if you stick your head up 
to say 'look what we are doing', people resent you for it and are keen to cut you 
down' (NHS Modernisation Agency quoted in Northcott and Llewellyn, 2005, p. 
428).  Nevertheless, the imposition of league tables and the star rating system 
under which the worst performing hospitals were ‘named and shamed’ was 
successful and, overall, hospital waiting times were reduced (Bevan and Wilson, 
2013).   
2.6.5 Dysfunctional Behaviour 
The key performance indicators (KPIs) regime has been criticised as leading to 
dysfunctional behaviours such as gaming (Wiggins and Tymms, 2002; Pollitt, 
2011; Sanger, 2013), because they give the opportunity to show the 'right' results 
without actually delivering any real improvement in performance (Grace et al., 
2013), and a mechanistic process or 'a paper chase, subject to manipulation and 
avoidance tactics and thereby discredited' (Sanderson, 2001, p. 311).  In a further 
example evidence from work undertaken on the introduction of standards in UK 
elections found that some officials admitted 'marking themselves low to begin with 
to show improvement' (James, 2013, p. 51).  In that standards initiative however, 
the overall result was considered to be an improvement in electoral arrangements 
and also an effective learning exercise. 
The efficacy of performance indicators in accurately assessing performance has 
been questioned by research showing that potential benefits might be offset by 
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dysfunctional behaviours and data manipulation (Lapsley and Mitchell, 1996; 
Pidd, 2005; de Bruijn and van Helden, 2006) and, Lapsley (2008) referring to 
experiences in the health sector.  Tillema expands on this practice explaining 
'organizations respond to stakeholders' expectations of improved performance by 
taking actions that improve their reported performance (i.e. benchmarking scores), 
but that leave their actual performance, at best, unchanged' (2010, p.71).  
Similarly, there is evidence that some authorities actively managed their responses 
to performance indicators by providing documents and evidence to satisfy the 
regulators and to get a high performance score 'without actually improving the 
quality of the underlying service' – described as 'procedural compliance' (Haubrich 
and McLean, 2006, p.277).  Their research provides a further example of a 
mismatch between the authors of performance indicators and the recipients in a 
practical example a performance indicator required the number of visits to the 
library – but the authorities aim was to increase the use of internet facilities.  The 
research continues with another example of perverse consequences of performance 
indicators for school attendance; a school might be more inclined to close on a 
snowy day – rather than declare poor attendance when the school was open.  Pidd 
(2005) expands on dysfunctionalities by referring to unintended consequences of 
publishing performance data in the public sector, including gaming, where 
managers under achieve on a first round to secure a lower target in subsequent 
rounds; and 'tunnel vision' where managers concentrate on the easiest targets and 
ignore the rest.  Furthermore, Lapsley held that 'performance measurement will 
continue to exhibit dysfunctional and contentious effects which will not be 
resolved in the foreseeable future' (Lapsley, 2008, p. 86).  However, more recent 
writings suggest to the contrary, with Kuhlmann and Jäkel (2013) proposing that a 
voluntary approach, rather than compulsory league tables, would prevent gaming 
strategies.  Quirk (2013) however, writing from the perspective of a practitioner, 
also noted the potential gaming effect and suggests that this should be countered 
by frequent changes to the approach to performance measurement and avoidance 
of an over reliance on quantitative measures. 
2.7 Conclusion 
There is ambiguity in the use of definitions of benchmarking within the public 
sector, and the term is used widely to cover both the comparison of benchmarks, 
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and best practice for improvement, leading Tillema to conclude that the link 
between benchmarking and public sector improvement is 'not straightforward' 
(Tillema, 2010, p.70).  A weakness in the public sector use of benchmarking is that 
it is focussed on the metrics (the benchmarks) rather than the processes (Ammons, 
Coe and Lombardo, 2001) and referred to as performance benchmarking rather 
than best practice benchmarking by Adebanjo and Mann (2008). 
Similarly, Hinton et al (2000) observed that a great deal of benchmarking in the 
UK was 'results' benchmarking and not 'process' benchmarking.  However, the 
work of Hinton was not specific to the public sector.  Lapsley refers to the 
difficulties that have been experienced with benchmarking in the public sector 
saying '[benchmarking] hinges crucially on comparing different organisations or 
parts of organisations, but genuine comparability can prove elusive' (Lapsley, 
2008, p.86).  This study will address the issues that district councils face in their 
search for comparability and the role of benchmarking in performance 
improvement. 
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3 Isomorphism and Legitimacy in the Public Sector 
3.1 Background to Neo-Institutional Theory 
This chapter provides a review of current literature from published sources on 
Bureaucracy and the theoretical construct of Neo-institutional theory and how 
research has shown this might apply to organisations within the local government 
sector.  This theory provides the theoretical underpinning for the research into the 
mechanisms driving performance management in local government post Localism 
Act 2011.  The theory is utilised to see if the current behaviours of local authorities 
are consistent with the theoretical framework (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 
2005).  The chapter provides an assessment of how benchmarking might be 
considered as a tool for the pressures outlined under Neo-institutional theory; as 
coercive from government and regulatory bodies in the form of delivery of 
benchmarks; as a mimetic pressure by copying ideas from similar organisations, 
and normative from professional organisations. 
Neo-institutional theory offers a conceptual framework to explain the reasons 
behind organisation change and advises that organisations make changes to their 
structures and processes that 'are not intrinsically motivated by the aims of 
improving efficiency and effectiveness but rather driven by changes in 'prevailing 
notions of how best to organise' (Entwistle, 2011, p. 661). 
3.2 Theoretical framework - Bureaucracy 
Institutional theory in the early to mid-20th century focussed on the work of Max 
Weber, who, in his work Economics and Society (Weber, Roth and Wittich, 1978), 
discussed leadership and organisational styles and concluded that the bureaucratic 
means of administration was the most rational way of exercising power over 
people, and determined the bureaucracy to be 'technically superior over any other 
form of organisation' (Weber, Roth and Wittich, 1978, p. 973) and that the advance 
of the bureaucracy was predicated on this technical superiority. 
Weber described bureaucratic organisations that ran with machine-like efficiency 
and outlined the key features of bureaucracies including hierarchical chain of 
command based on the belief in the authority of the office; all business in writing 
and documents ('the files') preserved in their original form; training in 
specialisation; rights and duties of officials (who had special examinations as a 
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prerequisite of their employment) being prescribed and proscribed in regulations; 
salaries fixed by contracts; and division of duties based on functional specialisms.  
In terms of efficiency, Weber held that 'Precision, speed, knowledge of 'the 
files',....reduction of ….costs, these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly 
bureaucratic administration' (Weber, Roth and Wittich, 1978, p. 973).  The 
bureaucracy, which could be described as an organisation whose existence is 
predicated on rules (being laws and administrative regulations) and knowledge, 
became the model for corporations (both public and private) during the inter-war 
period1.  Weber contended 'that bureaucracy, the rational spirits manifestation, was 
so efficient and powerful a means of controlling men and women that, once 
established, the momentum of bureaucratization was irreversible' (Weber quoted 
in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 147). 
For bureaucracies that were not in the private sector, Weber noted that 'a stable 
system of taxation is the precondition for the permanent existence of bureaucratic 
administration' (Weber, Roth and Wittich, 1978, p. 968).  A further feature was 
complete neutrality, in that Bureaucracies would remain impersonal in their 
dealings with the public: 
'bureaucratic officials are inclined to treat people in terms of 'cases' 
rather than as individuals and, under these circumstances, they 
remain impersonal in their contact with the public' (Morrison, 2008, 
p. 383). 
In addition, there would be administrative secrecy with professionals increasing 
their superiority by 'keeping secret its knowledge and intentions' (Weber, Roth and 
Wittich, 1978, p. 992). 
Weber reasoned there were two consequences of bureaucracy that were 
incompatible with democracy.  Firstly, he described the 'rise of economic interest 
groups who lobby state officials to advance their interests by manipulating the 
structure of power' and, secondly the 'tendency to develop secrecy especially in 
regard to the knowledge they hold and to their intentions and plans' (Morrison, 
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2008, p. 386).   
In his work the Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber 
described capitalism using the phrase stahlhartes Gehäuse which was translated 
by Talcott Parsons as 'iron cage'.  This expression has become widely familiar as a 
concept to typify a capitalist bureaucracy (Baehr, 2001).  The causation of 
bureaucratisation of organisations, according to Weber, was competition among 
capitalist firms in the market place; competition among states and an increasing 
need of rules to control their staff and citizenry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) but, 
writing in 1983, DiMaggio and Powell felt that although bureaucracy remained the 
common organisational form, these causes had changed. 
3.3 Theoretical framework – Neo-Institutional Theory 
In their seminal paper, The Iron Cage Revisited, an allusion to the bureaucratic 
'iron cage' of Weber, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that the causes of 
bureaucratization and rationalization have changed away from the drivers of 
competition and the need for efficiency, to a new model whereby 'forms of 
organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations 
more similar without necessarily making them more efficient' (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p. 147).  They further observed the paradox whereby individual 
efforts to deal with uncertainty often lead 'in the aggregate to homogeneity in 
structure, culture and output' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 147).  Two separate 
types of isomorphism are described; competitive, deriving from competition, and 
institutional, involving organisational competition for political and institutional 
legitimacy, (as in Mizruchi and Fein, (1999)), and the latter type of isomorphism 
is the type analysed within this research.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined the 
theory as a process of homogenisation where isomorphism takes place as 'a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units 
that face the same set of environmental conditions' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
p. 149) and they further propose that the primary shapers of contemporary 
institutional forms are the nation state and the professions (Ashworth, Boyne and 
Delbridge, 2007).  Within Neo-institutional theory the actors are 'bound by a logic 
of appropriateness very often communicated in roles, routine, obligations standard 
operating procedures and practices' (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 252). 
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3.4 Isomorphism 
Within Neo-institutional theory the components of isomorphism can be defined as 
having three pillars: coercive forces that are external to the organisation, and 
mimetic and normative forces that are internal to the organisation.  Coercive forces 
have also been described as 'vertical' and mimetic and normative forces as 
'horizontal forces' (Villadsen, 2013).  Each of these forces may drive changes in 
structure, culture, strategy process and strategy culture (Ashworth, Boyne and 
Delbridge, 2007), however they do not necessarily work in concert and Bovaird 
and Downe (2006) observed that actions from one force may counteract those from 
other forces.  They point out that there may be local differences in the external 
environment from political, economic, and social forces that will cause 
organisations to react differently to central coercive forces; they refer, as an 
example, to local authorities with a bigger revenue base, or to regional resistance 
to central government pressures and initiatives. 
3.4.1 Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism, the first of the three pillars, has been defined as 'driven by 
resource dependency relationships extending beyond the organisation' 
(Christensen and Parker, 2010, p. 251) or more basically, as political influences 
and a primary exertion of control from outside the organisation.  Such pressures 
can be applied to organisations from the state or from regulatory bodies, or from 
other organisations upon whom the organisations depend for funding, and 
organisations feel they must change their structures to meet the institutionally 
prescribed expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The main driver causing 
organisations to respond to these coercive pressures is political influence and the 
force of legitimacy (Khadaroo, 2005).  Practical examples of the coercive 
pressures could be 'fiscal years, annual reports and financial reporting 
requirements [which] ensure eligibility for the receipt of federal contracts or funds'  
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 150). 
3.4.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism in this context is the copying of other organisations in the 
same sector, believing their structures or processes to be better (Meehan, 2011) or 
'where a clear course of action is unavailable, an organisational leader may decide 
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to that the best response is to mimic a peer that they consider to be successful' 
(Mizruchi and Fein, 1999, p. 657).  A recent example of encouragement towards 
mimetic force was expressed as 'you don't need to relinquish localism to have the 
same basic structure as a dozen other councils across the country' (Jameson, 2013). 
Mimetic Isomorphism, or modelling, is a standard response to uncertainty 
(Khadaroo, 2005) and is said to take place when 'organizational technologies are 
poorly understood...when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 151).  Entwistle (2011) 
describes this as environmental turbulence, whilst Currie (2012) stresses that 
uncertainty is a 'powerful force that encourages imitation' (Currie, 2012, p. 237) or 
'drives organisations to mirror other organisations that are, in effect, both 
successful and worth copying' (Hassan, 2005, p. 127).  Using an early example, 
Care (2011) suggests that mimetic pressures were employed to institutionalize 
accounting practices in the public sector.  In practical terms mimetic isomorphism 
can be interpreted as organisations modelling themselves upon other organisations 
that they perceive to be more successful.  Christensen and Parker describe mimetic 
isomorphism in an example relating to the adoption of accruals accounting in New 
York State as 'motivated by a tendency to mimic an apparently successful peer' 
(Christensen and Parker, 2010, p. 251).  Currie and Suhomlinova (2006) observed 
this phenomena within the academic sphere noting that universities sought to 
follow more laboratory based research because that was the pathway taken by the 
high performers in that field.  In addition to modelling successful peers, it can also 
be achieved through the transfer of staff from one organisation to another, or 
through organisations using the same firm of consultants (Slack and Hinings, 
1994), and (Connolly, Reeves and Wall, 2009). 
3.4.3 Normative Isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism, the third isomorphic pillar, has been described as 
inducing institutional conformity by 'organisational members' shared professional 
norms, values, disciplinary education and professional networks' (Christensen and 
Parker, 2010, p. 251) and is predicated upon professionalisation of a workforce, 
where 'members of a profession share a common understanding and knowledge 
base' (Guerreiro, Rodrigues and Craig, 2012, p. 171), or education and certification 
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basis of accredited professional bodies (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007).  
Meyerson (1994), suggested that, although practitioners within the same 
profession are likely to exhibit commonalities, the same commonalities do not 
necessarily cross professional boundaries.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
hypothesised that the greater the reliance on academic credentials and the 
participation in trade and professional associations, the more likely that 
organisations would become like others in their field.  Guerreiro et al (2012) offer 
an example of the professional accounting bodies that agree [i.e. set] international 
accounting standards and they become an important normative pressure in 
changing to new standards. 
3.5 Benchmarking and Isomorphism 
The isomorphic pressures plus a desire for organisational legitimacy have been 
argued as providing an explanation for undertaking benchmarking (Watts and 
Mead, 2005).  Research has noted that universal practices emerge when firms 
benchmark against each other (Farndale and Paauwe, 2007) and this suggests 
competitive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The process of 
isomorphism has been used to explain institutional similarities such as structures, 
cultures and outputs, (Bovaird and Downe, 2006; Connolly, Reeves and Wall, 
2009; Christensen and Parker, 2010) and the process takes place through coercive, 
normative and mimetic forces (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Watts and Mead, 2005).  
Hinings and Greenwood noted that 'mimetic, normative and coercive processes 
come into play strongly when a new organisational form is legitimated by powerful 
actors, leading organisations, professional associations and interest groups' 
(Hinings and Greenwood 1988 cited in Slack and Hinings, 1994, p. 806) though 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contend that isomorphism is largely driven by the 
state and the professions.  The propensity of organizations to follow the practices 
of other organisations has been referred to as the 'learning organisation' (Currie 
and Suhomlinova, 2006), or inter-organisational learning (Bovaird and Downe, 
2006).  The different types of benchmarking practised and the drivers behind those 
practices have been linked to isomorphic pressures and evidence suggests that 
different pressures impact on organisations to undertake different types of 
benchmarking along the continuum from internal benchmarking to best-in-class 
benchmarking (McNair and Watts, 2006).  Coercive isomorphism has been argued 
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as the driver for internal benchmarking because it demands improved performance 
measures or, where a dependency relationship exists, and in the public sector this 
could be interpreted as the dependant on say, government funding where that is a 
significant fiscal source, greater performance is required to maintain funding 
levels.  Mimetic isomorphism however, which is seen as the need to mimic the 
practices of others which they perceive to be superior, is associated with 
competitive benchmarking; and is associated with three levels of benchmarking, 
competition, industry and best in class.  The third type of isomorphic pressure is 
normative and associated with industry benchmarking and best in class 
benchmarking.  McNair and Watts (McNair and Watts, 2006) offer an example of 
the later where the adoption of accounting standards across a variety of industrial 
settings where the accounting profession has undertaken normative behaviour to 
deliver a best in class outcome through the perception of a value added process.   
3.6 Application of Neo-institutional theory to the Public Sector 
Application of New institutional theory is not just confined to the profit sector and 
has been used within the public sector in the UK to analyse Human Resource 
functional forms (Truss, 2009); Introduction of major IT systems in the NHS 
(Currie, 2012) and  Local Management of Schools (Edwards et al., 2000); and 
procurement (Bovaird and Downe, 2006).  In an international public sector context 
it has been used in Norway (Performance Measurement in local government) 
(Johnsen, 2008); in Denmark (Danish mayors and expenditure allocation) 
(Villadsen, 2011); Indonesia (Performance measurement systems) (Akbar, 2012); 
Portugal (municipal corporations) (Tavares and Camões, 2010) and in USA (health 
care organisations) (Scott et al., 2000); (education) (Schober, 2013). 
3.6.1 Uncertainty within the Public Sector Environment 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refer to organisations in uncertain environments, and 
researchers have provided evidence that the public sector is influenced by varying 
environmental pressures, (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; Ashworth, Boyne and 
Delbridge, 2007; Christensen and Parker, 2010).  Following research to investigate 
whether either of the isomorphic forces exerted a greater pressure on governmental 
organisations, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) found that Government 
organisations were more susceptible to the coercive, mimetic and normative forces 
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than other organisations.  They also argued that the essential features of public 
sector organisations .… 'made them potentially very vulnerable to 
these........pressures' (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 286). 
The nature of the public sector environment and the uncertainty that it faces, e.g. 
national economic trends, ageing population, rising user expectations, 
technological change in service delivery, multiplicity of stakeholders, extent of 
central government; localism agenda; welfare reform (Bovaird and Downe, 2006) 
suggest that this sector is ideal for studying how organisations react in uncertain 
times.  However, whilst the public sector does have some resource dependency on 
central government, and faces environmental pressures, each element of the public 
sector does not face coercive pressures to the same degree.  Councils face 
unprecedented cuts in funding (Hughes, 2012) and these fiscal pressures, based on 
the political target of eradicating the public sector budget deficit by 2015, were 
described as driving a need for radical change of such intensity that 'Mrs Thatcher's 
actions were timid by comparison with what lies ahead' (Travers, 2010, p. 14).  The 
external environment within the public sector affects different organisations in 
different ways so organisations are likely to respond differently, Currie and 
Suhomlinova (2006) describe this as 'a patchwork of segments, united by a 
framework common to the entire field, but divided by differences characteristic to 
each segment' (Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006, p. 5), and, by implication, deliver 
a variety of responses.   
3.6.2 Coercive isomorphism in the Public Sector 
Coercive isomorphism highlights the political influences in the public sector and 
is likely to arise from regulatory and legal requirements from central government 
or funding bodies in the public sector (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2005).  
Entwistle (2011), in his work on radical organisational change in English local 
authorities, describes these as 'the fingerprints of government intervention' 
(Entwistle, 2011, p. 670). 
Most local authorities are currently dependant on significant funds from central 
government; and Grace (2012) describes this as 'vertical fiscal imbalance' (2012, 
p. 44) suggesting it is a feature driving benchmarking.  The funds provided are 
generally non-specific to services i.e. the majority are not hypothecated revenues 
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and can be used as a local authority decides; central government does not decide 
the quality of services that are to be provided, thus central government is a funding 
body rather than taking the role of a purchaser (Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2013).  
The extent of English local governmental reliance on state funding is changing at 
the district level to the extent that fifteen district councils (See Appendix B) ceased 
to receive government revenue support grant from 2017/18.  Under those 
circumstances local government could not be described as dependent on central 
government for its funding and would not therefore receive any fiscal benefit from 
responding to government coercive pressures.  There are however some inter-
council grants at a district level where the upper tier (County councils) are 
providing grants to the second tier as a form of incentivisation to collect more 
council tax and business rates, and under those circumstances the upper tier 
authority can be seen as coercive force.  Coercive pressures can lead to 'top-down 
benchmarking' where regulatory bodies determine standards that they expect 
organisations in that sector to follow (Marques and De Witte, 2010), or 
benchmarking for control (Northcott and Llewellyn, 2005). 
Evidence of isomorphism in English local government was identified in the 
requirements of local authorities to display Best Value (Bowerman, 2002; Francis 
and Holloway, 2007).  The Best Value legislation encouraged, though did not 
demand, the adoption of the Business Excellence Model (BEM).  The majority of 
adopters of the BEM expected that it would become the main means of assessment 
by central government, so they had responded to this perceived 'coercion' and 
commenced using BEM.  Coercive isomorphism does not automatically lead to 
improved organisational gains as Hassan (2005) explained in the context of Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP), where organisations adopted the PPP initiative 
following coercive pressures 'to appease their constituents rather than on a rational 
decision making basis' (Connolly, Reeves and Wall, 2009, p. 9).  Bovaird and 
Downe (2006) also noted, paradoxically, that, within local government, resistance 
had been mounted towards reforms, yet the resistance efforts themselves had 
manifestations of isomorphic tendencies. 
Whilst Neo-institutional theory might indicate that these coercive pressures drive 
the public sector to benchmark for improved performance, an alternative view is 
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promulgated by Northcott and Llewellyn (2005) who suggest that the transparency 
and collegiality that benchmarking demands is not engendered in an environment 
of comparative league tables and star ratings.  They do not think that ideas-
benchmarking thrives where there are pressures for 'indicator benchmarking'. 
3.6.3 Mimetic isomorphism in the Public Sector 
Researched examples of mimetic isomorphism in the public sector showed that 
organisations seek to copy within their sector, as Entwistle noted that, in 13 out of 
15 cases he had studied as part of research into the Best Value initiative, 
organisations had made research trips to 'prestigious or high performance 
organisations' (Entwistle, 2011, p. 671).  Bowerman (2002) observed that central 
government, a major fund provider for local authorities at that time, and was stated 
to be a big user of the BEM, and so local authorities tended to apply that model in 
a form of isomorphic mimicry.  Villadsen (2011) examined the mechanisms by 
which isomorphism took place and used the expression 'policy isomorphism' to 
explain the way in which social networks of Danish mayors influenced the 
similarity between decisions and actions in his investigations of the similarity 
between municipalities in their allocations of expenditure on major services. 
The consequences of mimetic isomorphism, as observed by Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz (2004), were that institutions tended towards a more centralized and 
formalized bureaucratic model.  Mimicry was also used to describe the Beacon 
Council scheme and benchmarking clubs (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007), 
though the use of professional public officers to deliver the Beacon Council 
scheme and the facilitation of benchmarking between groups of councils conveys 
a blurring of the edges between mimetic and normative forces.   
The Beacon scheme, previously introduced for Education and the NHS, was 
extended to councils in 1999, as part of the local government Modernization 
Agenda (LGMA) and continued until 2009.  The scheme, driven by central 
government, had the dual aims of rewarding high performing councils and raising 
service quality by enabling councils to share best practice.  Beacon status was 
given to councils who were judged to be models of excellence in theme areas that 
were determined annually by central government.  The themes varied each year 
according to the issues deemed to be priorities (e.g. in 2004 themes included 
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Affordable Housing, Promoting Racial Equality, Supporting new businesses 
(ODPM, 2005)).  The scheme was not mandatory, and councils were invited to 
show their excellent practice or innovation for those themes and also how they 
could share their approach with others; the awards were not targeted specifically 
at efficiency or financial performance.  Following an assessment by a panel of 
experts some councils were awarded the status of Beacon Council.  The application 
process for Beacon Council status incurred resource, but successful councils felt 
that the costs were outweighed by ‘raising the councils profile on the national stage 
and boosting staff morale’ (Wilson and Game, 2011, p. 379).  At a Corporate level, 
the achievement of Beacon status was considered to raise the internal profile of a 
service ‘and in some cases gave it increased legitimacy’ (DCLG, 2008, p. 47).  
Although the themes were wide ranging and permitted all type of authority to 
apply, the number of applications from district councils was fewer than for other 
tiers, and this was attributed to the resource issues they faced in preparing 
applications, and the concern that the burdens of being a Beacon Council 
disadvantaged smaller councils who did not have the advantages of scale and scope 
of the larger councils (Withers and Hartley, 2007).The scheme was based on the 
mimetic approach of the sector learning from within and learning from best in class 
i.e. those councils that performed best and was seen as successful.  Knowledge 
sharing took place in a variety of ways, including roadshows, open days, and 
consultancy; with the least successful mode being videos/CD-ROM and 
secondment (DCLG, 2008).  Whilst the value of learning from Beacons was 
recognised, not all councils implemented this learning citing lack of resources 
compared to the Beacon councils, and districts were most likely to mention this as 
a reason (Downe, Hartley and Rashman, 2004).  
The Beacon Councils scheme facilitated network building and attendees at 
roadshows not only learned from the Beacons presenting at the event but from the 
wider network of other authorities attending the event (Downe, Hartley and 
Rashman, 2004).  Factors used by councils in identifying which Beacons they 
could learn from were geographical location, economic factors and political 
orientation, and a need for similarity was particularly strong among district 
councils.  Districts wanted to compare ‘like with like’ in a family group of their 
own definition (Rashman and Hartley, 2002).  
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The perceived value of the Beacon Scheme differed between Senior officers (e.g. 
Chief Executives) and operational service officers.  The former were motivated to 
participate in the learning to find out about strategic management issues such as 
partnership working, corporate performance and central/local government 
relationships, whereas the latter were found to be more interested in practical know 
how and statistical performance data.  Central government was concerned that 
attendance of elected members at Beacon learning events was low in the early 
rounds and introduced a targeted campaign to improve this (Downe, Hartley and 
Rashman, 2004). 
Mimetic isomorphism suggests simplistic copying of the ideas and structures of 
others; however, the public sector evidence is more complex.  Camp (1993) 
explained that Xerox associated benchmarking with trips to other companies and 
described this as industrial tourism or 'feel good' trips.  Entwistle (2011) observed 
that councils were making visits to other authorities and noted that they did not 
always replicate the models they viewed and would use the visits to learn and adapt 
the ideas of others by 'active grafting and transplanting' (Entwistle, 2011, p. 672).  
He also noted that, although the visits were taking place, councils were not always 
undertaking mimetic changes as a result of those visits, but, on occasion, were 
simply undertaking the visits because they were expected, perhaps for political 
reasons, or to justify that their existing behaviours were superior or justified 
compared to the organisations they visited. 
3.6.4 Normative isomorphism in the Public Sector 
Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalism and professional 
networks as, for example, in the research of Christensen and Parker (2010) who 
studied public sector accountants and their adoption of accruals accounting in New 
South Wales.  They noted that institutional conformity has been induced by the 
organisations that shared professional norms, values, disciplinary education, and 
professional networks.  They referred to the accountants professional training and 
ingrained beliefs and their study noted that the accountants had listened to a 
speaker from New York (where accruals accounting had already been 
implemented) and were 'impressed by the combination of accountant [peer] and 
savvied politician' (Christensen and Parker, 2010, p. 259).  The practical methods 
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used to extend the professional knowledge include an example observed by 
Bowerman (2002) who noted that the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA), a professional body with many members in the public 
sector, had set up a Best Value Advisory Service which assisted its subscribers with 
improvement initiatives such as the BEM; through officer networks (Walker, 
O’Toole and Meier, 2007; Walker et al., 2010), and also through training (Akbar, 
2012).  Work undertaken by Davis (1998) found evidence of a lot of informal 
networking and information sharing by professionals within the public sector, and 
Walker et al (2010) observed that when public officials networked with managers 
in other councils they were likely to achieve higher levels of performance, 
explaining that they would gather information that they could use to improve 
services in their own organisations.  Conversely, they found that interaction with 
central government officials was negatively related to service performance! 
3.6.5 Resistance to Isomorphism in the Public Sector 
Recent research into organisational change in the public sector discovered that 
local government does not always respond positively to the coercive pressures 
applied by central government.  Truss (2009) observed that the HR function in the 
public sector, whilst facing similar environmental issues, and, presumably 
following a similar professional line, did not follow the same patterns and did not 
meet the expected theoretical perspective, that 'organisations in the same sector 
will tend towards common solutions' (Truss, 2009, p. 720).  She further enquires 
'how much similarity would be needed to provide unequivocal support for the 
institutional isomorphic framework' (Truss, 2009, p. 731).  Writing in the context 
of research into the NHS, Currie noted that the NHS 'failed to achieve legitimacy 
among large sections of the medical profession' (Currie, 2012, p. 245).  This 
research therefore poses two questions – does the public sector require a different 
nuance to the Neo-institutional conclusions drawn by DiMaggio and Powell, and 
to what extent does an organisation have to 'adopt similarities' to other 
organisations in the same sector and facing the same environmental uncertainties 
to meet the 'criteria' of isomorphism.   
English local government is an under-researched area and there is a need to 
understand more about the way public organisations work (Villadsen, 2011).  The 
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organisations within the sector are of varying sizes and subject to differing 
economic pressures so it seems likely that they too would respond to isomorphic 
pressures in differing ways; to suggest a common and standard response across the 
sector is too simplistic.  Whilst the susceptibility of public sector organisations to 
isomorphic pressures has been well documented in the literature, there is evidence 
that organisations, even when subject to the same environmental pressures, do not 
respond to the three pressures to the same degree.  Connolly et al (2009) noted that 
coercive pressures predominated in Northern Ireland whilst mimetic isomorphism 
dominated in the Republic of Ireland.   
In a twist to the expected isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
Bovaird and Downe (2006) have concluded that the resistance of local authorities 
to the expected organisational changes were themselves now evidenced by a kind 
of isomorphism, suggesting that local authorities 'share and communicate forms of 
resistance and locally acceptable adaptation to externally mandated institutional 
pressures' (Bovaird and Downe, 2006, p. 452).  Bovaird and Downe (2006) found 
evidence of isomorphism in local authorities as they researched the Local 
Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA).  They concluded that isomorphism 
had taken place and saw trends towards: 
• organisational configurations that conformed to templates expected by 
government and enforced by inspectors and auditors; 
• 'efficient' organisational configurations – particularly externalisation and 
decision making lower down in organisations; 
• managerially defined quality systems; 
• nationally defined service standards; 
• clearer decision-making structures. 
(Bovaird and Downe, 2006, p. 432) 
Whilst these observations would appear to indicate isomorphism in response to the 
coercive aims of the LGMA suggested by central government, Bovaird and Downe 
(2006) also observed the phenomena of resistance, with clearly observable models 
where the local authorities had rejected the government line and followed their 
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own direction justifying their choices with the rationale of local political choices 
and priorities or the 'insistence on the superiority of idiosyncratic organizational 
configurations and processes' (Bovaird and Downe, 2006, p. 433).   
3.7 Convergence and Compliance based on application to practice 
Research by Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge (2007) noted that isomorphic 
changes in the public sector did not clearly follow the same path along each of the 
three isomorphic types defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  They referred to 
compliance and convergence, explaining that compliance was the change in 
direction of coercive pressure; quoting the example of moving toward public 
service models promulgated by the state, whilst convergence was a change toward 
the norm of the field.  Hyndman et al (2014) describe the convergence as a 
movement towards a common isomorphic equilibrium.  Ashworth et al (2007) 
conclude that coercive and normative pressures are more likely to move 
organisations towards a model of management, and mimetic forces lead 
organisations to resemble each other more closely.  Some organisations however 
were found to be resisting the pressures to comply and displaying deviant 
behaviours and moving away from outcomes intended by the state, even to the 
extent that the councils were converging in their deviations (Ashworth, Boyne and 
Delbridge, 2005).   
Ashworth et al (2007) determined that public sector organisations have been found 
to adopt benchmarking following pressures that could be explained by Neo-
institutional theory; however, whilst that theory would expect organisations to 
morph towards both convergence and compliance, practice has observed that 
organisations appear to be 'converging' in their practise but not necessarily 
'complying' with the expected pressures.   
Neo-institutional theory suggests that organisations start from quite disparate 
models and 'morph' into similarity.  In practice, evidence from local authorities 
suggests that they are already fairly similar and the scope for further movement is 
small (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2005).   
3.8 The Concept of Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a key component in organisational change and Neo-institutional 
theory proposes that organisations must conform to 'societal standards and norms 
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of expected practice to derive legitimacy (Jacobs, 2012, p. 6).  It is further argued 
that the primary objective of organisational change is not to improve performance 
but to enhance legitimacy (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007).  In his work 
on leadership types, Weber (1978) offered three types of legitimacy that mirrored 
his leadership types: Charismatic, Traditional and Rational/Legal and it is the latter 
that is most relevant for modern institutions.  The underpinning for the concept of 
legitimacy is based on a survival mechanism being the desire of organisations to 
increase their survival prospects by converging around socially legitimated norms 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  A key attribute of legitimacy is that it provides a 
basis for decision making that is not based on means-end rationality (Zimmerman 
and Zeitz, 2002).  Actions driving efficiency do not always lead to legitimacy and 
there is evidence that some organisations have de-coupled efficiency measures 
from actions needed to appear legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Khadaroo, 
2005). 
Legitimacy has given rise to range of definitions: 'the ability to have ones actions 
and values perceived as correct and proper by those who are affected by them'  
(Schlusberg, 1969, p. 68); as 'congruency between the values, norms and 
expectations of the activities and outcomes of the organisation' (Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002, p. 416); 'a social judgement of acceptance, appropriateness and 
desirability' (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 418); or simplistically 'that an 
organisation is good and that it has the right to continue its activities' (Massey, 
2001, p. 156).  However, the definition from Suchman is more commonly quoted: 
'The generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions' 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
and he has further analysed his typology into three elements as shown in Figure 1.   
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Typology of Legitimacy (Suchman) 
 
Forms Sub-types Legitimacy attributes 
Pragmatic 
Legitimacy – 
focusses on the self-
interested 
calculations of an 
organisations most 
immediate audiences 
Exchange Legitimacy 
– direct (transactional) 
exchanges – expected 
value 
Support for organisational policy 
based on that policy's value to a 
set of constituents 
Influence Legitimacy 
– adapting the 
standards of 
constituents 
Being responsive to their larger 
interests 
Dispositional 
Legitimacy – honesty 
and trustworthiness 
'organisations that have our best 
interests at heart; share our values 
Moral Legitimacy – 
Normative approval -
has an external pro 
social emphasis (e.g. 
is the action the right 
thing to do) the 
perceptions that the 
organisation behaves 
in a manner that 
promotes social 
welfare as defined in 
the audiences 
socially constructed 
value system. 
Consequential 
Legitimacy – 
accomplishments; 
effectiveness measures 
What they accomplish e.g. 
emissions standards; hospital 
mortality; academic test scores 
Procedural 
Legitimacy – good 
faith, effort 
Sound practices to achieve valued 
ends 
Structural Legitimacy 
– proper procedures; 
quality control 
e.g. does the organisation inspect 
its end products for defects; 'the 
right organisation for the job; the 
right structures 
Personal Legitimacy – 
leader charisma 
Rests on the charisma of individual 
leaders; replacing executives 
Cognitive 
Legitimacy – being 
based on 
comprehensibility 
(i.e. stemming from 
cultural models or 
'taken for 
grantedness') 
Comprehensibility The audience must be able to 
understand what the organisation is 
doing 
'Taken for 
grantedness' 
'to do otherwise would be 
unthinkable' 
Figure 1  Legitimacy Typology   
Source: Suchman (1995) 
Suchman considered that cognitive legitimacy is more elusive to obtain than the 
pragmatic or moral types and more difficult to manipulate but more self-sustaining 
once established (Suchman, 1995, p. 585). 
There is a general agreement that the concept is socially constructed (Berger and 
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Luckmann, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Bitektine and Haack, 2015), and based on a 
perception of an organisation by others (Suchman, 1995; Massey, 2001; Desai, 
2018). 
Scott (2008) also sub analyses Legitimacy into three pillars being external 
environment regulative, normative, and cognitive.  His classification of the values, 
norms and obligations of an organisation suggests a layering of legitimacy types.  
Regulatory legitimacy being earned by an organisation conforming to the rules and 
operating within its legal requirements i.e. acting within the law.  Normative 
involving a moral dimension and an inherent feeling of responsibility, described 
as having behavioural reasoning of ‘ought to’ (Palthe, 2014).  Cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy corresponds to Suchman’s (1995) cognitive legitimacy, and relates to 
an organisation matching society’s values and having an internalized belief in what 
it does and ‘carrying out its activities in the best possible way’ (Cruz-Suarez, 
Prado-Román and Prado-Román, 2014).  Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) have added 
a fourth pillar called Socio Political Regulatory legitimacy to encompass 
government credentialling associations and professional bodies.  These 
subdivisions within legitimacy are important to organisations as they manage their 
interactions with the range of stakeholders who are able to confer legitimacy. 
3.8.1 Legitimacy Management 
The benefit of legitimacy to organisations is that it is important in attracting 
resources such as financial resources; technology and government support 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) and, as a consequence, a business cannot manage 
without it (Tilling, 2004b).  Maintaining organisational prestige is a key element 
in attracting professionals (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Legitimacy is conferred 
by stakeholders who can provide government, public or professional endorsement, 
and is not something that can be claimed by an organisation (Massey, 2001; Watts 
and Mead, 2005; McNair and Watts, 2006; Misani, 2010).  These conferring 
entities have been further explicated by Watts and Mead (2005) as government or 
government agencies who have control over the organisation; the public through 
setting and maintaining standards of acceptability and professions through setting 
standards of professional competence and accountability.  Tilling (2004b) adds the 
media to this list noting that although it has few direct resources it can significantly 
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influence the views of the public.  As legitimacy exists 'in the eye of the beholder' 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 416), it is an abstract concept and so not directly 
observable and this subjectivity is difficult to measure (Tilling, 2004a).   
Although traditionally seen as a dichotomous concept, with organisations being 
perceived as either legitimate or not legitimate, Zimmerman and Zeitz  suggest that 
it is in fact a continuous variable from high to low, and Tilling (2004b) notes that 
certain actions and events will lead to an increase or decrease in legitimacy.  A 
further layer of complexity is that the nature of stakeholders is neither 
heterogeneous nor static; stakeholders and their expectations change over time 
(Suchman, 1995).  The nature of legitimacy is multi-faceted and management 
made more complex by the changing nature of those who confer legitimacy, 
described by Suchman as 'the multiplicity of legitimacy dynamics' (1995, p. 585).  
As a consequence of these changing expectations there is an ongoing need for 
organisations to continue to explain and justify their actions (Funnell, 2015).   
Management of an organisation's legitimacy, which needs to be an active rather 
than a passive construct, passes through three phases – gaining (as in a new 
venture), maintaining, and repairing or regaining if it has been lost (Suchman, 
1995).  Although Tilling (2004b) adds a further category of extending legitimacy 
where an organisation moves into new markets,  that is not a significant issue for 
UK district councils.  Low levels of legitimacy occur when an organisation 
deviates from the expected social values and norms and the organisation will seek 
to close the gap or it may cease to operate (Suchman, 1995; Milne and Patten, 
2002; Tilling, 2004b).  An organisation must actively monitor and respond to 
changes in their environment because there would be a risk if it continued to 
undertake activities that may have been legitimate in the past but are no longer 
considered legitimate.  When an organisation wants to extend its legitimacy, it will 
intensify its actions to win over new or potential constituents. 
Different techniques are required for managing legitimacy when an organisation is 
stable and when it is going through change or facing crisis (Bitektine and Haack, 
2015).  In the acquisition stage, for example with a new venture or the early stages 
of a business, an organisation will need to build legitimacy to enable it to acquire 
needed resources (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  Although this stage seems 
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unlikely to relate to the English councils, the rule could be said to apply in the case 
of new local authority trading companies, often set up for housing purposes 
(Brown and Bright, 2018), who need to acquire financial resources, even though 
this is usually delivered through the owning council.  Organisations in the 
maintenance stage (i.e. most organisations) seek to maintain performance and 
'symbolic assurances that all is well' (Tilling, 2004a, p. 6) and maintaining a 
position of awareness for any challenges that would adversely impact on them.  In 
addition, organisations can be faced with not only the challenge of structural inertia 
which makes organisational change more complex, but also the balance required 
to anticipate stakeholder demands and environmental developments whilst at the 
same time protecting their past accomplishments and goodwill (Massey, 2001).   
Responses undertaken by organisations when there is a crisis of legitimacy have 
demonstrated the need for organisations to continually monitor their stakeholders 
perceptions and adjust their actions accordingly (Lewis, Palacios and Valenzuela, 
2016).  The typical action for an organisation facing a legitimacy crisis is a revision 
of the organisational structure without, necessarily, making significant changes to 
practice (Sellers, Fogarty and Parker, 2012).  Other defensive initiatives might 
include additional social responsibility communications and disclosures; 
professionalism and good corporate citizenship (Schlusberg, 1969; (Tilling, 
2004b).  Departures from societal norms do not, however, necessarily bring about 
a legitimacy crisis as they can be dismissed as unique (Suchman, 1995). 
Legitimacy is the collective perception of stakeholders and not the view of a single 
observer about a single behaviour, however if the stakeholder is large, powerful, 
and significant then the consequences for legitimacy can be fatal.  When 
perceptions of legitimacy fall below an acceptable threshold to crisis level, then 
previous good reputation ceases to count, and the organisation may be unable to 
continue.  In the case of Arthur Andersen, for example, where the organisation lost 
its legitimacy brought about by the coercive power of the state after the Enron 
accounting and document shredding scandal, 'a legitimation wildfire' swept Arthur 
Andersen away (Sellers, Fogarty and Parker, 2012, p. 197). 
Suchman (1995) defined three strategies for an organisation to employ in order to 
achieve Legitimacy in each of his three forms as shown in Figure 2: 
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Strategies to Achieve Legitimacy 
Strategy Method Active –Passive 
Continuum 
Conformance i.e. conforming 
to societal expectations 
To select among multiple 
environments in pursuit of an 
audience that will support current 
practices 
Relatively 
Passive 
Selecting supportive 
stakeholders 
To select among multiple 
environments in pursuit of an 
audience that will support current 
practices; organisations undertake 
market research to find other 
markets that they can enter without 
significantly changing their 
structures and processes 
neutral 
Manipulation – creating new 
ideas of what is legitimate 
behaviour 
New audiences and new 
legitimacies 
Relatively 
Active 
Figure 2  Legitimacy Management Methods 
Sources: (Suchman, 1995; Massey, 2001) 
Conformance means seeking legitimacy by achieving conformity with the 
demands and expectations of the existing social structure in which the organisation 
is currently positioned (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); this strategy does not 
question, violate, or change the social structure; it acquires legitimacy by following 
the rules.  From an institutional perspective organizations might be seen as 
pursuing mimetic measures i.e. 'mimicking' the most prominent and secure entities 
in their field (Suchman, 1995, p. 589) even if this does not bring about any 
improvement in performance (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007). 
3.8.2 Legitimacy and communications 
A keystone of legitimacy management is communication with the organisation's 
stakeholders (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  Successful 
management of legitimacy arises when organisational actions meet stakeholder 
expectations (Massey, 2001) and is dependent on communication with an 
organisation's audience either to manipulate an external audience or inform 
unaware audience members of the organisation's activities (Suchman, 1995; 
Massey, 2001;  Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002; Verhoest, Verschuere and Bouckaert, 
2007).  Communication is closely linked to moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and 
an example of moral communication are Corporate Responsibility Statements 
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(Lewis, Palacios and Valenzuela, 2016) which are published ostensibly to signal 
transparency but at the same time can reinforce legitimacy.  Slim (2002) gives an 
example of a press advertisement from a drug company advising of profits growth 
that included the strap-line 'Expertise with Responsibility' (Slim, 2002, p. 2) so 
signalling its corporate responsibility credentials.  It is indicative of changing 
consumer expectations that companies are being urged to present their 'triple 
bottom line' by including their social and environmental impacts as well as their 
financial position (Slim, 2002).  Within Local Government communication is 
expected under the Local Government Transparency Code 2015 which requires 
publication of information about expenditure and use of assets.  In a public sector 
context, the equivalent would be the Corporate Responsibility statement would be 
a Corporate Social Responsibility Statements.  
Communication is a two-way process and requires a dialogic approach with 
ongoing communication between the organisation and its stakeholders.  
Organisations undertaking socially undesirable practices can refrain from 
communicating these to stakeholders to preserve their legitimacy (Desai, 2018). 
3.8.3 Competitive or Institutional Pressures 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have analysed isomorphism into two categories; 
competitive and institutional (Connolly, Reeves and Wall, 2009) the former being 
'the force of efficiency when there is one best, cheapest or most efficient way of 
doing things' (Hassan, 2005, p. 127), and the latter including the rules, symbols, 
and beliefs to which individual organisations must conform to gain social 
legitimacy' (Connolly, Reeves and Wall, 2009, p. 6).  This is reinforced by Suddaby 
et al who explain that organisations are 'highly attentive to social and symbolic 
pressures arising from their institutional environment' (Suddaby, Seidl and Lê, 
2013, p. 330).  Bovaird and Downe (2006) noted that different organisations are 
likely to respond to their environment in different ways; for example they may 
have different resource dependencies to other organisations in the same sector.  
Amis (2002) warned that organisations make a ceremonial conformity of response 
to coercive forces to show legitimacy but unless the new values are held by 
organisation members, the organisation will revert back to its original values.  
Whilst there is evidence of converging isomorphism in organisations as identified 
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by Neo-institutional theory there is also evidence that the isomorphic pressures do 
not inevitably lead to a converging organisation (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 
2005). 
3.8.4 Legitimacy and Innovation 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) offer a subtle distinction between isomorphism and 
legitimacy.  Their view is that 'time spent by organizations complying with quality 
initiatives is symbolic of good management in other words such practices are 
legitimizing activities’ (Bowerman, 2002).  Innovations that enhance legitimacy 
are therefore seen as desirable (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007), but not 
the only way to gain legitimacy.  Tolbert  and Zucker (1983)  in their work on civil 
service reform in the United States, observed that later adoption [of innovations] 
was related to institutional definitions of municipal administrations.  The 
relationship dependency between isomorphism and legitimacy was confirmed in 
research by Deephouse (1996) whose research into the banking sector of the USA 
supported the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), finding that banks that were seen 
as conforming to the strategies used by others held greater legitimacy than those 
seen as deviating from the ‘usual’ behaviour.  
Initial adopters of innovations may be motivated to improve the quality, efficiency 
or effectiveness of their organisations, but beyond that point may continue because 
it offers legitimacy among their peers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Connolly, 
Reeves and Wall, 2009; Currie, 2012).  Bowerman reinforced that observation by 
noting that the adoption of innovations can be 'viewed as providing additional 
organizational legitimacy' (Bowerman, 2002 p. 48).  In presenting evidence of her 
study of the extent of the adoption of the Business Excellence Model, she 
suggested that legitimacy did not necessarily result from the adoption of widely 
accepted rational practices, but rather, after an initial surge in the adoption of that 
improvement technique, there was a slowdown in its adoption as it failed to offer 
any significant gain in legitimacy.  Her philosophy advised that if organisations 
seek only legitimacy from the adoptions of new innovations they should 'wait until 
the bandwagon is well and truly rolling towards a named destination before they 
join it' (Bowerman, 2002 p. 47).  Whilst that perspective was understandable under 
the NPM paradigm, it may not fit with the greater risk taking and the increased 
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importance of innovation (Osborne, 2010) in the current movement towards an 
NPG model.  Osborne et al (2013) are vigilant to the risk that improvement in 
operations without a public service-dominant approach may lead to more efficient 
services but will not, necessarily, deliver more effective services, and Andrews 
(2009) notes the original view of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that organisations 
do not aim to gain legitimacy to improve their effectiveness.  Finally, as innovation 
spreads across an industry a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides 
legitimacy rather than improving performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
3.8.5 Myths 
Institutional theory assumes that organisations adopt structures and management 
practices that are considered legitimate by other organisations in their field, even 
if they do not increase effectiveness or even increased costs and is described as 
contributing to a ‘myth’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Examples of this have been 
seen within the public sector where accounting principles have been adopted by 
the organisation, but not used in practice (ter Bogt and Jan van Helden, 2000; 
Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Modell, 2004).  Similarly, writers have referred to the 
continued adoption of innovations beyond the point of achieving desired 
performance as contributing to a 'myth' or signalling a display that the organisation 
is well managed (Bowerman, 2002; Hassan, 2005; Christensen and Parker, 2010).  
Whilst Neo-institutional theory suggests that organisations proceed towards 
legitimacy in their actions as responses to new innovations, in practice, 'institutions 
may undertake non-isomorphic actions i.e. actions that differ from what is 
considered legitimate in the institutional environment' (George et al., 2006, p. 
348), or 'construct stories about their actions that corresponded to socially 
prescribed dictates about what an organisation should do' (Mizruchi and Fein, 
1999, p. 656).  Frumkin and Galaskiewicz explain further that early changes in 
organisations were more ceremonial in nature rather than a 'detached calculus of 
costs and benefits' (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 284).  Myth, however, is 
a somewhat misleading term in this context, because, according to Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) the organisations have to maintain the appearance that the myths 
actually work.   
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3.9 Public Sector Legitimacy 
The concept of Legitimacy applies to the wider public sector and, specifically in 
local government, it is the understood as meaning 'citizen's continuous assessment 
of whether the local political system functions in an acceptable way' (Roos and 
Lidström, 2014, p. 138).  In the context of local government, legitimacy can be 
conferred by a range of stakeholders.  Top-down regulatory legitimacy is 
determined by Parliament and government departments who have the power not 
only to grant funds but also to extend or withdraw devolved responsibilities, and 
by regulatory bodies such as the Boundary Commission, Planning Inspectorate, 
and the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman (National Audit Office, 
2017).  Similarly, auditors are also empowered to confer legitimacy.  Funding 
bodies such as the NHS (e.g. Better Care Fund), European Union, other councils 
(e.g. for agency and shared services) also need to see a council as ‘legitimate’ 
before entering into fiscal arrangements with them.  Individuals and organisations 
with transactional arrangements i.e. suppliers; banks, voluntary sector, and 
partners also need to see councils as legitimate.  Citizens, as customers, judge a 
council by the services it provides (outcome legitimacy), but this area is becoming 
more complex as alternative means of public provision mean that the services can 
be delivered by other parties (Copus, 2014).  Elections are a major mechanism for 
conferring councils with leadership legitimacy, described as political input 
legitimacy, derived from their democratic mandate (DCLG, 2006), though low 
voter turnout is seen as diminishing the legitimacy of those elected. Tilling (2004b) 
suggests that the media also has the power to grant legitimacy. 
In common with legitimacy in the private sector, it is based on collective 
perceptions and is accepted by citizens even if the actions or decisions do not 
correspond with their personal preferences (Gustavsen, Røiseland and Pierre, 
2014).  However, there are subtle differences in legitimacy as it applies to local 
municipalities: Beetham (1991) defines three criteria for legitimate power 
relations: legality; justification; and acts of consent.  The first two are closely 
related to adherence to the rule of law but 'acts of consent' refers to the extent to 
which they are appreciated by their citizens.  Roos and Lidström (2014) advise that 
the level of legitimacy in local government can vary from being highly appreciated 
to being close to collapse. 
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Input-based legitimacy covers citizens perceptions of the extent to which they feel 
they influence policy and decisions; whereas output-based legitimacy is based on 
the services provided (Roos and Lidström, 2014).  A national survey of 
municipalities in Sweden showed that citizens were generally more content with 
output-based services than with input based.  Swedish citizens were more positive 
in their evaluations of services where municipalities were spending more on 
resources (Roos and Lidström, 2014).  A deeper analysis in the survey examined 
satisfaction with welfare services (schools and social services) and where levels of 
provision were strongly regulated by central government, and 'collective services' 
(refuse, roads, sports, and culture) where there was more local decision making 
and found that the amount of money spent on the latter had the greater effect on 
the citizens evaluation.  The Swedish study concluded that the most efficient way 
of achieving high levels of legitimacy was to deliver high quality provision in both 
welfare and collective services, but allocating additional resources to welfare 
services did not enhance legitimacy. 
Public sector organisations need to create, maintain and manage their legitimacy 
to maintain their funding (Bealing, 1994; Khadaroo, 2005; Currie and 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Bitektine and Haack, 2015).  Hernes, writing at a time when 
NPM was the defining paradigm, advised, 'public institutions are no longer 
guaranteed an existence as a service could be outsourced or eliminated'  (2005, p. 
12). 
In democracies, the electoral process is the ultimate determinant of Legitimacy 
(Funnell, 2015).  Legitimacy is dynamic; policies and actions that were considered 
to be legitimate for the public sector in early years can now be questioned e.g. the 
Public Finance Initiative (PFI) was a legitimizing activity under the NPM 
paradigm but it is now subject to criticism (Khadaroo, 2005, p. 70). 
Financial auditing conducted by public sector auditors provides the means to signal 
the Executive's financial competence and commitment to transparency and 
accountable government and thereby provides the possibility of confirming the 
political legitimacy of those who govern (Funnell, 2015).  Performance auditing 
by external auditors can strengthen the standing of elected governments bodies 
because it is carried out by bodies that are independent and not under the control 
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of the Executive (Tillema and ter Bogt, 2010); in the UK the CPA report of the 
Audit Commission would have contributed to this function. 
Legitimacy in the public sector has been explained as conforming to the 
expectations of key stakeholders in their environment (Ashworth, Boyne and 
Delbridge, 2007).  They reinforce this by explaining that some institutions copy 
others without any clear evidence of performance improvement.  Akbar found that 
Indonesian local governments adopted performance indicators 'more to fulfil 
regulatory requirements than to make their organisations more effective and 
efficient' (Akbar, 2012, p. 262) suggesting that they had followed coercive 
isomorphism pathway, but as soon as they had gained legitimacy by adopting the 
indicators they did not take any further action.  Legitimacy may be the driver for 
organisational change rather than performance improvement, as Ashworth et al 
(2007), and shifts in organisational characteristics are pursued for political as well 
as technical reasons.  Although the concept of legitimacy might imply that public 
sector organisations are motivated to make changes simply to be seen as 
'legitimate', Entwistle (2011) applies a more constructive slant in saying there may 
be benefits: 'Just because an organisation adopts an idea for reasons of legitimacy 
does not mean that it is a bad idea in terms of efficiency and effectiveness' (2011, 
p. 678).   
One of the elements of proving legitimacy to citizens is by demonstrating levels 
of performance and James and Moseley (2014) found evidence that systems for 
comparative performance increased local accountability.  Their research refers to 
'information about the local provider's service compared to the service provided 
by similar units' (James and Moseley, 2014, p. 494) and advise that extremes of 
performance have the biggest effect on citizens' perceptions and voting (Boyne et 
al., 2009).  However, attitudes to performance are more nuanced over time and 
James (2011) suggests that whilst high past performance led to higher customer 
expectations, prior poor performance did not have the reverse effect on customer 
expectations, concluding that citizens are progressively harder to satisfy over time.  
Notwithstanding, the impact of messages about relative performance, the impact 
on citizens of information about poor performance, possibly due to media 
treatment (Villadsen, 2013), was greater than the impact of, relatively high, 
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comparative performance.  In a counter intuitive response to news of high 
performance in a high performing area, the citizens were not seen to have raised 
levels of satisfaction.  The nature of legitimacy is not a constant in the public sector 
as observed by Hyndman et al (2014) who noted that, under New Public 
Management, legitimacy was 'Performance driven' with emphasis on efficiency 
and effectiveness evaluation, whereas under the emerging New Public Governance 
(NPG) discourse it was 'Legitimacy through negotiated agreements and 
democratic accountability' (2014, p. 404) identified by a focus on governance, 
transparency, and sustainability.  Hyndman et al (2014) further note that the 
discourses can co-exist with one another or overlap and different aspects can take 
precedent over time. 
3.10 Critique of Neo-institutional Theory for Analysing Organisational 
Behaviours 
Neo-institutional theory is one of the dominant perspectives within organisation 
and management theory (Greenwood, Hinings and Whetten, 2014) and its validity 
to underpin research has been affirmed by Jacobs (2012) who comments that the 
'use of Neo-institutional theory grew throughout the 1990's and has now reached a 
relatively stable level of popularity' and 'is a popular theoretical approach used by 
many researchers' (Jacobs, 2012, p. 17).  Suddaby et al confirm that it is 'a well-
established theoretical approach ….[with] strong empirical and theoretical 
foundations' (Suddaby, Seidl and Lê, 2013, p. 330).  Watts and Mead concur, 
stating that it is a 'legitimate vehicle for the study of business phenomena' (Watts 
and Mead, 2005, p. 10).  Specifically in the context of benchmarking, the theory 
was used by McNair and Watts (2006) to understand the cause and effect on 
benchmarking in order to understand the content, form and use of the practice. 
Within the public sector it has been found to be a suitable framework to inform 
research into public sector accountability changes (Parker and Gould, 1999); 
healthcare supply chain (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013); and the National Health Service 
(Currie, 2012).  This theory has been widely used as a means of explaining the 
features of public sector management reforms because it seeks to describe 
corporate behaviour (Torres, Pina and Yetano, 2011).   
Neo-institutional theory, which developed as a means of better understanding of 
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Weber's concept of bureaucracy at a time when organisational theorists had 
observed the spread of bureaucracies in modern societies (Greenwood, Hinings 
and Whetten, 2014), may, however, be a rather simplistic tool for describing 
organisational change.  Although isomorphic forces may be the primary reasons 
for organisational change, there are more subtle forces causing organisational 
disruption and divergence (Scott, 2008).  Covaleski and Dirsmith (1995) declined 
to use the theory in their research into administrative practice in Wisconsin because 
it paid insufficient attention to power and interest based behaviour,   
It has been suggested that the theory focuses far too heavily on explaining 
institutions rather than how organisations work (Has Institutional Theory Lost its 
Way?, 2014)   Other influences such as the impact of intermediaries, governmental 
ministries, industrial associations, trade unions, professional associations and 
consultants' (Scott, 2010, p. 14), or more specifically in the public sector, the 
election of new representatives, the crafting of new laws, judicial review and 
adjudication, initiatives and referendums, and constitutional amendments all have 
an impact on the way public sector organisations behave (Scott, 2008, 2010).  
Similarly, the influences of transnational bodies such as the European Union are 
likely to influence organisational change.  It has also been described as more a tool 
for explaining stability rather than change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) which 
suggests there may be limitations to using this theory in a contemporary setting. 
3.11 Limitations of Neo-Institutional Theory for contemporary study of local 
government 
Although Neo-institutional theory has been proclaimed the 'best developed 
theoretical positions from which to view the dynamics of organisational change' 
(Bovaird and Downe, 2006, p. 430) there are some limitations to its utility as a tool 
for examining change in contemporary local government.  Neo-institutional theory 
is not a good measure for explaining the changes that have to take place as a result 
of legislative changes.  Coercive isomorphism has been described as arising where 
the external coercive force is that of government or regulatory body, the 
organisation may adapt to ensure its own survival by minimizing conflict, this does 
not cover the circumstances where a local authority is forced to change its structure 
in response to government legislation, e.g. separation of direct labour organisations 
under Compulsory Competitive Tendering.  The theory is also limited in terms of 
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explaining responses from sub fields within an organisation to external pressures 
e.g. where a single department responds with changes to culture or practices but 
others do not within the same organisation (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 
2007). 
Pressures on the public sector, and in particular local government, changed after 
the general election in 2010, in that two of the former drivers of coercive pressure 
on local authorities changed following significant reductions in funding, with 
implied expectations of greater performance, and the removal of centrally driven 
and collected performance indicators.  Further, the Localism Act 2012 changed the 
focus of performance from central government to local communities.   
Neo-institutional theory does not easily explain the changes affecting 
organisations that arise from politics or internal leadership.  It infers an attitude of 
following or responding to pressures but does not explain what is happening when 
a single organisation is the first to try a new structure or model following 
leadership or innovation e.g. the first councils to share services, outsource core 
functions or adopt the elected mayor model.  The first two of these examples have 
become commonplace, or might be described as expected or legitimised, but the 
last example is less common and councils that have adopted the practice are 
'outliers'.  The concepts and language of convergence and compliance appear to 
have limitations when addressing the subtleties or granularity of change and the 
pace of diffusion of new innovations across organisational groups.  For example, 
where a municipal unit is the first to adopt a new initiative in conforming with 
external pressures, this innovation can be explained as compliance, but as a 
pioneer, the council cannot be said to be converging in its behaviour.  There is 
similar but opposite situation where a council does not follow the behaviours of 
others; the theory does not have a ready explanation of whether the behaviour is 
simply laggardly, or whether the organisation is undertaking 'deviance' behaviour 
or whether that organisation is responding to coercive pressures in a different way 
(Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2005).  Where the organisation adopts the policy 
favoured by the coercive body, sharing services for example, the theory does not 
help in explaining the depth and range and direction of travel of those services that 
is required to show compliance.  Organisations may also converge around the 
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wrong form of logic (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007) and fail to comply 
with the expectation of the coercive body. 
Within organisations, the impact of isomorphic pressures varies in strength and 
predominance at different stages of an organisation's development (Christensen 
and Parker, 2010) and Neo-institutional theory does not offer a clear theoretical 
perspective with which to measure these variations.  The appropriateness of Neo-
institutional theory and the 'iron-cage' analogy in the current digital age has also 
been questioned (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013).  The theory would also appear to be a 
weak choice for explaining the responses of organisations to fiscal shock or 
sustained economic turbulence where either fast or continual changes are required, 
suggesting that Neo-institutional theory was good for explaining what was 
happening to bureaucracies but has flaws when trying to theorize on fast moving 
structures. 
Although the method has been widely used as theoretical underpinning in public 
sector research2, Jacobs (2012) found that it may not be the perfect model for 
explaining public sector behaviour.  Jacobs noted that many researchers did not 
use this method exclusively and observed that they blended several approaches 
and he considered that a multi method approach might be appropriate for the 
'contextual and institutional complexity found in the public sector' (Jacobs, 2012, 
p. 2). 
3.11.1 Blended Approach 
Neo-institutional theory offers a theoretical framework to support the driving 
forces behind the organisational changes but further depth on theory behind the 
practical ways of making sustainable change happen can be found in work by 
Lewin (1947).  His work focussed on the role of groups in making change happen 
concluded that it was easier to change individuals that had formed into a group 
than it was to change individuals and within this conclusion is a clear message for 
the value of professional networks.  If district councils perceive themselves to be 
a 'group', even if in a wide sense, then there is a greater likelihood of group 
                                                 
225% (n=87) of theorised papers (n=353) in a sample of 758 accounting papers between 1992 and 2008 
(Jacobs, 2012, p. 5) 
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standards changing.  Conversely, Lewin's research found that pressures targeted 
on individuals were less effective.  This theory suggests that the government 
initiatives of compare and contrast directed at performance improvement in local 
government had less chance of success than the local government 'group' self-
improving or 'sector led improvement'.  Moreover, the arrival at a new performance 
level doesn't lead to sustained performance at that level but permanency needs an 
unfreezing of the current levels, a move to the new, and a 'freeze' at the new level.  
However, Lewin notes that for innovators and leaders of change within a group, if 
changes are too far removed from group norms then the individuals will be 
'ridiculed', which appears to mitigate against transformational change and favour 
incremental change. 
3.12 Benchmarking and the concept of Legitimacy 
Benchmarking has been used to acquire legitimacy as McNair and Watts (2006) 
explained 'organisations will benchmark other organisations in order to align 
themselves with symbols, values and practices which are perceived as legitimate' 
(McNair and Watts, 2006, p. 11).  The phrase 'legitimacy' is rarely used in the 
public sector to explain actions or behaviours, and though this may be a tacit 
rationale for activities, academic writing provides the source of definitions for this 
concept.  Andrews (2008), describes 'confidence in institutions as the level of 
legitimacy of public institutions' (2008, p. 175), or simply being received as 
trustworthy and legitimate institutions are those 'that deserve the confidence of the 
public' (2008, p. 176).  Bukh and Kjaergaard (2009) observe that organisations 
'feel a need to demonstrate that they are using efficient control models' (2009, p. 
3).  This 'need' could be indicative of a desire to display behaviours that confer 
legitimacy on the organisation and show that it is meeting the perceived 
expectations of its paymasters and stakeholders.  Entwistle observes the difference 
between adaptation theory and Neo-institutional theory in that with the former, 
organisations imitate in order to improve performance, whereas under the latter 
theory they imitate to 'enjoy the legitimacy of looking the same' (Entwistle, 2011, 
p. 665).  In terms of performance improvement, it is suggested that organisations 
will adopt performance measurement systems as a 'symbol of responsiveness' and 
not necessarily as a search for greater efficiency' (Torres, Pina and Yetano, 2011, 
p. 1085).  Some writers suggest that local authorities undertake benchmarking 
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simply to provide a display of 'legitimacy'; that the process is merely a box ticking 
exercise.  At a deeper level, public organisations can be seen undertaking 
benchmarking in order to comply with their need for professional endorsement and 
public acceptance (McNair and Watts, 2006).  Meehan (2011), for example, writes 
that public organisations may establish benchmarking to 'provide an outward 
impression of rationality and efficiency to avoid questions surrounding their 
conduct, but will not necessarily use the data'.  Similarly, Sanger questioned the 
usefulness of performance measurement suggesting that it rarely leads to 
'improved government performance or more efficient and accountable municipal 
management' (Sanger, 2013, p. 185), and Brignall and Modell suggested  that ‘the 
primary motivation for managers’ use of performance information is framed in 
terms of the notion of legitimacy-seeking rather than efficiency maximization’ 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000, p. 284).   
Benefits to legitimacy deriving from the introduction of innovations have been 
queried (Deephouse, 1996) and this proposes further question of how 
benchmarking fits in with innovation and legitimacy and at what point do new 
structures and processes become the 'new legitimacy'.  Historically, some local 
authorities have crossed boundaries and introduced new ideas, often as a response 
to financial pressures; Council N had a large scale voluntary transfer of all its 
housing stock, London Borough of Brent introduced a decentralisation of 
management (Bovaird and Davis, 1999).  In 2011 the London Boroughs of 
Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster entered into 
a shared service arrangement, 'Tri-Borough', to create efficiencies and economies 
of scale.  The partnership was innovative in that the shared service operated with 
three separate mechanisms of political control suggesting that 'legitimacy' is 
constantly changing.  The shared service  dissolved in 2017 (though Kensington 
and Chelsea and Westminster have continued their partnership), is indicative of the 
movement from the previous philosophy that technical methods of saving money 
were paramount, as in NPM, towards a newer theme or paradigm that prioritises 
political autonomy (Carr-West, 2017). 
3.13 Conceptual Framework and Research Problem 
Public sector research by Ashworth et al (2007) observed that organisations were 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
65  
showing evidence of compliance but less of 'convergence' and noted that both were 
necessary to meet the requirements of Neo-institutional theory.  This research 
attempts to close a gap in theory by examining the evidence of the approach to 
benchmarking in the public sector in a new legislative and economic environment; 
it also provides some of the needed fine grained detail from an interpretivist 
perspective on the structural changes in local government (Andrews and Boyne, 
2012).  Discerning between the three different isomorphic pressures particularly 
mimetic and normative pressures, which although theoretically distinct, has proved 
difficult empirically (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999), and this research will endeavour 
to see how these are operational by examining the factors making up each of the 
pressures.   
The conceptual framework suggested by the literature is presented in Figure 3. 
The councils have a structure and practice that meets their existing legitimacy 
needs – then face additional exogenous pressures – the isomorphic pressures.  
Their organisational response is to comply with these pressures – 'Compliance' and 
amend their structures and practices in a collective freezing of form that meets 
their perceptions of the new legitimacy requirements. 
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Original Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 3  Original Conceptual Framework 
 
The components of this framework convey the Turbulent Environment (a) in which 
the organisations (councils) exist.  The initial status of the organisations that 
conform to the norms, structures and conventions that meet the expectations of 
legitimate behaviour and represent the original components of legitimacy are 
shown here as the 'Old Legitimacy' (b).  External pressures are suggested by block 
(c) which exert pressures on the organisation to make changes.  The organisation 
responds to the isomorphic pressures (d) in two ways; by complying with the 
external pressures (di) and, according to Neo-institutional theory they will 
converge (dii) their structures and practices.  To be able to respond to the 
requirement to converge, they will 'unfreeze' their old position (e) and move to the 
new position where they will 'freeze' into a new structure.  The new structure meets 
the legitimacy expectation of the new order described here as the 'New Legitimacy' 
(f).  The issues of degrees of heterogeneity of separate councils or the time frames 
for implementing the changes are beyond the scope of this schematic. 
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The conceptual framework is relatively simple but gives the themes to guide the 
research and form the supporting structure upon which to develop a more 
sophisticated model.  There is a simplistic assumption that the 'legitimacy' is the 
same for every council and that having made changes to meet the legitimizing 
needs the structures freeze into a new solid state until the next change.  Similarly, 
the diagram gives equal weight to all of the isomorphic pressures at the same time, 
but the weight, importance and timing of response given to each separate pressure 
may vary in practice.  The simplicity of this conceptual framework disguises the 
complexity of the longitudinal and latitudinal changes that take place as a response 
to the isomorphic pressures.  Further, the consequences of previous pressures and 
practices may well impact on the current responses.   
The research problem is about understanding the way benchmarking has evolved 
within local administration, specifically the district council level, and discovering 
how it has transformed over time and whether the way in which this evolution has 
taken place can be explained by Neo-institutional theory.   
Specifically, the research questions that emerged from the literature review are 
thus: 
• Are District Councils undertaking benchmarking or [just] comparing 
benchmarks? 
• How are District Councils converging in their approach to benchmarking 
during the period of localism; 
• Are district councils 'converging' and 'complying' in their practice of 
benchmarking; 
• Are district councils 'converging' in their practices, cultures, and structures 
as a consequence of their benchmarking; 
• Has the impact of previous isomorphic pressures sedimented into current 
cultures and what impact does this have; 
• What does the concept of legitimacy mean in the district council context and 
how is their approach to benchmarking helping to achieve this. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
68  
These themes will form the direction of the research. 
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4 Methodology 
The chosen research method to research these goals was an exploratory case study 
and this section justifies the chosen method for undertaking the work required to 
answer the research questions.  The way in which rigour was built into the practical 
research is outlined together with an analysis of the way in which generalisability 
applies to the chosen methodology (Eisenhardt, 1991; Zucker, 2009).  The 
accessibility and sufficiency of potential participants is also analysed (Flick, 2011). 
4.1 How the research problem was identified 
A definition of the research problem was undertaken using the pathway outlined 
by Flick (2011).  Firstly, the focus was on 'what is new about the problem?' (Flick, 
2011, p. 89).  In the context of this research there are predominantly two new issues 
– firstly the legislative changes made by the coalition government, viz. 
introduction of the Localism Act and cessation of the centrally collected 
performance indicators.  And, secondly, the changing fiscal balance between 
locally collected revenues and centrally provided unhypothecated grant income 
from central government.  These factors indicate that the attitudes towards this new 
fiscal and political environment could be perceived as an 'uncertain environment' 
for local government or whether a constantly changing political, legal, and 
economic scenario is considered to be the normal state. 
4.2 Rationale for chosen method 
A review of the literature showed that there was an identifiable gap in research.  
The second tier level of local government is under-researched (Andrews, Boyne, 
and Walker, 2011) and the sector generally is an under-researched area (van Helden 
and Tillema, 2005), and there is an identified need for empirical analysis and 
comparative evidence from the public sector (Ashworth et al., 2013), particularly 
from ontological and epistemological perspectives (Raadschelders, 2011).  Various 
writers have pointed to a dearth of current academic research in the area of local 
government (van Helden and Tillema, 2005; Askim, Johnsen and Christophersen, 
2007; Walker, 2008; Ashworth et al., 2013) particularly as it has been questioned 
whether much of the public management theory is embedded in the manufacturing 
ideology on which NPM was based (Osborne, 2010).  The limitation of existing 
research is that there is little contemporary research at district council level in the 
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UK, and research prior to 2010 was commonly positivist in nature and used the 
performance indicators of the National Indicator set, collected under the CPA 
regime, which are no longer available.  Much of the research e.g. (Boyne, et al., 
2008, 2010) covered upper-tier authorities because they offered a wider range of 
Performance Indicators to measure.  Walker et al (2010) undertook a 
comprehensive study of councils in 2010 but noted that District councils were 
excluded because there was no aggregate external measure of performance. 
The Objectives of the research will be to: 
• Investigate the extent to which comparison with other organisations is used 
to drive improvements in performance; 
• Assess the impact of benchmarking activities on district councils’ 
practices, structures, and policies; 
• Analyse how the results of benchmarking activities are used in the 
organisations; 
• Understand the drivers behind decisions to undertake benchmarking; 
• Assess the extent to which benchmarking is perceived as a legitimising 
activity under Localism. 
The research problem can be summarised as 'Can the approach to benchmarking 
under Localism be explained by Neo-institutional theory?' 
The three elements of the research paradigm, ontology, epistemology and 
methodology are justified using a definition adapted from Healy and Perry (2000) 
being that ontology is the reality that researchers investigate; epistemology the 
relationship between that reality and the researcher, and methodology the 
technique used to investigate the reality. 
The research was conducted under an interpretivist or qualitative paradigm with 
the underlying assumption that reality is subjective because it is socially 
constructed and that social phenomena are in a constant state of revision (Collis, 
2009; Bryman and Bell, 2011).  That basis for research is supported by Munir 
(2005) because it researches theorisation and Munir argues it benefits from a 
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rigorous social constructionist approach.  The method enabled the researcher to 
study business practices in situ (Silverman, 1998). The epistemological 
assumption is to understand how that social reality is created (Collis, 2009). 
The chosen method for this research was an exploratory case study.  This method 
was determined using three initial criteria: 
• the type of questions to be asked; 
• the extent of control over behaviour; and 
• the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events 
(Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009). 
The choice of method was driven by the research question which asks for answers 
to 'How' and Why' questions.  Other methods were considered by comparing the 
five major research methods and three conditions as suggested by Yin (2009) as in 
the following table. 
Method Form of Question Control 
of Events 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
events 
 Decision 
Experiment How?, why? yes yes  Reject – control of 
events not required 
Survey Who?, what?, where?, 
how many?, how much? 
no no  Reject – proposal 
covers current 
events. A survey 
would not 
necessarily capture 
answers to ‘why?’ 
and would lack rich 
explanatory 
qualitative data 
Archival 
Analysis 
Who?, what?, where?, 
how many?, how much? 
no yes/no  Accept 
History How?, why? no no  Reject – proposal 
covers current 
events 
Case Study How?, why? no yes  Accept 
 
 
Figure 4  Research Method Selection Table 
Source: (after Yin) (Yin, 2009, p. 8) 
The aim of the research was to develop an understanding of the changes in the 
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approach to benchmarking and to discover evidence of the phenomenon of 
organisations converging in their benchmarking behaviours but not necessarily 
complying with the behaviours expected by their paymasters.  The research also 
examines in detail what 'compliance' means in the context of district councils. 
Selection of the specific method then pivoted on three points: 
• Form of questions 
• Control of events 
• Contemporary or historical 
The research required answers to 'How', 'Why', and to some extent 'Who' questions.  
Although Performance Indicators measure 'how many' and 'how much' the 
Performance Indicators are not the specific focus of this research, but rather the 
changes in how these are used and the factors influencing those questions.   
4.3 Rationale for Rejection of Alternative methods 
The research did not require control of behavioural events.  The nature of the 
research did not require any scientific controls driven by the researcher, and an 
experiment would have divorced the phenomenon from its context and so would 
not have met the criteria for the research.  Even if it had been possible to engineer 
a control council by restricting all changes/responses over a given period that 
would have offered no evidence to explain why compliance or convergence was 
happening elsewhere. 
The historical context is covered within the Literature Review and, although this 
will provide background and context, the research was not examining historical 
events so the history method was not appropriate.  The objective was to study the 
responses of district councils in the current economic and legislative situation 
(which may or may not be perceived as uncertain) and which historical analysis 
may not fully explain.  Research encompassing, say, the last fifteen years has 
already been covered (Bowerman, Raby and Humphrey, 2000; Bowerman, 2002; 
Boyne, 2003; Boyne et al., 2009).  Archival analysis of minutes, reports and 
published data provides background and contextual information but would not, 
alone, have answered the 'Why' question. 
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The technique of ethnography was rejected because although it might have offered 
the opportunity to determine why a single council (perhaps the researchers own 
employers) had undertaken isomorphism, the time-scale of the DBA precluded use 
of that technique.  Similarly, participant observation was an inappropriate 
technique for the DBA due to the time that would be involved.  Undertaking a 
longitudinal study reviewing attitudes at the beginning of the research and then 
reviewing these after a period of some years to see if the views and practices had 
changed, was also beyond the scope of the DBA. 
A survey was dismissed as a research method in this case because that would have 
been a weak tool to answer the 'why' question as it would not have necessarily 
captured the reasons why a phenomenon is happening.  A further reason for 
rejecting a survey would be the limit to the questions posed and it would lack the 
richness of qualitative data that might explain the phenomenon. 
4.4 Selection of Case Study methodology 
The case study method is justified for this research because it is designed to bring 
out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple sources of 
data  (Tellis, 1997b) and a means of understanding the dynamics present within 
single settings' (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534).  The validity of this choice is reinforced 
by the definition from Yin (2009) that the case study is an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context.  Other 
researchers within the public sector have used the case study technique Houghton, 
Casey and Murphy (Houghton, Casey and Murphy, 2012) and Tellis (1997a) in 
Health, Merriam (1998) in education, as well as broader public sector research 
(Holloway, Francis and Hinton, 1999; Bland et al., 2010; Mimba, Helden and 
Tillema, 2013). 
In summary, the researcher used an exploratory case study method in order to 
understand a real life issue and contemporary set of events in depth and that 
understanding encompasses important contextual conditions over which the 
investigator had little or no control (Yin, 2009).  In-depth interviews were chosen 
in addition to archival analysis because interviews with individuals were based on 
the belief that a full and rounded understanding of the organisational experiences 
and situations of a few individuals, however unrepresentative they may be, is of 
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more value than a limited understanding a large representative group (Veal, 2006, 
p. 40).  Interviews would also gain an insight into internal and environmental 
factors which would not have been revealed in a postal questionnaire (Torres, Pina 
and Yetano, 2011). 
The research undertaken was exploratory and not intended to provide a theory that 
is generalisable across the wider public sector but rather to explore what is 
currently happening in districts following the Localism Act and offered potential 
to suggest hypotheses for future research. 
The primary justification for using the exploratory case study method was 
explained by Eisenhardt because it is well suited to new research areas or research 
areas for which existing theory is inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 549).  This 
method was deemed appropriate by Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) for 
research in an area where few previous studies have been carried out.  This latter 
view reinforces the view that the case study method was appropriate as there is a 
paucity of recent interpretive research at English district level (Daniel and Ward, 
2006). 
Unlike descriptive or explanatory studies this research was not intended to produce 
propositions in advance of the interviews because the researcher did not 'have 
enough experience, knowledge or information from the literature upon which to 
base propositions’ (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
4.5 Procedures followed 
A protocol was developed to ensure rigour in the case study (Baxter and Jack, 
2008; Brereton et al., 2008; Yin, 2009) and this is presented in Appendix C. 
4.5.1 Time Scales 
Field research commenced in June 2014 with a test interview and continued with 
interviews until March 2015.   
4.5.2 Description of the sampling method - how cases were located and selected 
The researcher aimed to select units of analysis where the maximum could be 
learned in the period of time available (Tellis, 1997b, 1997a). 
The boundaries were set within English Local Government and specifically 
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English District Councils.  This was chosen as the researcher’s area of work and 
therefore the research results would be of most value from a job-related 
perspective.  The focus on district councils was also justified from several other 
perspectives, determining that a study of district councils was worthwhile, and that 
districts had sufficiently distinct characteristics to enable a separate study.  At the 
time of the research there were 201 districts in England with responsibility for 
spending a significant sum of public money having a total service expenditure of 
£9bn. (MHCLG Revenue Outturn summary 2014 to 2015).  District councils 
(specifically shire districts in County areas – the study did not address 
Metropolitan districts which have responsibility for a different set of services see 
Appendix A(ii)) have a distinct identity compared to other tiers of local 
government and warranted separate study for the following reasons: 
• Financial Pressures:  Following the 2010 election they faced the biggest 
financial cuts in non-hypothecated grants of all the authority types (see 
Appendix A(ii)) with front loaded cuts of 25% in the first two years and 
total cuts of 38% (though Metropolitan districts suffered the largest overall 
cuts (National Audit Office (NAO), 2018)) so facing the biggest pressures 
in those early years;   
• Financial Sustainability:  A National Audit Office report in 2014 found 
auditors were ‘confident about future financial sustainability of district 
councils’ but were pessimistic about single tier and county councils 
(National Audit Office, 2014, p. 10); 
• Benchmark Indicators:  The number of national performance indicators 
that are still collected and published, e.g. by LG Inform, are fewer than for 
the higher tier councils suggesting they may have a different set of issues 
around comparative performance;   
• Planning:  District councils are responsible for local Planning and were the 
subject of a special service-focussed benchmarking activity (Planning 
Advisory Service, 2015); 
• Different demands:  In addition, the pressures they face are distinct from 
other authorities e.g. they are not facing pressures from the increasing 
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demands for social care like County councils, reinforcing the view that the 
lower tier is distinct from other tiers; 
• Evidence from work on the Beacon councils, where district councils made 
fewer applications for Beacon status than other types of council, suggests 
that under past performance regimes they acted differently from other 
council types (Withers and Hartley, 2007) . 
From a practitioner’s perspective they were the researcher’s area of expertise and 
thus gave higher motivation to discover if there were any benefits to districts from 
the research.  Whilst there was research into performance in councils it tended to 
focus on upper tier authorities e.g. Boyne et al (2008), Andrews and Boyne (2010), 
there was a lack of specific research for that tier, though they had been included in 
general local government studies in the UK e.g. Rashman and Hartley (2002), 
Downe, Bottrill and Martin (2017).  Geographically, an area 120 miles from the 
researcher’s home was chosen because the research method included face to face 
interviews at the interviewee’s workplaces and greater distances would have 
involved more work absence that could be managed within the researcher's annual 
holiday and the DBA time-scale. 
Potential interviewees were based on a purposeful sample (Merriam, 1998) using 
both convenience and network bases based on their involvement with current 
benchmarking initiatives or roles within district councils concerned with 
Performance improvement. 
The interviews were selected from a population of 90 district councils in the South, 
East and Midlands that met the geographical constraints. 
The universe from which the sample was finally selected was district councils 
within the following government regions: 
East 
South East 
South West 
East Midlands 
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West Midlands 
Councils in the North West, North East and Yorkshire and Humberside regions 
were outside the geographical range (see Appendix A(iii)). 
In addition, one interview was sourced from a Unitary council. 
To protect confidentiality, details of the individual councils selected for interview 
and the group that agreed to take part are not separately identified here, but 
characteristics of the councils, including a summary of their political control, are 
given in Appendix D for information. 
The sampled shire districts had a total budget for net service expenditure of 
£1,007m in financial year 2014/15, and held non Housing Reserves of £231m. at 
1 April 2014 (HM Government, 2014).  All were in areas that had three tiers of 
local government meaning that they all had at least one Parish within their district.  
None of the Councils had shared Chief Executives or Shared management teams 
at the time of the interviews.  At the time of the research none of the districts were 
in crisis measures, meaning none were subject to a government inspection 
following failure of finance or services; none were subject to a notice issued under 
Section 114 of the 1988 Local Government Finance Act, nor subject to a public 
interest report from their auditors under Section 24 of the Local Audit and 
Accountability Act 2014.  None of the councils were engaged in imminent merger 
or re-organisation plans and they were all operating on a 'business as usual' basis.  
Six councils had a Housing Revenue Account meaning that they still held 
responsibility for social housing.  Four districts were coastal, and the remainder 
were inland.  Appendix D provides collective information about the job roles of 
the interviewees, the region in which the councils were situated and the CPA score 
that each council had received in 2009. 
The interviewees fulfilled a variety of roles in benchmarking.  They were selected 
on the basis that: 
• They met the geographical constraints; 
• They were willing respondents; 
• They, or their employing authorities had undertaken an active role in 
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furtherance of benchmarking such as: 
• Active in-service benchmarking club; 
• Member of the Local Government Association Knowledge Hub; 
• Had written articles about benchmarking in technical journals; 
• Active in CIPFA Benchmarking Club; 
• Led county wide exercise on benchmarking back office. 
The sampling began by selecting individuals for interview who had a profile within 
the public sector on benchmarking.  Initial approaches were made to members of 
the LGA Knowledge Hub who were employed in district councils; subsequent 
requests to people who had written articles on benchmarking on performance in 
the public sector press.  Then followed requests to finance professionals who had 
assisted in the CIPFA Benchmarking Club and, later, the Planning Advisory 
Service where their authority had participated in the Planning Benchmarking Hub. 
These were selected in preference to random selection of Chief Executives or 
Performance Officers because the researcher was trying to capture views about 
benchmarking and the authorities’ approach to that; there was a risk with random 
selections that respondents would have answered that they not undertake 
benchmarking or didn't know anything about the subject and this would not have 
furthered the research enquiry.  In practice, a response of this nature seemed 
unlikely but would nevertheless have been a risk. 
Approaches were initially made to Chief Executives though there were three 
exceptions to this.  At that level the respondents would have known about the 
approach of their authority because they are the Head of Paid Service, or would 
have agreed to their authority participating in the research. 
An alternative approach would have been for the researcher to approach contacts 
from her own professional discipline (accountancy) by network or by a snowball 
approach.  This would likely have given valid and interesting research responses, 
but they would possibly have been skewed towards metrics benchmarking and may 
not have collected the wider range of views that the mixed disciplines delivered. 
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The three exceptions mentioned earlier were the personal approaches to 
individuals who had undertaken active benchmarking study from an accounting or 
service perspective and from service areas within the researcher's own County.  
Approaches were only made to paid officers of councils; elected members were 
not approached.  Whilst their views about benchmarking would have been a valid 
focus of study, the specific research is focussed on approaches to benchmarking as 
outlined by officers.  As this was an exploratory study, further research based on 
response from elected Members or from service-based officers or specific 
professional groups would be valid but outside the scope of this exploratory work. 
Invitations were sent in tranches to allow time for prospective interviewees to reply 
and agree dates before the next requests were made.   
4.5.3 Archival Information 
Before visiting any of the authorities, information was gathered as background to 
that authority.  This was restricted to information available in the public domain 
from the authorities’ websites. 
The background information was 
• Authority net spend (from DCLG website) 
• Latest audit report 
• Latest statement of accounts 
• Officer structure 
• Copies of Local Government Association (LGA) Corporate Peer 
Challenge (CPC) reports undertaken at the district (usually referred to as 
'Peer Review') 
• any LGA Corporate Peer Challenge reports where the interviewee had 
participated at a Peer Review elsewhere 
Not all documents were readily available in the public domain for each authority 
4.5.4 Locations for Interviews 
The aim was to interview people in their normal working environment.  The 
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alternative locations of interviews taking place at the researcher’s workplace or a 
third-party venue (e.g. London or Kingston University) were rejected as the 
potential costs of interviewees travel costs and venue room hire were outside the 
budget of this research.  Additionally, it would have significantly increased the lost 
work time for interviewees and as the immediate benefit of this research to 
individual authorities was not apparent it was expected that there would be a low 
response to that type of request.  Interviewees were interviewed in their own 
workplaces and they answered questions based on their own authorities and their 
own service functions.  The locations ranged from the interviewee’s own offices, 
a borrowed office from a colleague, a committee room and, on one occasion, the 
staff refreshment area.  The locations were chosen by the interviewees and were 
seen as physical locations that would be normal and comfortable for them.  All 
took place during normal working hours.  No payments were made to respondents 
and none asked for any remuneration for their interviews. 
4.5.5 Ethical Considerations 
Prior to any interviews being requested, ethical approval to the project was 
obtained from Kingston University (form RE4 as Appendix E).  There was no 
foreseeable harm to the organizations arising from their participation in the 
interviews (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987). 
The scope of the case study did not plan to access any unpublished or confidential 
material however during the course of interviews some such material was provided 
by the interviewees. 
All interviewees agreed that their interviews could be recorded, and digital 
recording and transcribing equipment and software was obtained. 
Immediately prior to each interview, and in line with the Universities ethical 
procedures, interviewees were invited to sign a declaration (as Appendix F) giving 
written consent to their interview being digitally recorded.  Interviewees were 
promised confidentiality in that neither their names nor that of their employing 
authority would be revealed in any published data, but that it was possible they 
could be identified from text used in any quotations.  Names of other councils 
referred to by interviewees were also redacted in the report to maintain 
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confidentiality.  The interviewer signed the same form to provide assurance that 
the confidentiality of the interview would be respected.  The interviewee was 
provided with a signed copy of the consent form.  Prior to the single interview 
undertaken via telephone, the interviewee was given the same information and 
agreed to proceed. 
One interview took place at the researcher's own workplace and this gave rise to 
the risk of bias from being an insider-researcher.  This risk was mitigated as the 
interviewee was from a different professional discipline and took a detached stance 
to the questioning and the interview framework followed the same questions as 
other councils. 
4.5.6 Interview Questions 
The interviews were planned to be on a semi-structured basis and the questions 
were designed to bring depth and breadth to the original research questions and to 
bring out actual examples of practice 
After initial enquiry about the role the interviewee took in benchmarking, the 
questions were grouped into broad topic guides around the six research questions 
as follows: 
 
Research 
Questions 
Interview Topic 
Guide 
Aim of Questions within Topic 
Guide 
Q1 Are Districts 
undertaking 
benchmarking or just 
comparing 
benchmarks? 
Benchmarking - 
General 
Interviewees interpretations of 
benchmarking, and how any 
benchmarking is undertaken in 
practice; 
Extent of convergence in 
benchmarking or practices 
Existence of mimetic isomorphic 
pressures in copying from elsewhere; 
Comparative 
Performance 
Role of benchmarking in performance 
measurement and assessment. 
Q2 How are districts 
changing in their 
approach to 
benchmarking during 
the period under 
Localism? 
 
Comparative 
Performance - 
Localism 
Changes in approach to benchmarking 
under Localism 
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Research 
Questions 
Interview Topic 
Guide 
Aim of Questions within Topic 
Guide 
Q3 Are districts 
converging and 
complying in their 
practice of 
benchmarking? 
Comparative 
Performance CPA 
 
Perceptions of CPA as a coercive 
pressure in making changes; 
Role of coercive 
bodies – central govt.; 
auditors – 
Transformation 
Challenge 
Perceptions of central government and 
of [external] auditors as coercive 
pressures; 
Professional 
groups/organisations 
The extent to which normative groups 
were involved in benchmarking; the 
officer perceptions of the value of 
belonging to Benchmarking club(s) 
(formal or informal) to address 
whether club membership was 
considered important for officers 
displaying the legitimacy of their 
behaviours to elected members; 
County wide and 
national groups  
The extent of normative isomorphism 
and role played by professional and 
informal networks; 
Role of the LGA – 
Peer Reviews and LG 
Inform 
The role played by the sector led body, 
and whether that is seen as a normative 
force; 
Changes to structures Extent of copying others’ structures as 
a mimetic pressure. 
 
Q4 Are district 
councils ‘converging’ 
in their practices, 
cultures, and 
structures as a 
consequence of their 
benchmarking? 
Comparative 
Performance - 
mechanisms 
Impact of practical mechanisms 
employed to drive performance at each 
council to enable comparison of 
convergence with others; 
Changes to Structures Ascertain influences on changing 
structure; 
 
Changes to Structures 
- Localism 
Specific impact of Localism on 
changes to structures etc 
 
Changes to Structures 
– Shared Services 
Influences to share 
services/management 
 
Q5 Has the impact of 
previous isomorphic 
pressures sedimented 
into current cultures 
and what impact 
does this have?   
Comparative 
Performance CPA 
Influence of CPA on current practice; 
The impact of previous coercive 
pressures including assessment 
regimes and the impact these have 
made on current approaches to 
benchmarking 
 
Q6 What does the 
concept of legitimacy 
mean in the district 
Benchmarking – 
Members 
 
Perceptions of club etc membership as 
a legitimizing activity from Members 
perspective; 
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Research 
Questions 
Interview Topic 
Guide 
Aim of Questions within Topic 
Guide 
council context and 
how is their approach 
to benchmarking 
helping to achieve 
this? 
Impact of Localism Perspective of delivering citizen 
satisfaction under Localism; 
 
Legitimacy Role of benchmarking, sharing 
services or management in delivering 
legitimacy 
 
Figure 5  Table of Research Questions and Topic Guides 
4.5.7 Test interview 
A set of test questions was prepared based on the review of literature and an 
arrangement made with a personal contact of the researcher who had responsibility 
for performance at a local authority to participate in a test interview.  (This 
interview took place in June 2014 at the interviewees’ workplace; the interviewee, 
and his colleague, completed the ethical consent form and that interview was 
recorded).  The purpose of the test interview was to ensure that the questions could 
be answered in practice by local government officers involved in performance and 
that they were relevant and timely.  Also, to check the digital recording equipment 
in a live environment and to give practice for the interviewer in interviewing in a 
neutral manner and to test the transcription equipment. 
The interview took place as planned and the questions were found to be sound.  
The interviewees were co-operative and gave comprehensive responses to the 
questions.  Transcribing the test interview was undertaken personally by the 
researcher and, whilst taking longer than expected, was found to be useful in 
gaining deeper understanding on what had been said.   
The interviews were planned to elicit specific information that was unavailable 
from the literature review and was crucial to satisfying the research questions.  The 
interviews were semi-structured with flexibility to include further open-ended 
questions based on the initial responses.  The advantage of open-ended questions 
was seen as allowing the interviewees free rein to expand on their answers and 
deliver rich descriptions from their own experience, instead of having to pick from 
survey answer choices that may not have included an appropriate answer from 
their perspective.  The interviews lasted between 25 minutes (where an additional 
interview took place at one council) to one and quarter hours.  Questions were 
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based on overall objectives of the study as well as the literature review.  The 
question sheet used as the outline for the interviews is included at Appendix G 
because that is considered to be good practice (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 
1987).  During the interviews, manuscript notes were made as a precaution against 
equipment failure, and as an aide-mémoire of any points that the interviewer 
wished to follow up or request further clarification. 
 
4.6 Main Interviews 
A total of 44 Chief Executives were approached in order to obtain interviews at 18 
councils. 
Requests for an interview were sent by email to the Chief Executive at the 
workplace address.  These were 'cold call' requests, with the exception of three 
interviewees known personally to the researcher.  If no response was received after 
two weeks a further request was made by email.  If there was no response to the 
second email, the council was dropped from the request list.  29 Chief Executives 
declined or did not respond to a second request. 
The interview phase lasted for a period of nine months.  Interviews had to be 
arranged at times that were convenient to the interviewees and fitted in with the 
researcher's own work constraints.  Interviews followed the guideline questions 
that had been identified and tested during the test interview. 
Appendix D shows the total number of interviews, the officers interviewed, and 
the geographical spread of councils covered in this research.  It also includes the 
results of the final Comprehensive Performance Assessment for those councils.  
The schedule of interviews shows a spread of councils over the regions in the 
South, East and Midlands, together with a range of CPA scores across the four 
possible results. 
4.6.1 Data Collection 
As planned, a total of 18 interviews plus an additional interview offered whilst the 
researcher was at a district location, were undertaken and, with the exception of 
one interview that was conducted over the telephone, all took place at the 
interviewees' workplaces which were local government offices.  In the week 
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preceding the interviews, the interviewee was emailed further information about 
the research (Appendix H).  All the interviews took place at the planned time and 
location.  On four occasions the expected interviewer was accompanied by a 
colleague who also participated in the interview.  On one occasion the opportunity 
was given by the interviewee to speak with a service colleague at the same location 
and this interview was also undertaken using the same ethical arrangements 
outlined earlier.   
The main collection source was 19 interviews (originally proposed 18) with 23 
practitioners from 18 councils and took place over a period of nine months and 
were completed before the General Election in 2015.  This time-scale was 
considered possible within the sector and timetable (Rowley, 2002).  The actual 
interviews were undertaken with: 
• 2 Chief Executives; 
• 5 Service Officers; 
• 4 Finance Officers, including those with s.151 responsibility; 
• 12 Performance Officers (or similar titles). 
The interviews were planned to elicit specific information that had been 
unavailable from the literature review and was crucial to satisfying the research 
questions.  The questions were semi structured with flexibility to include open 
ended questions based on initial responses.  It was anticipated that the interviews 
would last one hour, and that proposed duration was quoted in the request for 
interviews to enable them to plan their time.  All interviewees were assured of 
complete confidentiality and as a consequence neither their names nor their 
authorities are mentioned in this dissertation. 
Most of the interviews were face to face with a single council officer, but at four 
councils there were interviews with two officers (Appx D).  At three of these the 
pairing was a senior officer and the performance officer, whilst at the fourth, it was 
a service officer and performance officer.  The paired interviews were offered by 
the councils and were not specifically requested.  Multiple interviews, either on an 
individual basis or as focus groups were not part of the plan for this study.   
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Multiple interviews would be appropriate where the interviewees at a site are seen 
as diverse (Ritchie and Lewis, 2011), based on a belief that each management level 
or job type represents a diverse layer, rather than an homogenous group.  Multiple 
level surveys i.e. two or three layer echelons, are considered superior to elite 
surveys in public sector research because they are considered to give a more 
accurate organisational picture (Enticott, Boyne and Walker, 2008; Döring, Downe 
and Martin, 2015).  For this research, additional interviews would have been 
required for each selected diverse layer at every council.  However, the 
perspectives of the different layers were not seen as critical for control or 
comparison in this research, though it is acknowledged that senior officers such as 
Chief Executives would be likely to have a different perspectives from operational 
officers, e.g. Downe, Hartley and Rashman (2004) but, logistically, multiple 
interviews would have reduced the number of councils that could be sampled and 
were not used as a method at this exploratory stage.  There is therefore a limitation 
within this study of the opportunity to triangulate both between different levels at 
each site, and between the same or job roles at different sites and multiple 
interviews could therefore be useful in a wider ranging study. 
4.7 Research boundaries 
Research Boundaries were set to guard against the risk of the investigations 
becoming too wide and drifting away from the original plan (Benbasat, Goldstein 
and Mead, 1987) and therefore boundaries were demarcated (Merriam, 1998) to 
delimit the study.  The boundaries also followed the guidance of Stake (1978) who 
stressed the importance of ensuring that boundaries are kept in focus 'what is 
happening is deemed important within these boundaries (the emic) is considered 
vital' (Stake, 1978, p. 7).  The study was confined to the district council level of 
English local government. 
Interviews for the study were limited to council officers only, and did not include 
Cabinet members with responsibility for performance (or committee chairmen in 
councils that did not have the Cabinet system).  The sample of interviewees was 
guided by principles outlined by Ritchie, who noted that if the population is known 
to be very diverse in relation to the subject then the sample size would have to 
increase noting that each sample unit would need intensive resource for data 
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collection and analysis (Ritchie and Lewis, 2011, p. 84).  Interviews did not include 
elected Members because they were seen as a diverse group with perceptions and 
expectations differing from those of officers.  Including the members would also 
have broadened the scale of the study because of the need to interview the Cabinet 
Member (or equivalent) at all of the selected councils.  In addition, the accessibility 
and availability of members could have extended the time duration of the work 
beyond the time constraints of the DBA.  
Restricting the interviews to officers is a limitation of the work and further research 
could be undertaken into the views of elected members, and members with 
responsibility for performance and contrasting their views with the views of 
officers.   
4.7.1 Determining sample size for planning purposes 
Literature was probed for the factors in qualitative research that would help 
determine an approximation sample sufficiency at the planning stage (Malterud, 
Siersma and Guassora, 2016; Hagaman and Wutich, 2017). 
Whilst there is a power calculation to calculate sample size for a given population 
in quantitative studies, no similar standard exists for qualitative studies (Malterud, 
Siersma and Guassora, 2016) and samples for qualitative study are generally 
smaller than for quantitative (Mason, 2010).  Because the sample size for case 
studies are not pre-defined it has been suggested that further interviewing should 
stop when saturation point is reached i.e. no further incremental learning  is taking 
place and researchers are observing phenomenon seen before (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009).  In practice, this point has been described as the point in data collection and 
analysis 'when new information produces little or no change to the code book' 
(Hagaman and Wutich, 2017, p. 25). 
An overriding issue in the determination of sample size was that the nature of the 
research was exploratory with the aim of indicating [areas for future research] 
rather than concluding (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006; Malterud, Siersma and 
Guassora, 2016).  Multerud et al advised that they were 'usually satisfied when a 
study offers new insights that contribute substantially to or challenge current 
understandings' (2016, p. 1759).  The sample size was required to be not too large 
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so that deep case oriented analysis could be undertaken (Sandelowski, 1995).  A 
further factor impacting on the sample size is that of the expertise of the researcher; 
Jette, Grover and Keck (2003) considered that expertise in the research area helped 
to facilitate a smaller sample size. 
4.7.2 Planned Sample size 
The planned sample size of 18 was selected following an examination of research 
reports (Hazlett, Mcadam and Beggs, 2008; Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2013) 
and, taking on board comments from researchers on the size of the sample, 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Adler and Adler, 2013; Miller, 2013). 
As a further check, the size of the sample was checked against other writers who 
had specified the point at which their research had reached saturation point.  In 
their research, Guest et al (2006) found that whilst many published sources 
explained the rational for sampling, only 7 sources provided guidelines for actual 
sizes.  Sandelowksi (1995) wrote that whilst a sample of one may be sufficient to 
permit the valuable kind of generalisation which can be made from and about 
cases; Guest et al (2006) found that saturation had, for the most part, occurred after 
the first 12 interviews; Latham (2013) concluded 15 interviews as a minimum; 
Bertaux (1983) argued that 15 was the smallest possible sample size in qualitative 
research; Hagaman and Wutich (2017) found that 16 or fewer interviews were 
enough to identify common themes, whilst Crouch and McKenzie (2006) 
considered that less than 20 was sufficient.   
This review confirmed the reasonableness of the original sample size for planning 
purposes. 
The final size of the sample is considered to be 'a matter of judgement and 
experience in evaluating the quality of the information collected against the uses 
to which it will be put' (Sandelowski, 1995, p. 183).  Adequacy of the final sample 
size was continuously evaluated during the research (Malterud, Siersma and 
Guassora, 2016). 
4.7.3 Adequacy of Final Sample Size 
18 councils were included in the final study.  A total of 18 planned interviews took 
place and an additional opportunity was offered at a location to interview a service 
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officer giving a total of 19 interviews. 
Within qualitative research the sample size is usually small because phenomena 
only need to appear once to be part of the analytical map (Ritchie and Lewis, 2011; 
Malterud, Siersma and Guassora, 2016).  A key point being that one occurrence of 
a piece of data or a code is all that is necessary to ensure it becomes part of the 
analysis framework (Mason, 2010).  Appendix I provides evidence of this where 
information for 3 nodes was referenced in only one interview but those 
interviewees provided rich information sources.  Whilst the last new coding node 
was made after the 15th council, interviews continued up to the planned level to 
check that no new major concepts emerged in the next few interviews (Thomson, 
2011; Latham, 2013); Appendix J.  
The adequacy of the sample was continuously evaluated during the research 
(Malterud, Siersma and Guassora, 2016) following the concept of saturation 
(Glaser and Strauss, 2009).  The point of data saturation was reached when there 
was sufficient information to replicate the study and further coding was no longer 
feasible (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006; Fusch and Ness, 2015).  In addition, 
the data needed to have quality i.e. ‘rich data’, and sufficient quantity i.e. ‘thick 
data (Fusch and Ness, 2015).  The requirement for ‘rich’ data is that it is many 
layered, intricate, detailed, and nuanced. 
The breadth and scope of the questions influenced the achievement of the sample 
size.  As the range of the research was narrowly defined it was expected that 
saturation would be reached more rapidly than in a broader study (Fusch and Ness, 
2015).  The following graph shows how new nodes were added to NVivo as the 
interviews progressed. 
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Figure 6  Code creation in NVivo 
 
The rate of accretion of new coding slowed down after the first 5 interviews and 
no new codes were added after the 16th interview (15th council).  Only two new 
nodes were created in the last 3 councils with no new NVivo codes added after the 
16th interview.  The later interviews added additional data (thick data) and further 
examples within the codes that has already been created in the earlier interviews 
suggesting that further coding was no longer feasible (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 
2006).  Although no new codes were created, interviews continued as good 
practice to test the level of saturation (Thomson, 2011). 
The data was sufficient to answer the themes in the research and had provided 
sufficient data such that the study could be replicated.  The data was assessed to 
be both ‘rich’ and ‘thick’ as the interviews had provided over one thousand coded 
comments across sixty-four nodes.  For ‘richness’, the quotations gave examples 
that provided both interest and depth to the study and a range of perspectives to 
each of the nodes.  Some candid views were captured, especially regarding politics, 
supporting the view that richness of data had been achieved.  Although two 
interviewees with academic members of the LGA Knowledge Hub were originally 
planned, these did not take place and triangulation was effected through academic 
papers. 
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Justification for this small sample is that all interviewees followed the same 
industry wide language (or jargon) (Charmaz, 2013).  This small study did include 
interviewees from different disciplines (e.g. Planning, Housing, Finance) but was 
restricted to local government and did not cross industries (Mason, 2010). 
The heterogeneity of the population was another factor in assessing the adequacy 
of the final sample size, as a diverse population would increase the required sample 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2011).  There was a mix of positions held by interviewees in 
the actual study.  Actual interviews took place with senior officers (Chief 
Executives, s.151 officers, or service managers reporting directly to the Chief 
Executive) and less senior officers – mainly Performance Officers, so this 
questioned the extent to which they were a homogenous group.  All the 
interviewees were council officers i.e. not elected members, and so could be 
treated as homogenous in that respect, though it could be argued that at a more 
granular level they could be viewed as a more diverse group suggesting a separate 
study.  
4.7.4 Data Handling 
A project was set up in NVivo and a dissertation log was also started in NVivo 
noting the researcher’s reflections on the interviews, process, and subsequent 
coding.  The transcripts were made verbatim except where the recording was 
unclear and after several repeats could not be understood; where this happened, 
the script was marked '[unclear]' in the transcript.  Potential for contract typing of 
the recordings was considered and rejected as it was felt that the additional time 
listening to the interviews would aid in-depth understanding of the responses 
because they would pick up tone and nuance of speech that is not shown on the 
transcripts.  All interviews were personally transcribed, and accuracy was checked 
by proof reading the scripts against the digital recording by both the researcher and 
a native English speaker with a knowledge of local government whilst listening to 
the audio recording.  After any corrections, the transcript was emailed to the 
interviewees' work-based email address. 
The interview transcripts were immediately loaded into the NVivo project.  
Original transcripts are available together with the recordings made during the 
interviews. 
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4.8 Coding of interview material 
The initial coding was based on an initial set of a-priori thematic codes based on a 
pre-reading of the first transcripts.  (Coding commenced after the first five 
interviews).  Further codes (nodes in NVivo) were developed from textual analysis 
and were added as more transcripts were coded (Miles and Huberman, 1984).  
Initial transcripts were then reviewed to reflect the additional codes in an iterative 
process.  After consideration on how the information could be synthesised, the 
initial nodes were conflated to a smaller number to facilitate a match to the revised 
conceptual model.  A schedule of the final nodes is given at Appendix I.  All the 
coding was undertaken by the researcher so there was no risk of team inconsistency 
in the interpretation of codes.  Material from the research is held in NVivo so that 
future researchers would be able to access it. 
As the interviews had included open ended questions and had encouraged 
interviewees to expand on topics with examples from their own experience, the 
coding could not be mechanized (although some NVivo queries were run on key 
words such as finance and funding).  NVivo was used to run sample queries on 
patterns of responses analysed by professional groups e.g. all service officers, as a 
sense check for similarity of the scope and coverage of coding for their transcripts.  
The risk that the analysis coding is subjective is acknowledged because the facts 
have been filtered through the subjective lens of the investigator (Benbasat, 
Goldstein and Mead, 1987, p. 378).  This risk has been mitigated by including 
thick descriptions in the final analysis and the collection of notes during the course 
of the study – especially the dissertation log – that support the conclusions. 
The quality control of the research was enhanced by using the unexpected theories 
as part of the investigation.  The unexpected findings in the evidence have been 
used to strengthen the case study and so increase the rigour of the research. 
To assist in analysis of the interviews, the extracts from all of the interviews were 
printed out as analysed by node.  These interview listings were re-read and salient 
comments that gave the essence of that node were highlighted for use in the text 
to illustrate the views that were voiced in the interviews and to substantiate the 
findings.   
The districts have been anonymised to keep faith with the anonymity promised by 
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the ethical considerations of the project.  They have been described as Council A 
through to Council R in the order in which the selected quotations have been used.  
The extracts from transcripts are brief and references to councils that were not part 
of the study have been redacted, and some references to events have been removed 
to avoid the possibility that an informed reader would be able to identify the 
sources from the text. 
4.8.1  Difficulties encountered 
The response rate to interview requests was initially disappointing but, ultimately, 
sufficient councils responded out of the initial 44 requests to meet the planned 
interviews at 18 places.  The original expectation was that interviews would take 
place with Chief Executives of councils, but in practice the requests were 
sometimes delegated to officers with responsibility for performance or services.  
In practice, officers below the level of Chief Executive may have had more detailed 
knowledge of the practice of benchmarking in their council.  Insistence on an 
interview with the Chief Executive may have resulted in gaining insufficient 
interviews to meet the chosen target of 18.  Pragmatically, an interview with an 
officer designated by the Chief Executive was as valid as the Chief Executive 
because such delegation was considered as giving tacit approval to participation in 
the study. 
If the Chief Executive referred my request to another officer, I interpreted that 
delegation as the Chief Executive empowering the delegate to answer 
appropriately on the behalf of the authority and, by implication, the Chief 
Executive.  This delegation was seen as valid by the Researcher as the action of 
the Chief Executive taking time out of their schedule to speak to a researcher on a 
matter with no immediate or obvious benefit to the authority may not have been 
perceived as good use of that senior resource by elected Members.  Further, Chief 
Executives would know which officer is best placed to answer questions on 
practical aspects of running the authority. 
Where a Chief Executive offered an interview with an officer responsible for 
Performance this was accepted.  In practice this added additional breadth to the 
research as those officers added a different perspective. 
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One interview took place by telephone and although the quiet and private location 
had been tested for the ability to hear and digitally record a telephone call, the 
actual interview was only part recorded because of very poor telephone line quality 
and the transcript of the interview relied on manuscript notes made at the time.   
Transcribing interviews was originally expected to take six hours per hour of 
interview but, in practice took twice as long after checking and proof reading.  The 
extra time arose mainly from time taken in listening in real time to check typing 
accuracy and for small sections where the speech was unclear due to extraneous 
noise or unclear speech. 
4.9 Critique of this research method 
This section examines possible criticisms of this method and justifies the selection 
and method applied. 
4.9.1 Potential for Different Approaches 
Potentially this research could have been undertaken by Factor Analysis to 
determine perceptions of the benchmarking but that approach, as used by Andrews 
et al (2011) in their study of Welsh local services, requires initial questions to be 
sound and fundamentally for the researchers own paradigm would not have 
gathered the rich data of an interpretive approach.  Within the same method the 
aspects of the research that could have been handled differently would be a 
different geographical base, but this was rejected on cost grounds.  A shorter time 
scale was not achievable within the constraints of researcher time.  The scope of 
research could have covered other tiers of local government but that would have 
made a larger study that could not have been achieved within the time scale of the 
DBA. 
4.9.2 Sufficiency of case sites 
The duration of each individual interview was realistic.  Additional interviews may 
have provided a greater depth to the study and that could offer opportunity for 
future research.  The initial scope of the project did not consider that there would 
be any significant regional variations in responses but geographical differences in 
approach did appear during the interviews; there is potential for further research 
on a regional basis and further research into the rationale and factors affecting the 
apparent co-working that was discussed in the Midlands but was not apparent in 
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the larger counties of the South East. 
4.10 External Validity 
Ensuring external validity for this research was undertaken by applying sound 
principles relating to interpretative studies based on literature research.  Potential 
risks and criticisms were addressed, and the actions taken to safeguard the research 
validity from those risks are explained here.   
4.10.1 Risk of Lack of Rigour 
Case study research has been criticised as a technique because of suggestions that 
it lacks rigour (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010), although Yin (2009) advised that other 
this lack of rigour is not an inherent feature of the technique but possible failures 
in the implementation of the technique by 'sloppy' researchers.  He holds that other 
techniques can also lack rigour, citing surveys where the questions have been 
biased, or poor experiments.  The safeguard that was observed in this research to 
counter allegations of lack of rigour was to follow the systematic procedures set 
up prior to undertaking the field work (Rowley, 2002), and to report all evidence 
fairly without conscious bias.  For this reason, quotations have been included in 
the research report to interpretations and original digital recordings and transcripts 
are held as evidence. 
4.10.2 Construct Validity 
The concept of construct validity is addressed here separately from the wider issues 
of research quality because there are differing views on its applicability to 
interpretive research.  The function of construct validity is to show that the right 
tools have been chosen to answer the research question, i.e. that the research does 
what it says it is going to do.  Silverman (1998) however, rejected the concept of 
construct validity because it conflicted with the nature of interpretive study.  Yin 
(2009) from a positivist stance, offered three remedies for ensuring construct 
validity and these appear to be sound controls on research quality and these were 
followed in the research.  Firstly, the research involved more than one type of 
evidence, so documents from analysis sites and benchmarking clubs were used in 
addition to interviews.  A clear chain of evidence was maintained on a database 
which is referenced so that material could be accessed by future researchers.  The 
final recommendation is that the report should be reviewed by key informants; this 
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cross check was undertaken with colleagues with an involvement in benchmarking 
and performance who were not part of the informant organisations (Gibbert and 
Ruigrok, 2010). 
4.11 Ensuring research quality 
Critics of the case study method have challenged the method on grounds of 
validity, reliability, and generalisability of the results, though these terms are 
usually used in connection with quantitative research.  Merriam (1985) suggests 
that a different vocabulary is appropriate for qualitative research and notes that 
qualitative research should be judged as credible and confirmable as opposed to 
valid and reliable.  The quality of this research will be confirmed using the 
trustworthiness criteria defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985).  Their criteria have 
been used because it is a better fit for qualitative research.  They have a 
categorisation of criteria that parallels the quality controls set by Yin (2009) for 
quantitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 43): 
• Credibility; 
• Transferability; 
• Dependability; 
• Confirmability. 
4.11.1 Credibility 
This parallels the quantitative 'internal validity' and aims to ensure that the findings 
will be believable.  Four quality control measures are suggested to prove research 
credibility: Prolonged engagement, Triangulation, Peer debriefing and Member 
checking (Houghton, Casey and Murphy, 2012). 
Prolonged engagement is more appropriate to an ethnographic study and was not 
a relevant option for this study.  Peer debriefing (a feature of investigator 
triangulation)  (Denzin, 1989) will not feature in this research as the work will be 
undertaken by a single researcher and not as part of a consortium or shared 
research.  Member checking was included by inviting interviewees to review the 
transcripts of their interviews.  Triangulation was included by using a mix of 
sources rather than relying solely on interviews (Merriam, 1985).  Initial 
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interviews, and their coding, were triangulated against later interview coding.  
Triangulation of one case to others in a study was considered to be valid 
triangulation by McClintock, Brannon and Maynard-Moody (1979) where the 
researchers used one single case as the base – an in-depth study of a single 
individual - and then triangulated the evidence from seven other studies against 
that individual.   
4.11.2 Transferability 
Transferability parallels 'external validity' or 'generalizability' in quantitative 
research and enquires if the findings can be applied to other cases. 
 'Criticising the case study method for being ungeneralisable is 
comparable to criticising a washing machine for not telling the time.  
It is unjust to criticise a method for not being able to do something 
that it was never originally designed to do' (Becker et al., 1994). 
A case study is not intended to provide a basis for generalisation (Stake, 1978; 
Brown, 2008).  Yin explains this by saying that 'case studies ……... are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes'(Yin, 
2009, p. 15).  Rowley clarifies the matter saying: 
‘The method of generalisation for case studies is not statistical 
generalisation, but analytical generalisation in which a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the 
results of the case study.  In analytic generalisation, each case is 
viewed as an experiment, and not a case within an experiment’  
(Rowley, 2002, p. 20).   
The aim of this research was to undertake some analytic generalisation, i.e. to 
expand and generalise theories and to find out what is going on in local 
government, and not to undertake any statistical generalisation. (Hazlett, Mcadam 
and Beggs, 2008). 
The scope of the study, at 18 organisations, was small and it is acknowledged that 
overarching generalisations cannot be drawn from study at this exploratory level. 
(Bhakoo and Choi, 2013). 
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4.11.3 Dependability 
This feature, which mirrors the quantitative Reliability or the absence of random 
error (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008), covers the question - are the findings 
applicable at other times?  The objective of dependability in the study is that 
another researcher would be able to replicate the steps in the study and gain the 
same insight.  An audit trail provides good evidence for dependability (Rowley, 
2002) and a database of evidence including case study narratives and interview 
transcripts has been maintained is available for retrieval to support the final 
dissertation.   
4.11.4 Confirmability 
This facet of quality control is summarised by Bryman and Bell with the question 
'has the investigator allowed his or her own values to intrude to high degree' 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.43).  The case study technique gives rise to huge 
amounts of data (Yin, 2009) but only reports the researcher's conclusions, and is 
susceptible to greater risk of researcher bias than other methods; Miles (1979) 
summarised that, unlike quantitative research, there are few conventions the 
researcher can rely on to 'defend himself against self delusional or presentation of 
unreliable or invalid conclusions' (Miles, 1979, p. 590).  The evidence for 
confirmability in this research is that all the steps in the research have been 
recorded and evidenced thus providing an 'audit trail' showing how the sources 
were derived and the evidence obtained. 
4.12 Quality Control 
To ensure that the research met best practice for case study methodology, the work 
was reviewed against the following exemplars given by Yin (1994) and, prior to 
that research, the expected contribution to knowledge was determined. 
4.12.1 Significance of the case study.   
Yin (1994) advises that for an exemplar case study, the cases are unusual and of 
general public interest.  The individual cases selected for this study were not 
perceived as particularly unusual and the evidence from the individual cases was 
often similar but, as the evidence built up, it became clear that the current practice 
was presenting a different view from that expected from previous theoretical study 
and was thus of valuable academic interest.  From the technical perspective of the 
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local government sector, the activity of benchmarking still has a high profile as it 
is promoted through the LGA LG Inform tool and through audit reports and CIPFA 
promotion of benchmarking clubs. 
4.12.2 Completeness 
Prior to work commencing, the boundaries of the research in terms of resource 
availability were determined and the limits and de-limits of the work (Appendix 
K) designed so that it could be completed within the resource constraints.  Yin 
advises that the case study should continue until the analytic periphery is reached 
and 'the information is of decreasing relevance to the case study' (Yin, 1994, p. 
186).  Within the predetermined boundaries of the research, the evidence was 
analysed thoroughly using NVivo to report by nodes and also to report by 
keywords and these reports were used to explain and to justify the research 
interpretation.  The analysis of this information continued until no further new 
information was evident 
4.12.3 Consideration of Alternative Perspectives 
Within the examination of evidence, the alternative views were reported, e.g. 
where interviewees had rejected the use of benchmarking as a performance 
improvement tool, and where opposing views were held on value of audit reports 
or scepticism about the value of CPA.  Examples were sought to bring out 
compliance and convergence of practice. 
4.12.4 Sufficiency of evidence 
Within the report, quotations have been used to reinforce views held and to support 
evidence for the theoretical conclusions.  Examples are provided that do not only 
support the researcher’s conclusions but those which present an alternative view.  
This had been done to add richness and interest for the reader and to reflect the 
wide nature of the cases examined, but also to reinforce a lack of bias in reporting 
the evidence. 
4.13 Summary 
A formal case protocol which specifies the scope of the research, the limits, and 
de-limits of the research, together with a practical template which was followed 
during the empirical stage of the research is attached as Appendix C.  The de-
limitations of the project are included as Appendix K. 
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5 Findings – Benchmarking Practices and Pressures 
5.1 Introduction 
This section gives an interpretation of the research derived using the coding regime 
in NVivo.  The findings from the research begin with the contextual framework 
within which English Districts were working.  This is analysed over the political 
context and financial pressures both at a micro level from local Members and tax 
payers, and externally from central government.  Although commencing with the 
Neo-institutional model (Figure 3), the research suggested a new conceptual 
framework as Figure 13.  Starting from the original framework the pressures within 
Neo-institutional theory that might suggest isomorphic movement towards a 
common set of processes are examined.   
Empirical research found that whilst the actions of the isomorphic pressures, 
particularly normative and coercive pressures were relevant in the changes to the 
approach toward benchmarking these actions were tempered by or filtered through 
the culture of the organisations and the culture relating to benchmarking in the 
districts.  These ‘filters’ acted as modifiers on the benchmarking activity.  The 
research examined the actual current practice of benchmarking and this is 
explained in detail.  Ashworth et al (2007) suggest that for Neo-Institutional 
Theory to fully explain legitimacy, the practices should both comply and converge 
towards the isomorphic pressures.  The actions of the councils in complying with 
the pressures and converging in their practices are examined against this 
theoretical underpinning.  Finally, the research summarises the extent to which the 
approach to benchmarking can be explained by Neo-institutional theory. 
In summary, the approach as interpreted from the research is that the technique of 
benchmarking is seen as a post facto confirmation that the council is in line with 
its peers on metrics and is a tool used for indicating existing performance in 
comparison to similar councils.  Councils sought re-assurance that their services 
were as good as, or slightly better i.e. faster or cheaper than their peers; there was 
no evidence that it was seen as a tool for comparing to the best in class from other 
sectors.  Councils did not use the term benchmarking to describe changes to 
structures. 
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5.2 Contextual background 
The research took place in English District Councils and the context of the research 
is examined by looking at the framework of politics, the attitudes towards 
customers and the impact of, and perception towards, Localism.  The research took 
place between June 2014 and March 2015 during the Liberal-Democrat 
Conservative coalition and interviewees made references to the potential impact 
of the result of the election in May 2015.  Politics are probed more deeply into the 
relations between Members and Officers and the policies operated within councils.  
Finance is a key factor in the contextual framework of district councils.  The 
turbulent nature of finance in district councils was described in their annual 
statements of account (SoA), e.g. 
‘The financial future for local government remains extremely 
uncertain’ (Statement of Accounts 2013/14 Council C). 
Districts stated that they faced volatility in income from fees and charges (SoA 
2013/14 Council F); low investment income from low interest rates (SoA 2013/14 
Council M); risks from localisation of business rates and Localisation of Council 
Tax Support (SoA2013/14, Council A).  Districts also faced increasing demands 
for services following cuts in funding to other tiers of local government: 
‘[Council N], as a district council will have to manage the risk of 
community expectation to backfill for reducing County Council 
services’ (CPC, Council N) 
‘plan for the impact of potential County Council decisions, for 
example, the reduction in funding for community centres’ (CPC 
Council F) 
There were also .increased concerns from other financial pressures such as benefit 
payments and homelessness (SoA 2013/14 Council O; Council L; Council B)  
The full impact of finance and potential reductions in external funding are 
addressed within the section on Coercive Pressures. 
The context of delivering benchmarking comparisons was stressed by some 
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interviewees particularly in assessing the flaws of the previous CPA process:   
“It often failed to really understand the local context for an 
organisation”  (Transcript Council A, page 6, line 243). 
The individual circumstances of a district council could make a difference to 
comparative figures and without an explanatory context, comparisons could be 
misleading: 
“we need the contextual information around why we are expensive 
or why our performance is not as good as it could be” (Transcript 
Council J, page 5, line 218). 
This initially sounds like a defensive excuse for metrics that compared 
unfavourably with others, but supports the views, discussed later in this chapter, 
that the council considered itself to be unique. 
5.2.1 Politics 
District Councils operate in a political environment in a regime with separation 
between politicians (Members) are responsible for defining general plans, and the 
administration (professionals) who have responsibility for executing them 
(Hyndman et al., 2014). 
Members are democratically elected either every four years or one quarter of seats 
up for election every year, or elections in three years out of four with County 
elections in the fourth year.  Some Members operate within party political groups 
identifying with national political groupings, whereas some councils have many 
independent members.   
Councils can choose between a Cabinet system or a Committee system of 
governance.  Where a district has a Cabinet system, a Member will, again in the 
style that echoes central government, have responsibility for a specific service and 
be known as the Portfolio Holder.  Where the Committee system exists, the elected 
member with responsibility will be the Chair of the service committee.  Some 
Councils are finely balanced between parties and control can change overnight at 
an election or by a Member 'crossing the floor'.  Officers have to be able to continue 
services and one Chief Executive explained that there had been discussions with 
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all groups prior to the elections to obtain a feel for their policies if they were to be 
successful at the ballot. 
Some Independent Members do not necessarily identify as a group.  The ruling 
group, 'the administration', will elect a Leader and, as with central government, the 
minority group (or groups) would be the 'opposition Members'.  Where a party 
system operates then each political grouping would have its own group leader.  
Officers hold political neutrality.  Senior Officers will usually be in 'politically 
restricted posts' which precludes them from working for political parties.  Whilst 
officers must be non-partisan they have to be politically aware.  Some councillors 
can be elected as Members to more than one tier of local government, referred to 
as 'dual hatted'; belonging to two or, sometimes, three of County, District and 
Parish or Town Councils.  One interviewee explained the situation where their 
Leader was also a county councillor and the Leader of the county Council was on 
the same district council.  One council had three Members of its Cabinet also on 
the County Cabinet which led to the situation where the County Council wished to 
close a facility within the District and consulted with the District about the closure.  
The District Members had (some of whom were also County Members) had to give 
the district response (which was a desire to keep the facility open).  In another area, 
even though members were dual-hatted there was no drive for unitary status.   
Another Council referred to: 
“lack of trust at a political level between districts and County” 
(Transcript Council D, page 24, line 783).   
Friction between district and County was seen in connection with districts 
combining and being large enough to be a threat to the County Council. 
Officers were aware of the cyclical nature of council elections and saw this as 
having an impact on the presentation of performance information.  In an interview 
in early 2015 an officer noted: 
“at the moment all the Members want us to be top of the pops for 
everything they want us to show that we are high performing and 
we're low cost and we're, you know, efficient but fast forward four 
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months and you've got different ...strategic...aspirations.” 
(Transcript Council K, page 8, line 363). 
Earlier whilst at each individual council the division between activities that are the 
responsibility of the administration and the decisions that can be taken by the 
executive are clearly defined these limits of delegated powers are not common 
across all districts.  Members have the power to determine these delegations at 
each council:  
“the 90% of stuff that is delegated is only delegated because 
Members agree the constitution that allows it to be delegated”.  
(Transcript Council K, page 6, line 296).   
5.2.2 Members and Benchmarking 
The approach of Members to benchmarking did not follow a consistent pattern or 
practice.   
The degree of interest expressed by Members in benchmarking activity varied 
between councils and this was possibly driven by the extent to which officers 
pushed benchmarking information towards Members rather than a response to 
member demands.  At one council Members were considered to be treating 
benchmarking information as important because: 
“it enables them to, shall we say, constructively criticise the 
administration and senior officers......they'll use it for negative 
political....... they are bothered about the bottom line of what they 
can put in their political pamphlets”  Transcript Council O, page 3, 
line 47). 
At the other end of the spectrum an officer held the view that Members had little 
interest in whether or not an authority participated in benchmarking: 
“I would have thought they give very little conscious thought 
whatsoever”  (Transcript Council P,  page 8, line 258). 
Performance Information based on internal indicators with comparison over time, 
was usually reported to Members, of either Cabinet or an Overview and Scrutiny 
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Committees, on a quarterly basis: 
‘Each quarter we monitor how these [Corporate Plan] activities are 
being delivered’  (Cabinet report, Council B). 
However, some councils reported more frequently: 
‘Members get a monthly dashboard of internal indicators’  (Annual 
Governance Statement, Council D). 
 The level and frequency of the benchmarking provided to Members varied from 
regular and proactive [and implied metrics]: 
“They get our performance info on a quarterly basis and Portfolio 
Holders get what's relevant to them on a monthly basis” (Transcript 
Council P, page 9, line 290); 
to a rather less frequent: 
“what we take to Members once a year for them to have a look at”  
(Transcript Council B (i), page 13, line 269). 
Although the nature of benchmarking information that members demanded was 
not explored, one officer advised that the only information their members 
requested was for comparative council tax increases across the county.  There were 
no examples given of members requesting evidence of comparisons of methods of 
providing services. 
5.2.3 Customers 
Councils exist to provide services to their customers and in the interviews the 
officers referred to 'customers' and 'residents'; their focus was on residents rather 
than businesses.  This focus on customers came across strongly: 
 “we start with the objective of 'this is what the customer needs' 
'focussing on what's important to local people”  (Transcript Council 
B (i), page 12, line 246). 
Customer focus was a key component of the Peer Reviews and all of the Reviews 
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that had taken place gave feedback on the Councils’ attitudes toward customers.  
Overall the commitment to customers that had been observed by Peers was high: 
‘The Peer team found a good customer service ethos throughout the 
organisation’ (CPC Council C) 
‘[Council F] engages with residents more proactively than many 
councils’ (CPC, Council F) 
In particular, the teams picked up on commitment to minority groups of residents 
such as the Sikh community (Council L).  Council K ‘went the extra mile for its 
less privileged communities’ (CPC Council K).  Several councils had entered into 
collaborative arrangements with partners to operate ‘Gateway’ arrangements and 
this led Peers to comment: 
‘the incorporation of partners into the approach is beneficial for the 
customers’ (CPC, Council L) 
However, customer feedback was not high at every council, and one district was 
counselled by its Peer Team to monitor levels of satisfaction more systematically. 
This focus on customers was a change to the way officers had seen the delivery of 
services in the past: 
“a fundamental shift of the approach of this council to its [service 
redacted] service was seeing it as being very paternalistic and 
minimalist to ...a professional service that was delivering what 
customers wanted.”  (Transcript Council E, page 8, line 232). 
The role of service users is changing in district councils, and there were examples 
of empowerment to users such as housing tenants having direct responsibility for 
their own maintenance budgets.  Whilst the approach to providing customers with 
what they want, with an obvious link to the ballot box, appears logical, the 
approach could be seen as narrow because it focusses on current residents and not 
potential future residents or businesses. 
Knowledge about responsibilities for services between local government tiers or 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
107  
even between districts, particularly when shared services were involved, was seen 
as poor, with residents perceived as being unable to differentiate between different 
providers. 
5.3 Cultural Background 
This section examines the way in which the approach to benchmarking is mitigated 
or filtered by the organisational culture and how the factors making up that culture 
might lead to a variety of differing responses to isomorphic pressures.  The 
organisational culture elements were grouped in the following elements: 
 
Figure 7  Elements of Organisational Culture 
 
5.3.1 Sense of Uniqueness 
English Districts consider themselves each to be unique.  Many respondents gave 
examples of why their district was different from others and by implication could 
not benchmark their services effectively against other councils.  This was not an 
excuse not to benchmark but a genuinely felt difference.  The differences focussed 
on differences within the County; with local councils generally or communities 
within their district as opposed to geographical differences.  This perception of 
uniqueness was described in terms of community differences: 
“the issue for us is that Council E [district] has a very different 
demographic to the rest of [county redacted]”  (Transcript Council 
E, page 15, line 474); 
Or Council I:   
“The needs of that community are significantly different than 
perhaps somewhere like [quoted two other towns in the County]”  
(Transcript Council I, page 4, line 194). 
In Geography or Politics, the differences were explained: 
Sense of 
Uniqueness
Sense of 
History
Sense of 
Pride
Learning 
Organisation
People
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“[a District with a high % of Green Belt] one of the other metrics 
was ….number of houses that are built but many of our councillors 
don’t want to build too many houses” (Transcript Council A, page 2, 
line 58). 
A further fact of the perceived uniqueness was in mode of service delivery: 
“….it's not really relevant to us because…..we deliver our services 
in a different way” (Transcript Council G, page 6, line 291). 
Where national initiatives were involved, the districts gave examples of the 
changes they had made to make a policy unique to them rather than accepting the 
standard national version: 
“….. and re-badge it and do it in our own style” (Transcript Council 
J, page 2, line 60). 
The same council was operating the national ‘Troubled Families’ initiative but had 
given the project a new name and 'put a local spin on it'  (Transcript Council J, 
page 10, line 450). 
5.3.2 History 
A sense of history and past reflections is part of the cultural underpinning of district 
councils and some interviewees had been in post during the years of CPA, some 
11 years prior to the research, and mentioned the impact of that regime.  The 
recollections were strong, and the assessment result from the CPA still resonated 
with officers: 
“at the time I came to this Authority we had just been assessed as 
weak…we were bottom quartile…there were things where we needed 
a fifth quartile!”  (Transcript Council P, page 10, line 303). 
Officers reflected on the practices of the CPA regime and there was some 
disappointment with the demise of the national data set and the way they were 
grouped with other 'similar' councils for comparison of metrics: 
“we used to have a strong CPA group and a list of performance 
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measures that were nationally set that we could compare” 
(Transcript Council B (i) page 5, line 95). 
Several officers commented on their length of service to justify the soundness of 
their remarks: 
“when you’ve worked in local government as long as I have”  
(Transcript Council E, page 16, line 491); 
“personal perspective of somebody who works in the sector for a 
long time” (Transcript Council J, page 13, line 622). 
5.3.3 Pride 
Respondents presented a view of pride in their service and with local government 
generally.  This pride was predicated on the ability of the sector and the councils 
within it to achieve by showing their resilience, initiative, and innovation: 
“We are an incredibly resourceful bunch in.... local government…” 
(Transcript Council E, page 17, line 543); 
going on to explain: 
“throw change at local government and it will dissipate extremely 
rapidly in many organisations”  (Transcript Council E, page 17, line 
544). 
Peer Review teams had reflected on this, reporting on: 
“enthusiasm and pride in the council shown by all staff” (CPC, 
Council L) 
“There is pride in the area and there has been a ‘buzz’ created that 
they value highly” (CPC, Council O). 
Councils also reported in their annual statements their pride in achieving 
recognition on the national scene such as gaining Investors in People Gold; a 
Certificate of Excellence in The National Housing Maintenance Forum, and South 
East in Bloom competitions.  
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Examples were given of achievements they had made at service level e.g. 
“We moved our recycling rate from around 32% up to about 38%”  
(Transcript Council M, page 7, line 215); 
“we’re one of the cleanest districts” (Transcript Council M, page 15, 
line 479); 
“plaudits over the years for our Housing Benefits service”  
(Transcript Council G, page 3, line 125). 
Another Authority [Council J] described winning a national award for Planning 
leading to a presentation at Downing Street.  It was perhaps understandable that 
interviewees would ‘talk up’ their achievements that they had delivered, but the 
language used in describing their activities was positive and spoke of innovation 
and motivation. 
5.3.4 Learning and Achievement 
Achievement came across as an important factor in the operation of district 
councils and the expression ‘improvement journey’ was used by two interviewees 
(Council O; Council E) and there were expressions of a keenness to learn that was 
frustrated by the actions (or lack of actions) in actively sharing their achievements 
or good practice: 
“what they could do….about why they’re the top performers” 
(Transcript Council N, page 7, line 210). 
The yearning for improvement and hunger for achievement was expressed by 
another, in referring to their Peer Review: 
“[the reviewers] could have been a bit more challenging of us”  
(Transcript Council N, page 11, line 330). 
The concept of learning spread to the sector as a whole and there was desire to 
raise standards across all councils: 
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“it’s not about making yourself look better by making others look 
worse – it's about trying to raise the profile of the sector as whole”  
(Transcript Council K page 5, line 237); 
“ …helps the local government community to improve itself” 
(Transcript Council O, page 2, line 23); 
“more about learning from them so we can improve”  (Transcript 
Council N, page 2, line 33); 
but it was acknowledged that, in practice, learning did not always take place and 
that resource constraints stood in the way and opportunity was lost.  At one council 
the Peer Challenge team noted that there has been inconsistent take up of internal 
learning and development initiatives and advised Council F to ‘consider how to 
increase the take up’ (CPC, Council F).  At another , the Peer Team observed good 
practice but noticed that it was not transferring across the authority. 
In summation, a council phrased the desire to continue learning and reflecting on 
past achievements saying: 
“we weren’t going to rest on our laurels”  (Transcript Council G, 
page 1, line 30); 
and continuing with an admission that their performance had been poor:   
“we can’t be that bad we can’t be that dysfunctional but I’m afraid 
we found it” (Transcript Council G, page 3, line 122). 
5.3.5 People 
The evidence of the interviews brought out elements of staff values, leadership, 
pride in the service and the organisation and attitudes towards learning and 
achievement and these factors all mitigated against homogeneity of the approach 
to benchmarking. 
Interviews were undertaken with staff at varying levels within the organisations – 
with Chief Executives, their direct reports and other, mainly Performance Officers 
reporting to Directors.  The role of leadership had a clear effect on the approach to 
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performance in a council and changes in Chief Executive were referred to as a 
catalyst for a gear change in activity and performance.  The role of the Chief 
Executive as described by a service officer as: 
“[changing the Council] to one that was professional and well run 
and well managed and part of that journey was the whole 
performance, management culture…” (Transcript Council E, page 
7, line 225). 
Another Chief Executive was described as: 
“very keen on performance” (Transcript Council Q, page 1, line 23). 
Although it might be expected that Chief Executives would be keen to show that 
their actions had a positive impact on performance, the interviewees, with the role 
of Performance Officer, felt that it was their own role leading the drive towards 
performance improvement and that performance improvement had to be driven: 
“…you’re often relying on the interested individual officers to put in 
the work” (Transcript Council P, page 5, line 142); 
Or: 
“…if there is a driving force behind it ….  that might well encourage 
others”  (Transcript Council I, page 12, Line 557). 
And compared with the compulsion of previous CPA regimes, one officer saw that 
the presence of a dedicated [performance] officer was key to delivering 
improvements: 
“if you haven’t got a dedicated person, which most councils haven’t, 
to do that work, it just falls by the wayside” (Transcript Council N, 
page 3, line 70). 
Performance Officers saw their own roles in different ways, from the passive 
collation role as: 
“to pull together all the Corporate Performance Information but 
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also to have the role”...(Transcript Council M, page 1, line 13); 
to the more active: 
“a catalyst, a sort of agitator”  (Transcript Council M, page 10, line 
307). 
District Councils presented a staff-centric attitude; staff mattered and were 
considered important for the delivery of service improvement.  This issue of well-
being was mentioned as important for the Chief Executive and acknowledgement 
that the previous benchmarking exercise had been: 
“a highly stressful exercise for staff”  (Transcript Council E, page 8, 
line 249). 
5.3.6 Organisational Culture Summary 
These comments from the sector suggest that district councils view themselves to 
be innovative, proud of a history of achievements and keen to learn, implying that 
the pressures that might exist to undertake benchmarking as a performance tool 
would flourish in this environment but, as explained in the following section, this 
encouraging filter is tempered by the cultural impacts of benchmarking culture to 
mould benchmarking practices.  The process of benchmarking appeared to be a 
strong part of the culture of the organisations suggesting that the practice, 
previously compulsory under the Best Value regime, had now sedimented into the 
culture of the organisations. 
5.3.7 Conclusions 
In summary, the environment in which councils operate is party political and 
increasingly customer focussed.  Neither the services delivered nor the structures 
in which they operate are common across all councils.  There is an awareness of 
Localism and there are ever increasing pressures to act and react in different ways: 
“the council should be aiming to do things differently in order to 
meet the different nuances that affects different communities”  
(Transcript Council I, page 4,  line 190). 
This responsiveness will be tempered by an awareness that increasingly there will 
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be local policies and further pragmatic moves away from status and homogeneity: 
“it’s a case of what works works so if it's the same as someone else, 
fine, if it's different from someone else that’s fine”  (Transcript 
Council D page 22, line733). 
5.4 Benchmarking Practice 
This section explains the practical approach to benchmarking in district councils.  
The results of the interviews on how benchmarking is undertaken in practice have 
been grouped into the following headings 
• Definitions 
• Information sources and data handling 
• Performance 
In practice, benchmarking activities in councils covered the collection of 
predominately metric data that was used for re-enforcement of views about 
performance, or to determine where more work was required to determine why 
costs or services were poor compared to others, or as a start for service reviews.  
Some councils included references to their active benchmarking in their Annual 
Governance statements (AGS):  
‘determine how the authority’s resources are allocated so that 
outcomes are achieved effectively and efficiently’ (Audit Committee, 
Council G); 
‘The Council actively looks for opportunities to benchmark 
performance against other councils’ (AGS, Council O).  
Benchmarking data was collected on an individual council basis, by membership 
of formal or informal clubs that were county based in the larger shire counties but 
more regionally based in the Midlands, or as in the case of the planning 
benchmarking exercise on a national basis.  Frequency of collection varied from 
an occasional basis (as with Planning) to more regular reporting on speed of 
processing housing benefit claims or households living in temporary 
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accommodation.  The tools used for the collation and presentation of data also 
varied between custom performance packages, use of informal systems or 
spreadsheets developed in-house.   
5.4.1 Definitions 
The definitions given by interviewees of how they saw the purpose of 
benchmarking differed according to their role in the organisation, but it was 
common for them to speak of comparing with similar authorities rather than 
comparing outside the sector.  Senior managers and Chief Executives emphasised 
the expectations of improvements going forward: 
“not just a comparative tool it's a means to an end to improvement” 
(Transcript Council O, page 1, line 17); 
“more than just a comparison of performance but comparison for 
best practice – gaining ideas for how to do things differently, do 
things better as well” (Transcript Council P, page 1, line 12). 
Overall, the definitions of benchmarking were based on metrics with the aim of 
learning from those comparisons and identifying services that could be improved 
rather than adopting observed practices. 
5.4.2 Information sources and data handling 
The information used for benchmarking activities came from a range of sources 
including CIPFA statistics, government returns and LG Inform, whereas for 
participation in clubs, information would come from club members.  The Planning 
Benchmarking exercise was a nationwide data collection activity.  The cessation 
of much of the national data set had restricted the information from that source.  
The data available in the national government sources and the veracity of data was 
questioned: 
“despite the fact that they are supposedly standardised guidelines 
there seems to be a wide variation still as to what people include in 
what box” (Transcript Council D, page 6, line 183). 
Another interviewee said the way they were completing the input for the national 
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statistics at their own authority may have been inaccurate: 
“we recognised that it needed to go through an exercise in reviewing 
how we completed those particular returns over time what we had 
been submitting to government in those returns had morphed and 
been manipulated” (Transcript Council L, page 8, line 238). 
The DCLG also came in for some criticism at one council: 
“by one return we were the worst in the country and we wanted to 
understand why and found out there was a data error in the DCLG 
that created a problem for us” (Transcript Council D, page 18, line 
607). 
Some councils used LG Inform to handle the comparative data (e.g. Council B) 
and others had jointly procured a commercial performance management system 
(e.g. Council P).  Councils participating in small regional hubs found that initial 
enthusiasm for benchmarking waned over time.  A hub member referred to a 
council in a neighbouring county that had been keen to join: 
“they somehow found out what we were doing and asked if they could 
be part of it” (Transcript Council P, page 2, line 62). 
But went on to explain that, over time, interest, or perhaps perceived benefits, had 
dwindled and now the return rate from their 46 members was down to less than 
50%.  This hub asked questions about metrics but also how services were 
delivered, for example asking to compare audit timetables and how the frequency 
of audits was prioritized. 
A council participating in shared services commented on the difficulty of obtaining 
performance information; where the host council wanted to inform their own 
authority of the results before sharing it with partners (Council N). 
5.4.3 Performance 
There was frustration that good performance was not being shared and there were 
shortcomings within the local authority sector in learning from others: 
“I'd like to see more about really pushing people that are doing well 
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in specific things and how they managed”  (Transcript Council N, 
page 20,  line 641). 
Results and benefits from benchmarking exercises varied from one council where 
it was felt that the exercise had not led to any changes: 
“I don’t feel that we've actually had a really really significant amount 
of information from it that made us do anything substantial” 
(Transcript Council B (ii) page 6, line 109). 
However other interviewees who had participated in benchmarking exercises with 
others communicated that they found it useful to benchmark as it improved the 
way they networked with colleagues.  In other councils, the relationships that built 
up in that way formed useful contacts for discussing interpretation and application 
of new legislation.  Throughout the process they had continued to stay in contact 
after the initial exercise was over.  Their networking was considered important in 
the context of staff having a sounding board to discuss impacts of new legislation.  
Similarly, the value of networking was highlighted in a county owned exercise on 
the governmental troubled families initiative where good practice was shared to 
improve the county target (Council F). 
The national planning benchmarking exercise had led to some practical benefits: 
“when we looked at our reports we found it was four times more 
expensive to send an application to committee that to do it under 
delegated so that sort of information was really helpful so when we 
are training Members....”  (Transcript Council B (ii) page 5, line 91). 
Local policies affected the benefits that could be gained from benchmarking 
information.  In terms of practical application of changes to processes, several 
examples were given of the benefits to authorities of their participation.  Council 
M found that its performance on CO2 emissions was poor compared to others and 
used the information to support the introduction of an energy efficiency plan; 
another council advised that they had restructured their validation team in Planning 
to free up time of professional planning officers and had saved money.  The level 
of delegated authority within planning would be a policy decision of the council, 
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impacting on the costs of determination; a council with high level of delegation 
i.e. officers determining planning applications would have lower costs than a 
council where more applications were decided by members. 
Benchmarking exercises covered  
back office functions and a county council driven exercise exposed a heterogeneity 
of different practices in handling insurance procurement among the district 
councils within that county and pointed to potential for county wide procurement, 
and the leader of the exercise commented: 
“residents who sit on the border will get one service from one 
organisation and a different service from a different organisation and 
those two organizations are paying in some cases vastly different 
amounts to deliver that service”  (Transcript Council L, page 14, line 
441). 
This insight suggests that there is a difference between back office functions where 
an activity could be delivered in a homogeneous way to save money, and the 
changes to customer focussed services that were moving towards more localised 
delivery.   
An examination of the flaws of benchmarking practice revealed that one authority 
had turned away from benchmarking as a performance technique and was instead 
using 'Systems Thinking' (Seddon, 2012) to improve its performance from within.  
That council severely criticised the practice of collecting comparative performance 
data: 
“collecting all sorts of performance management data that says 
nothing about how well the service is meeting the purpose that it 
has.”  (Transcript Council G, page 3, line 130). 
Using the technique of Systems Thinking enabled them to focus on their own 
services with the aim of better meeting the needs of their customers. 
5.5 Coercive Pressures 
This section reviews the potentially coercive forces that may be impacting on 
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English districts.  The interviewees responses are examined to determine how the 
forces have changed over time and whether they are leading to a commonality of 
benchmarking behaviour i.e. isomorphism.   
The potential coercive forces were analysed from the model as assessment and 
performance indicators, audit references, funding sources and central government 
initiatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  Components of Isomorphic Coercive Pressures 
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interviews.  There was general support for the view that CPA was seen as an 
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“We had a very poor CPA assessment which led to a change of Chief 
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O, page 4,  line 80); 
“CPA was very effective” (Transcript Council C, page 2, line 63); 
“I’m sure it did improve performance” (Transcript Council B (i), 
page 12, line 246); 
“without that torch shining in you can easily lose focus and fall by 
the wayside so I’d say it was fairly effective' (Transcript Council N, 
page 3, line 87). 
Some respondents had a strong view that the assessment element of the CPA was 
the important factor in driving up performance changes: 
“I think it was a massive step in the right direction when we had red 
flags and green flags of excellent performers in some areas – all 
Councils were rated...” (Transcript Council J, page 7, line 322). 
However other respondents were sceptical about the extent to which it drove up 
performance for all authorities and there was an inference here that, unless an 
authority really adopted the drive to improve, that CPA was only effective in 
tackling performance and did little to enthuse high performers to raise to an even 
higher level: 
“There were some authorities that, well we’ve got that result, we’ll 
leave it as it is”  (Transcript Council O, page 4, line 81). 
This view was further reinforced by a council [Council O] explaining that unless 
a council was 'right at the bottom of the tree' (quoting two councils that had been 
adjudged to have seriously failing performance) and, 'where there was outside 
pressure to move up', was not obliged to do anything to improve on a 'fair' 
performance.  Despite the indications that CPA resulted in movements in 
performance, the evidence that CPA had a positive impact on benchmarking was 
weak.  In fact, some comments suggested that the imposition of compulsory 
benchmarking led to aversion to benchmarking because of its association with a 
regime that led to ‘poor’ score compared to others: 
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“I’m not sure that wider benchmarking is something that they 
enjoyed at the time so certainly won't do it now if they don’t have to”  
(Transcript Council B (I) page 11, line 225). 
The final ‘have to’ reflects the coercive nature of benchmarking under CPA. 
Benchmarking tended to be seen as something almost old fashioned; a tool that 
was no longer fashionable or in vogue: 
“So, under that [compare] a good way of comparing was 
benchmarking but CPA's’ been and gone quite some time ago…if they 
can't see the benefit to it“ (Transcript Council N, page 3,  line 68). 
Some who looked back at the demise of the regime that brought with it a rigour of 
performance expectation, expressed with some regret and perceptions of risk that 
standards could slip without a regular external assessment.   
“…. There was a competitive element to some extent and it’s a pity 
in many respects that the regime folded.”  (Transcript Council O, 
page 4, line 80); 
“without some sort of an inspection regime I’m not sure whether 
Councils are…potentially could be.....coast a lot more”  (Transcript 
Council Q,  page 6, line 258); 
 “most authorities are .....will be sort of cruising in a sense because 
they don't really have a comparison …. if we were CPA'd again right 
now, would we be an excellent council?”  (Transcript Council M, 
page 9, line 297). 
In conclusion, CPA was a process that did improve performance, particularly of 
the weaker councils, and did add value to councils undertaking comparison by way 
of metrics benchmarking, but the association of the benchmarking with CPA 
regime still leads to a mind-set that benchmarking is a CPA tool and not a current 
business technique.  The pejorative nature of the CPA assessment was described 
using the phrase: 
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“we suffered under CPA!” (Transcript Council B (i), page 11, line 
220). 
The perceptions of enhancement to an authorities score under CPA echoed the 
concept of legitimacy by referring to the reputational aspect of a successful score: 
“I mean for us to get Excellent was a big thing at that time; you know 
it was really big….”  (Transcript Council M, page 9, line 295). 
(This respondent worked at a Council where the Audit Commission Excellence 
plaque was displayed on the wall of their entrance hall). 
The frustration of a council that had only received 2 stars led them to justify that 
result by ‘blaming’ the practices of other councils: 
“we truly couldn’t find any differences between ourselves and 4 star 
councils and the conclusion we came had to come to was that it was 
a ….the way in which you told the story”  (Transcript Council L, 
page 10, line 319). 
Rather than benchmark their services, one council found itself evaluating their 
performance against four star councils to see where the differences were and found 
that it caused them to be side-tracked from pursuing what was really important.  
(Transcript Council B (i), page 13, line 266).  Perhaps, unsurprisingly the criticism 
of the process came from authorities that did not receive a ‘good’.  A major 
criticism of the CPA as a performance tool was the feeling that it ignored local 
political decisions or the context in which local authority found itself.  The CPA 
was unfavourably compared to a league table but excluded context and failed to 
focus on ‘what’s important to local people'  (Transcript Council B (i), page 12, line 
247). 
The perceived flaws of the CPA process will be addressed later, but the advantage 
of the CPA regime was seen as bringing up poor performers to a basic standard.  
Interviewees responses focused very clearly on the drive to improve by whatever 
method and that it should be driven by meeting customer requirements and the role 
of benchmarking in performance improvement was summarised by a respondent 
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as only one of many performance improvement tools and the driver for 
improvement should come from an inherent desire to provide better services to 
users: 
“It doesn’t really matter whether you improved the service because 
you’ve shared it, you’ve outsourced it or done Systems Thinking or 
you’ve looked at benchmarking; what people are much more 
interested in is how you’ve changed the service how you’ve 
transformed those areas rather than the method you get to it”  
(Transcript Council B (I), page 20, line 408). 
CPA Flaws 
The CPA process though acknowledged as a driver leading to improved 
performance for some councils, was still perceived as flawed in its processes and 
in delivering any value to local authorities.  The criticism of the process was aimed 
at the volume of work required to provide evidence: 
“the amount of resources that went into planning for the scheduled 
inspection as it were, was, you know, Wow!!” (Transcript Council F, 
page 5, line 212). 
And the perceived futility of such of the evidence gathering exercises: 
“There was a lot of evidence to gather, there was a lot of time and 
effort put in by officers that it felt like were just doing this to tick a 
box”  (Transcript Council I, page 4, line 162). 
The inspectors themselves also came in for criticism as having had previous long 
careers in local government but hadn’t worked in the sector for ten years and were 
therefore seen as out of date; they were compared unfavourably with the more 
recent Peer Review initiative where ‘Peers’ are current Members and Officers. 
The toll on staff was noted: 
“….. was a high cost exercise and highly stressful exercise for the 
staff involved” (Transcript Council E,  page 8, line 250). 
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But the real criticism was that the regime diverted staff away from delivering 
services to managing the inspection regime.  The regime was also criticized for the 
transient relationship between inspectors and the councils they were inspecting and 
the relationship with external auditors was seen as stronger in this context: 
“CPA inspectors often came in and went again but they didn’t 
develop any sort of relationship”  (Transcript Council A, page 8, line 
352). 
Although some received funds after the CPA to assist in their performance there 
was an underlying dissatisfaction with the CPA that it failed to really understand 
the authority being inspected and so failed to add value: 
  “it often failed to understand the local context for an organisation”  
(Transcript Council A, page 6, line 243); 
“I don’t believe that they would understand the size of an 
organisation like this” (Transcript Council A, page 6, line 251). 
The key failure of the CPA process was perceived as not adding value and based 
on poor strategy: 
“There was a lot of providing evidence to show this is what we do – 
as opposed to changing a lot about what we did” (Transcript Council 
I, page 4, line 180). 
Dysfunctional behaviours were reported by some interviewees who suggested that 
Councils learned how to ‘play the game’ by throwing resources at the process, and 
this was seen by some interviewees as invalidating the whole CPA process.  Whilst 
CPA did provide the opportunity to act as a catalyst for performance improvement, 
in practice, as the name of the exercise ‘assessment’ suggests, the objective of 
performance improvement was implied rather than overt and the government were 
further criticised for the length of time it took to deliver a report – nine  months – 
and this compared unfavourably with Peer Reviews where feedback, as will be 
discussed in a later section, was much quicker. 
An unexpected consequence of the CPA regime was that there was a general 
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improvement in the ratings, though some of this may have been councils’ 'playing 
the game': 
“when organisations I knew were not 3 stars by playing the game 
throwing resources at the inspection process; burying the bodies”  
(Transcript Council E, page 8, line 239). 
5.5.2 Audit References 
The role of external auditors as forces for coercing councils into similar 
benchmarking practices or even performance improvement was not seen as high.  
When interviewees were questioned about a potentially active role in raising 
performance their responses were negative.  The role of auditors was seen as linked 
to finance alone – rather than having the wider remit previously held by the Audit 
Commission: 
“I was able to see the non-financial side of auditing work ….don’t 
see anything that has replaced that…” (Transcript Council P, page 
15, line 468). 
It was acknowledged that Grant Thornton who were the external auditors for the 
districts in the South East, did some non-financial comparisons e.g. sickness levels 
(Grant Thornton, 2013b), but this was seen in a passive light rather than an active 
prompt to make improvements. 
In comparing the value of these audit reports on financial resilience as drivers of 
increased performance a response was: 
“it's useful information but it hasn’t driven any changes in this 
organisation that’s for sure”  (Transcript Council H, page 12, line 
557). 
This view was, however, not unanimously held and there was a suggestion that 
auditors had the potential to suggest ways of enhancing performance but in practice 
there was no formal requirement to do so.  Benchmarking was included in some 
external auditors’ annual reports (ISA 260) as part of their duty in ensuring the 
council had arrangements for securing economy, efficient and effectiveness: 
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‘…….included the benchmarking of working balances against a 
group of similar English districts’  (ISA 260 report, Council L); 
‘management make good use of benchmarking to identify areas for 
potential saving’ (ISA 260 report , Council J). 
The current role of External Auditors in driving up performance was perceived 
unfavourably with the previous CPA regime.  The auditor role was seen as helpful 
in checking on Councils financial value for money against a standard but not 
driving up greater performance: 
“you certainly wouldn’t use it [the audit report] as a basis for 
determining…..whether we should be doing them in a different way.” 
(Transcript Council L, page 11, line 341). 
The different relationship between councils and their commercial auditors was 
noted as was the balance required between governance and commercial interests 
i.e. audit firms undertaking consultancy work for councils.  This potential conflict 
did not arise under the previous Audit Commission because they did not offer any 
commercial consultancy services. 
A strong theme from the answers given about auditors was that their current 
powers and influence as drivers towards performance excellence was much diluted 
compared to the Audit Commission CPA regime.  That view contrasted with the 
view of the interviewee at Council B who felt that the current audit regime was 
better able to understand the context in which a Council finds itself and able to 
encourage more improvement in performance. 
Although the influence of external auditors in driving Councils to make changes 
to their strategies was not strong, it was in financial matters that the influence of 
auditors was felt most strongly.  Auditors were seen as picking up on performance 
that was below an implied standard though their role was limited solely to financial 
issues.  Conversely, a Chief Executive considered that auditors had: 
“…….help drive up performance by challenging what we are doing 
around value for money.”  (Transcript Council A, page 8, line 359). 
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In conclusion, auditors were seen as having some potential to improve 
performance by cross-referencing to the other councils and there was a perception 
that they had the potential to bring errant or poorly performing councils up to a 
standard, but they were not actually inspiring Councils to benchmark or to improve 
performance.  External auditors undertook comparative examinations as part of 
their resilience checks, commenting at one council: 
‘There were reasonable explanations for areas in which the Council’s 
performance was an outlier compared to those of its nearest 
neighbours’ (ISA 260 report,  Council D) 
Again, in this example using a reference to the old Audit Commission family 
groups.  
‘The current role of auditors in encouraging performance improvement was 
perceived unfavourably with previous Audit Commission regimes, particularly 
because of the national performance framework and this was summed up by a 
Chief Executive saying: 
“ I think their ability is probably less now than it used to be twenty 
years ago when the Audit Commission ran the national studies.” 
(Transcript Council A, page 8,  line 360). 
A Chief Executive considered that External Auditors could drive up performance 
by ‘challenging what we are doing around Value for Money’ (Transcript Council 
A page 8, line 359), but it is perhaps illustrative that the word ‘could’ was used 
rather than positively claiming that in practice they do drive up performance. 
The perceptions of external auditors as checking that a standard has been achieved 
rather than driving up performance could be encapsulated by the comment: 
“…I guess it’s another way to make sure that we are doing what we 
should be doing.....” (Transcript Council Q, page 12, line 585). 
This was reiterated by the comment: 
“  I think there has to be some sort of external verification of what 
you … you can't be left to your own devices”  (Transcript Council K, 
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page 9, line 429). 
Although the expression ‘benchmark’ features in the external audit reports it was 
in the context of financial metrics and the benchmark tended to be seen as a 
reference point set externally by the auditors as in: 
“we fell foul of their benchmark on Reserves this year” (Transcript 
Council H, page 5, line 217). 
The benchmark was perceived as belonging to the auditors and that the authority 
had failed to meet this reference point rather than being seen as an aspirational 
target that other councils had met.  A Finance Director commented that the Red-
Amber-Green method adopted by Grant Thornton to deliver their opinions on 
financial resilience and VFM were not inspirational: 
“Yeah we’re greens and ambers – that's good and left it at that’  we're 
not saying Oh, Why is that one amber?” (Transcript Council H, page 
13, line 562). 
In summary, the Councils’ response to external auditors as coercive force for 
undertaking benchmarking was low.  It was acknowledged that they had a role in 
encouraging improvements as: 
“…there’s a role for them to play in trying to inject that learning 
through an audit into how things might be able to be improved – so 
yes, I think they have a role”  (Transcript Council K, page 9, line 
434). 
but the challenge was only limited: 
“….you certainly wouldn’t use it as a basis for determining 
whether….we should be doing them in a different way…..” 
(Transcript Council L, page 11, line 342). 
5.5.3 Funding Sources 
This section addresses whether or not central government funding issues can be 
considered as a coercive force in the drive to undertake benchmarking.  Central 
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government provide funding to district councils in the form of revenue support 
grant, but this is reducing, and 15 districts received none in 2017/18 (Appendix 
B).  Interviewees were questioned to determine their perceptions of the role of 
central government in coercing councils towards benchmarking their services.   
The interviews took place during the Conservative-Liberal coalition government 
and the government offered Transformation grants specifically to encourage 
councils to improve.  The interviews were analysed to see the extent to which 
additional funding was a driver for performance improvement and whether the 
Councils were adopting a common response to these incentives.  There was an 
acknowledgement that central government, through funding initiatives, was 
coercing councils to improve.  The coalition government offered Transformation 
Challenge funding to councils that had applied saying that they needed pump 
priming funding to begin innovative and performance improvement measures.  A 
Chief Executive saw this as a ‘carrot’.  Unsurprisingly, Councils did not decline 
government cash and another perspective of the Transformation Challenge was: 
“they gave us money to entice authorities to work together to bring 
it in a little sooner”   (refers to a Housing initiative) (Transcript 
Council G, page 8, line 395). 
The attraction of extra government money was clear: 
“…any initiatives that would bring in additional funding …then our 
Members would look on that favourably” (Transcript Council J, 
page 10, line 480). 
Examples of the consequences of funding limitations tended to suggest that they 
drove Councils towards sharing resources and combining activities rather than 
simply improving performance. 
“ it would be the Medium Term Financial Plan that would drive us 
into shared services”  (Transcript Council A, page 16, line 737). 
This was echoed by the comment that: 
“…some who have a look to see what funding is available then 
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structure their strategy to secure the funding” (Transcript Council A, 
page 7, line 323). 
Perversely there was a suggestion that a council had engineered a poor quality 
rating to enable them to access government funding for service improvement: 
“ there were organisations…..that got 2 stars (because it was the key 
to government money)”….. (Transcript Council E, page 8, line 245). 
Specific Government Funding Initiatives 
Some government funding was hypothecated to specific projects rather than being 
available for general use, and there was clear understanding that central 
government was directing changes in specific areas viz: 
“… they also tried to do it through funding so …there’s a second 
tranche of Pickles money around waste”…(Transcript Council D, 
page 19, line 616); 
“  the government were saying we want you to deliver it a different 
way; we’d like you to be more IT based…..here’s £150,000 to smooth 
it along” (Transcript Council G, page 8, line 383). 
A reflection that funding coerced behaviour was suggested for these 
Transformation Grants: 
“You’re bending your strategy to achieve purely what the 
government wants” (Transcript Council A, page 7, line 327). 
And an earlier example of central government using a specific funding tool to drive 
district council efficiency was the Planning Delivery Grant: 
“….it used to be that the case that local authorities were rewarded 
with turning things around quickly and got Planning Delivery 
Grant” (Transcript Council K, page 4, line 169). 
A similar initiative running at the time the research was undertaken was support 
for Troubled Families, where government money was made available for public 
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administrations to work collaboratively to deal with families with complex 
educational, health and housing needs.  Councils also reported in their annual SoA 
receiving specific funding for Green Deal Communities; Fraud Funding from 
DCLG; and Coastal Communities Funding. 
Within the broader financial background there were comments that suggested that 
lack of funding was the main driver for performance improvement: 
“because obviously we’ve all got to make savings” (Transcript 
Council N, page 13, line 402); 
“and we’re having to make bigger ones over the next four years”  
(Transcript Council J, page 10, line 478). 
Demand Management 
Councils suggested they were developing a demand management approach to 
reduced funding by encouraging other bodies to take on activities previously done 
by the Council: 
“  what services can those communities themselves take on because 
we won’t have the resources to provide everything we currently 
provide”  (Transcript Council J, page 11, line 517). 
‘[Recommend] Further analysis on demand management to identify 
any correlation between tenants accessing all areas within the 
service and trend behaviours’ (Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 
Council C) 
This theme was also taken up by a Peer Team advising a council to:  
‘Look at demand analysis to further achieve savings and improve 
service delivery’ (CPC, Council D) 
Summary    
In summary, it appeared that funding overall was a very serious issue with concern 
that funding from central government sources and the ability to raise their own 
funds via Council Tax was not directly coercing councils to undertake 
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benchmarking as a performance tool, but more likely to suggest shared services 
initiatives.  This compliance to central government direction is covered in a later 
chapter. 
The perceptions of central government as a coercive influence on benchmarking 
practice were addressed in questions about the impact of central government in 
making changes to their structures and practices.  One Chief Executive considered: 
“they’ve given us freedom and flexibility to do things we want 
to …..you don’t need to spend time on things you don’t need 
anymore”  (Transcript Council N, page 8, line 238). 
Though, perhaps more cynically, suggested that: 
“I’m not sure how interested central government are in how local 
authorities are performing they seem to want to bash us all the time” 
(Transcript Council N, page 8, line 241). 
A s.151 officer echoed this view by suggesting that: 
“…their approach seems to be to let local government sort of police 
itself through the LGA”  (Transcript Council D, page 17, line 571). 
And although central government were able to direct district councils in the event 
of certain failures, e.g. failure to undertake the planning function, the view was 
that their exercise of that power or rather the potential for that power to be 
exercised only ensured adherence to a standard level: 
“it doesn’t then drive any further improvement”  (Transcript Council 
D, page 18, line 594). 
5.5.4 Central Government Initiatives 
Shared Services and Shared Management 
The risks of reducing future funding was seen as a serious risk to the extent that it 
might affect the sovereignty of smaller councils and reducing costs became the 
driver for more sharing of services.  The drivers for this were seen as two-fold – 
economic and political: 
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 “our [shared management arrangement] was partly facilitated by a 
Transformation Grant” (Transcript Council M, page 16, line 516); 
“it would be the Medium Term Financial Plan that would drive us 
into shared services – or Eric Pickles” (Transcript Council A, page 
16, line 740). 
The reference in this statement, however, is that although there is the freedom of 
choice to share services it would be a forced decision following lack of funds.   
The coercive impact of central government policy on structures could be seen in a 
statement from Brandon Lewis, speaking at the Local Government Association 
conference in 2013 said ‘ having district councils with stand-alone management is 
not going to last' (Westminster Publications, 2013).  The spread of shared 
management echoes this but conversely there was no evidence from the sample of 
councils that this was becoming isomorphic behaviour.   
5.5.5 Summary of Coercive pressures 
Within the research context the coercive pressures on districts come from 
assessment and performance indicators, especially CPA, auditors, central 
government initiatives and funding pressures. 
Overall, these pressures were felt strongly and there was evidence from all districts 
of the coercive powers of these factors, however each factor did not exert the same 
amount of pressure to change behaviours at the same time.  For example, the power 
of external auditors was seen as diluted compared with that of the CPA regime, and 
the coercive element of current audit was seen as solely related to finance and a 
response to conform to their requirements rather than an inspirational driver to 
benchmark or to improve performance.  Conversely, pressures from the previous 
Audit Commission CPA regime had an impact with councils that had strongly 
sedimented into the organisational and benchmarking culture of the councils.   
Funding pressures from central government were a strong coercive factor in two 
distinct ways.  Firstly, in reducing unhypothecated grants and so enforcing changes 
in behaviours to be able to continue in a financial regime that is geared away from 
government funding that gave councils no alternative but to comply in changing 
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their practices did not drive convergence in benchmarking behaviour.  Secondly, 
in applying specific grants e.g. Transformation Challenge, government funding 
was a coercive force to which councils complied and did converge in some of their 
structures into shared services. 
5.6 Normative Pressures 
This section addresses the normative pressures that were found in councils and 
groups the responses into the following four factors that were identified around 
professionalism and professional networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Components of Normative Isomorphic Pressures 
5.6.1 Sector Led Peer Review and Peer Challenge 
This section addresses the perceptions of the Peer Challenge philosophy and the 
respondents’ views on how the make-up of their team added value to the operation 
and examines the extent to which the LGA Peer Challenge acts as a normative 
pressure on the practice of benchmarking.  This initiative was developed by the 
LGA following consultation across the sector (Local Government Association, 
2011) and the plan for self-regulation had wide support.  Benchmarking was 
addressed in the consultation and there was support from the consultees for using 
that tool, but there was an awareness that it required collective buy-in to work 
effectively.  
The Peer Review Challenge (CPC) initiative organised by the LGA in 2011, was a 
component of their 'Taking the Lead' strategy and was proposed as a measure to 
challenge and further learning within the sector.  Each review is tailored to the 
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opportunity to have one peer challenge free of charge.  The current format of the 
challenge covers five basic areas for challenge: 
• Local context and priority setting 
• Financial Planning and Viability 
• Political and Managerial leadership 
• Governance and Decision making arrangements 
• Organisational capacity and Focus to deliver 
Source: LGA Peer Challenge Report (Sevenoaks District Council, 2014). 
In this research the Peer Review has been treated as a normative isomorphic 
pressure and not a coercive one.  Peer Reviews were voluntary with no statutory 
prescriptive underpinning.  They were not funded directly by central government 
and their reports were not required to be made public, though the LGA encourages 
authorities to do so.  Peer Reviewers were senior officers in local government and 
current elected Members (usually a Leader from a council that has similar size or 
geography), so from the point of view of officers were ‘colleagues’, but one Panel 
included a senior director from a large software company and was considered to 
give greater value than 'a local government officer team coming in and telling you 
just local government stuff' [Transcript  Council J, page 12, line 586].  The team is 
supported by staff from the LGA.  The officers and members are not paid to 
undertake the reviews but there is implied reciprocity and an expectation that 
people from a reviewed council will respond to a call to assist at other reviews.   
Peer Reviewers came from a range of professional disciplines who are selected for 
their experience and expertise and they are chaired by a Chief Executive; one of 
the interviewees – a Chief Executive – had himself chaired a Peer Review at 
another council.   
Whilst all councils included their proposals for performance management in their 
AGS, Council J specifically included its openness to receiving feedback from a 
Peer Review and inspections.  Councils that viewed the Peer Challenge in a 
positive light considered that the visiting teams identified areas for improvement, 
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treated the visiting team as ‘the ultimate critical friend’ (Transcript Council E, page 
12, line 360) and attested to the value of the team towards improvement saying: 
“We produced an action plan following the Peer Review”  
(Transcript Council N, page 9, line 290). 
But the reported changes and improvement following the visits were around 
strategic direction rather than processes: 
“did give us some advice on bits and pieces in the strategic review” 
(Transcript Council M, page 13, line 423); 
“they said we needed to give focus on our Corporate Plan…in other 
words they were saying …our Corporate Plan was a slightly woolly 
affair” (Transcript Council D,  page 19, line 635). 
This emphasis on the strategic direction of councils was reinforced by a 
Performance Officer who noted that: 
“the team picked up on some areas of performance ….........not in the 
performance measure side of things”  (Transcript Council M, page 
13, line 414). 
Peer Review feedback reports gave emphasis to the need for councils to have a 
clear strategy for the future and to focus on Place shaping: 
‘…it is important to have a compelling vision for the future 
economics of the area’ (CPC, Council C); 
‘develop a long-term narrative for the future, to inform place 
shaping’ (CPC, Council R). 
At one council the Peer Team criticized the benchmarking that had taken place, 
implying that a higher standard was expected as the norm for the sector: 
‘The limited benchmarking that the team did see was confined to 
performance indicator type data and didn’t bring together cost, 
performance and satisfaction metrics’ (CPC, Council R) 
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Participants viewed the LG Peer Challenge as giving some benefits to the host 
organisations, but the technique was not without criticism with the make up of the 
teams and in particular the Challenge Chairman having the biggest influence.   
Peer Challenge has a political dimension and the Challenge teams included 
Members, and this was seen as adding value.  The rationale underpinning the Peer 
Challenge was to show the sector was capable of sector led improvement but the 
councils that had hosted Peer Challenge tended to view the value of CPC as 
providing a health check or external endorsement of their self-assessed high 
standards rather than drivers of change: 
“were around strategic direction of the Council and being very clear 
about what the strategic direction was” (Transcript Council L,  page 
16, line 500); 
“they were keen for us to write a strategy that said this is what we 
are going to do in each area  ”  (Transcript Council B – interview (i) 
page 18, line 370). 
Although the CPC Reviews emphasised the importance of a clear strategic focus, 
none of the respondents reported any pressure to direct their strategies and policies 
into structures suggested by the LGA.   
Peer Challenge teams were criticised by some respondents with the process 
considered to be cumbersome and requiring a lot of work at the receiving council.  
The effort required to meet the Peer Challenge was, perhaps cynically, described 
as heavy and a deterrent to taking up the offer: 
“uses up a lot of resource as we would have to prepare lots of 
documentation for people who would probably skim read it at best”  
(Transcript Council A, page 5, line 210). 
Peer Challenge was used as a generic term to cover the activity of officers and/or 
Members and sometimes outside participants coming to an organisation by 
invitation to review a council or one or more of its services.  Respondents spoke 
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of single service reviews: 
“we’ve done government, one on leadership,…one on 
Licensing…the Chief Executive loves Peer Challenges”  (Transcript 
Council H, page 15, line 648). 
and the Corporate Peer Challenge, organised by the LGA with a representative 
from the LGA on the team, and a third, less formal, challenge organised by 
Councils who paired with another district for mutual peer challenge: 
“the LGA would put together sort of like-minded authorities”  
(Transcript Council K, page 6, line 251). 
An alternative view of the review process was put forward that the time was short 
and the depth of the challenge could only be superficial: 
“you’ve got the team for two days and they’re limited in what they 
can do in that”   (Transcript Council N, page 9, line 277); 
“It was too short a period of time so they couldn’t really get under 
the skin of things"    (Transcript Council D, page 19, line 625). 
Learning from the challenges is promoted on the LGA website by presentation of 
case studies.  An independent review of the [Corporate Peer Challenge] process 
undertaken by Cardiff University (Downe, Bottrill and Martin, 2017) confirmed it 
was 'a highly effective tool at the heart of the Sector-led improvement 
programme ….... and provides value for money' (Local Government Association, 
2017b), but the review warned that councils should be prevented from 'cherry-
picking' lead peers to ensure the process remained as robust as possible.  The 
independent review found that most councils asked for member peers from the 
same political party as their own, and a peer lead from a similar sized council. 
Sector Led Peer Assessment 
Councils liked the fact that Peer Reviews could provide reinforcement that their 
current performance was good and sufficient, and it was a form of external 
assessment and the language used in considering the extent to which the modern 
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Peer Challenge helped to improve performance, reflected this: 
“The Peer Challenge …helped us feel confident that we hadn’t 
dipped since our CPA assessment” (Transcript Council P,  page 13, 
line 409). 
The word 'assessment' and ‘health check’ were used several times when speaking 
of Peer Review and there appeared to be an underlying need to reinforce the feeling 
that existing performance was good.   
In a comment interpreted by the researcher as a reference to legitimacy, a 
Performance Officer said: 
“it does help with your reputation if you get a clean bill of health 
from a Peer Review” (Transcript Council M, page 14, line 449). 
The need to be [externally] assessed as performing strongly was summarised as: 
“I think it would benefit all local authorities to take part in a Peer 
Challenge because I think it would enable local authority as a sector 
to demonstrate better to central government and to its residents how 
well we are performing”  (Transcript Council J, page 13, line 616). 
Sector Led Peer Review - Team Membership and Team Leaders 
The make-up of the team was seen as key in the effectiveness of the challenge: 
“It's easier to prove the credibility of it if you’ve got people coming 
in who are currently Members” (Transcript Council P, page 14, line 
437); 
and the inclusion of Members on the team enhanced the legitimacy of the exercise 
with Members in the host authority: 
“Members will often take challenge better from other Members than 
they would from other Chief Executives, Directors….” (Transcript 
Council A, page 5, line 228).   
The party political dimension was another underlying theme in the management 
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of the Peer Review.  Although the Peer Challenge itself was apolitical, districts 
operate in a political environment and the management of expectations was 
mentioned as evidence that the district that managed the timing of the Review 
where the Leader had been reluctant to have a Peer Review and didn’t want the 
council to be involved in one “just before an election“ (Council O) with the 
implication that the Peer Review might provide unwelcome information for 
opposition parties. 
Further evidence of the need to manage expectations was provided by awareness 
of a respondent who spoke with a cautionary note, that: 
“If you go into it without a full appreciation of what might come out 
of it you then suddenly find yourself with a lot of messages that need 
managing which can sometimes be quite difficult”   (Transcript 
Council E, page 12, line 371). 
Scoping the Review was seen as key to ensuring that the benefit from the review 
was maximised: 
“The more specific you can be and clear about the scope the better 
you’ll get from it”  (Transcript Council N, page 9, line 279). 
“we asked too much and we didn’t get the challenge we really 
wanted” (Transcript Council N, page 11, line 362) 
Councils particularly liked speaking to teams that were perceived as having similar 
issues to themselves; a theme that will be addressed later when benchmarking 
partners are examined: 
“We had a very good team led by a Chief Exec from [redacted 
council], probably our most comparable authority so that worked out 
really well  (Transcript Council J, page 11, line 541). 
There were no specific comments from participants about benchmarking practices 
as a specific item within the challenge but the real potential for benchmarking 
appeared to come from the learning experienced by those who had joined Peer 
Review panels.  A Chief Executive opined: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
141  
“I honestly got more out of it than I think they did…in the sense that 
I brought a few things back here about what they were doing with 
Planning”  (Transcript Council O, page 10, line 203). 
Sector Led LG Inform 
The propensity for the Sector Led bodies to exert isomorphic pressure is addressed 
here within Normative pressures, rather than with coercive pressures.  
Participation in sector led activity is voluntary rather than a mandatory 
requirement.  In this context ‘sector led’ is predominantly the activities of the LGA 
and their service of providing comparative information called LG Inform.  In its 
annual membership pack, the LGA explained the service as: 
‘a free on-line benchmarking service that allows anyone is a council 
or fire and rescue service to compare their performance with other 
similar authorities’ (LGA Membership Pack for Council I) 
LG Inform captures a series of Performance Indicators and presents these in the 
public domain.  At the time of this research LG Inform was a comparatively new 
innovation and comments about its efficacy came from Performance officers.  
Their conversations suggested that LG Inform was filling a void left by the demise 
of the National Indicator Set but, in practice, there were perceived flaws in the way 
data was captured and presented that could explain the limited efficacy from 
performance officers’ perspectives and why one respondent noted that: 
“I mean a lot of councils haven’t taken part” (Transcript Council N, 
page 6, line 190). 
The data offering is already captured in government returns. 
The perceived flaws in LG Inform were 
• Lack of context to the data; 
• Insufficient measures on offer; 
• Limited set of metrics; 
• Lack of perceived benefits from use; 
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• Data was insufficiently recent; 
• Presentation was not user friendly. 
There was considerable scepticism about its usefulness.  In their responses, 
participants acknowledged the political aspects to their role and the interaction 
they had with Members and referred to the difficulty of presenting timely 
information: 
“We’ve got the Scrutiny Panel this week…we can’t take Quarter 2 
benchmarking to that because it hasn’t come out yet.”  (Transcript 
Council Q, page 3, line 142). 
Their Members were advised that: 
‘there have been widespread technical issues with the system which 
has prevented widespread usage’ (Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee, Council Q)  
The political context in which the LGA sits was also noted: 
“  they need to have a relationship with central government 
and….take care about what they say and I think that shallows their 
message” (Transcript Council H, page 13, line 582). 
Respondents were asked about the actions they were taking as a result of their 
participation in LG Inform but apart from comments that the comparative data was 
useful they offered little evidence of actions arising citing that : 
“ it’s difficult to get anything really meaningful from the standard LG 
Inform bits” (Transcript Council Q, page 10, line 460). 
Council N commented on the impact of any follow up from the use of LG Inform 
that whilst they would like further information from other councils on how they 
had achieved the results showing on LG Inform, they would not wish to be on the 
receiving end of thirty other authorities contacting them to ask "what are you doing 
that's different" (Transcript Council N, page 19, line 615). 
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The timeliness of LG Inform and the inability of councils to make current 
comparisons was given as evidence for the East Midlands Councils to adopt a 
faster approach and mutually agree to collect data on a quarterly basis.  Other 
councils in the South and East that were interviewed did not mention any examples 
of this sort of local collaboration. 
In terms of normative pressures there were no suggestions that participating in LG 
Inform or the use of LG Inform data for benchmarking was the norm of behaviour.  
One interviewee did suggest that: 
“often you find the higher performers are more switched on by this 
kind of thing and more alert to the benefits” (Transcript Council N, 
page 18, line 587). 
In conclusion, the LGA, through its new LG Inform did not appear to be generating 
normative pressure to join the service or to use the service offered as a means of 
improving performance or changing their approach to benchmarking.  There was 
however an underlying desire to return to the national data set and a source of 
comparative data: 
“ in terms of driving up service performance there would be more of 
a sort of central framework …a re-invention of the Audit 
Commission”  (Transcript Council F, page 4, line 159). 
The overall view was that the presentational software used by the LGA was sound, 
but the content was insufficient.  What district councils wanted was: 
“a combination of both…a standard set that we can compare and 
then we want LG Inform as the piece of software to be able to throw 
out the information” (Transcript Council Q, page 9, line 450). 
Summary 
In summary, the Peer Challenge was seen as beneficial though it did not have an 
impact on the process of benchmarking.  The emphasis was on helping authorities 
to focus on future strategy rather than concentrate on current practices, 
transactions, or delivery methods.  The panels were not prescriptive in saying what 
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the Councils should do and were not coercing the councils to converge towards the 
same strategies but rather to ensure that they had strategies in place.   
5.6.2 Profession Led Activities 
Some councils were members of specific clubs such as those organised by CIPFA.  
This section examines the normative pressures felt by members of that group and 
the direction of their behaviour in compliance to any normative pressures exerted 
by the group. 
Benchmarking Clubs – Regional Variations 
Interpretation of the expression ‘benchmarking club’ varied across the regions.  As 
membership (or non-membership) is not in the public domain it was not possible 
to predict any regional variations before the field research took place.  The actual 
results did show a regional variation between the Midlands and East region 
councils and those in other regions as shown in the following table: 
NVivo Coding References by 
region 
South and South 
East  
(11 Interviews.) 
Midlands and East  
(8 Interviews.) 
CIPFA Clubs 11 3 
Other Clubs 11 8 
Informal Benchmarking 
Partners 
22 47 
 
Figure 10  Coding References for Benchmarking Clubs 
 
Councils in the South and East referred to CIPFA clubs more than colleagues in 
the Midlands, though the references tended to be negative, with statements that 
they used to belong to CIPFA clubs but had ceased membership.  The reasons for 
leaving were stated as costs outweighing benefits, with the resource involved in 
submitting data to the club seen as onerous; the need to compare only with very 
similar councils; or a feeling that the comparative data didn’t reflect differences 
arising from local policies.  Members at Council Q were advised that 
benchmarking across county wide or family groups had reduced or ceased 
altogether due to a reduction in resource (Overview and Scrutiny Committee 
Council Q).  A Midlands Performance Officer said that several disciplines within 
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their authority did subscribe to the CIPFA benchmarking service, but the 
Performance Officers did not.  However, no one referred to members of CIPFA 
Benchmarking clubs as ‘partners’. 
References to ‘other clubs’ were similar across all regions.  The East Midlands 
Councils benchmarking group was only called a ‘club’ by one interviewee, and in 
other regions the coding related to informal clubs on a service specific basis such 
as housing and democratic services. 
East and Midlands made more references to BM partners (47) than the South and 
South East (22) with lots of references to the Midlands group, which although 
administered from East Midlands covered the West as well.  However, that may 
have been a bias reflecting the professional disciplines of the interviewees between 
the regions and this is addressed under limitations of the research.  Within that 
Midlands framework there were many references to co-operation between other 
Midlands staff, and small groups (one called them focus groups) of ‘similar’ 
authorities doing small benchmark comparisons on specific service issues such as 
telephone answering.  The position was different in the larger shire counties of the 
South and East where only Essex was found to have a recognised county-wide 
benchmarking group.  In other large counties, the partners were either chosen, not 
from the County but, from old CIPFA family groups of around 15 councils that 
had the most similar characteristics, or from selected authorities seen as ‘similar’.  
When the term ‘nearest neighbours’ was used it referred to the family groups and 
not geographic proximity, for example, a Remuneration Panel advising on 
Members allowances for Council M reported that it had: 
‘Benchmarked the Basic Allowance against comparable roles paid 
by CIPFA ‘Nearest Neighbour’ councils for each authority’ 
(Wiltshire Remuneration Panel) 
The selected councils came from three separate counties that were not 
geographically close to Council M. 
Profession Led - Benchmarking Clubs CIPFA 
CIPFA Benchmarking clubs, which are subscription clubs, were perceived as 
expensive and not providing value for money or the time invested in preparing 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
146  
input: 
“they're *** expensive for what you get out of them – they’re a 
thousand a club”  (Transcript Council D, page 11, line 341);   
“we took the strategic decision about 4 or 5 years ago not to 
subscribe anymore because we found that we were paying for those 
services and the bottom line is that actually they were not 
comparable at all” (Transcript Council L, page 9, line 280); 
“because for the cost of it we didn’t get enough information” 
(Transcript Council D, page 11, line 362). 
A further reason was cited in that there were insufficient differences in the 
information provided at a district level every year to warrant an annual 
subscription: 
“no point in doing it on an annual basis for the same service.....in 
many ways it was a waste of time the answers in year two will be the 
same as the answers in year one” (Transcript Council A, page 3, line 
133). 
The new LGA sector led information set was seen as having an advantage because 
it was free ('We don’t have to subscribe like we do with CIPFA' (Transcript Council 
J, page 6, line 254) and the reports were regarded as useful.  However, one council 
was enthusiastic about the benefits of the CIPFA offer and had subscribed to ten 
Benchmarking clubs to assess the performance of support services (AGS, Council 
O).   
From a district perspective, membership of the CIPFA benchmarking clubs was 
not seen as especially valuable or useful and there was no evidence from the 
interviewees that these clubs exerted any normative pressures or that behaviour 
was modified as a result of membership.  
Profession Led - Benchmarking Clubs - Other 
A specific professional based group mentioned by interviewees was the Planning 
Benchmarking Service and their large-scale benchmarking activity that covered all 
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councils.  One respondent noted the norm pressure felt by managers to act in a way 
that supported this club: 
“It's often the manager that feels they need to be doing or providing 
the information to the Club” (Transcript Council F, page 3, line 141). 
But this pressure was more to conform by supplying the information to a club they 
had already joined rather than take action on methods and practices as a result of 
complying with the norms set by the club: 
“different managers don’t see the value in terms of 
benchmarking…quite a time-consuming task …....pulling together 
the data” (Transcript Council F, page 3, line 137). 
There was no evidence that membership of benchmarking clubs compelled 
members to provide information as ‘norm’ of professional behaviour and 
interviewees reported on the difficulty of getting data.  Their view is that 
benchmarking is solely about metrics providing data and costs rather than methods 
and practices. 
Housing authorities had benchmarked their activities against other housing 
providers using HouseMark.  Members at Council C were advised that the exercise 
compared their figures with 66 other social housing providers, and it was: 
‘An evidence based approach to resource allocations, cost 
reductions and target setting’ (Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 
Council C).  
Officers in the Midlands region referred to the East Midlands councils as a body 
that had undertaken benchmarking activity for councils in that geographical area 
and it was only that group where an officer suggested a sense of that membership 
requires a commitment as a norm of belonging: 
“ by being part of the group you're sort of committing yourself to be 
part ….to be able to provide information” (Transcript Council Q, 
page 17, line 848); 
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“ we don’t use CIPFA anymore….. because there just wasn’t the take 
up”.(Transcript Council H, page 4, line 149). 
Reasons were cited against using formal benchmarking clubs underpinned by a 
sense that benchmarking clubs were about metrics perhaps with a view to 
reviewing services following the results, but not as a driver to improve.  The 
apparent lack of enthusiasm amongst district council professionals for 
benchmarking was encapsulated by: 
“I think a lot of people misunderstand the role of benchmarking and 
seem to think that benchmarking gives you the answers; it doesn’t, it 
gives you the questions to ask and I don’t think a lot of people 
appreciate that”  (Transcript Council A, page 3, line 120). 
Other examples of reasons why officers did not join benchmarking clubs were seen 
as the effort involved in providing information being onerous and not matched by 
the benefits of membership.  This view was reinforced by a report to Council Q 
that benchmarking across county wide and family groups had reduced or ceased 
altogether due to a reduction in resources (Overview and Scrutiny Committee 
Council Q).  In summary, there was no evidence that professional groups exerted 
any normative pressures to either undertake voluntary benchmarking or that, 
within clubs, there was any pressure to deliver information on metrics. 
5.6.3 Officer Led Networks – Formal   
The role of Professionals that might act as normative pressures in district councils 
was also examined.  These were the collaborative groups of officers at either local, 
regional, or national level that might have been perceived as exerting pressure to 
benchmark as 'the way we do things' in our industry; the groups most frequently 
mentioned went along professional discipline lines.  Examples of these groups 
were the County Planning Officers groups; [County] Finance Officers; the 
Performance Officer’s network.  These groups have regular meetings for exchange 
of information and, as the name of the latter suggests, networking between officers.  
The way in which one interviewee described the operation of his officer network 
group typified the ways which those groups operate: 
“one of the reasons for existence of the benchmarking process…run 
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on a quarterly basis…set of measures of interest to district 
councils….Benefits processing, sickness, planning applications.  So 
you can see where you are in relation to all the other councils”  
(Transcript Council D, page 8, lines 247-253). 
This description suggests that the group is informative and shares metrics rather 
than being in any way a driver of benchmarking activity.  Further questioning 
explored the extent to which this represented the ‘norm’ of how council officers 
are influenced by their peer group.  An officer suggested a more active outcome 
from their performance officer network: 
“Each of us presents on what we’ve done around efficiencies and 
savings just to share ideas that we can take back to our Councils” 
(Transcript Council D, page 16, line 543). 
This implies a learning activity and reinforces there is some benefit to the network 
and gives some suggestion that this is the norm for the industry and, by implication, 
that the value of officer groups in sharing ideas was greater than existed in the 
benchmarking groups. 
Attendance at County meetings (County levels prevailed in the large counties 
where cases were examined e.g. Kent and Essex where there were large numbers 
of districts within the County Area (Essex and Kent have 12), but a wider network, 
crossing county boundaries, was described in a part of the country where there 
were fewer districts within each county boundary e.g. the East Midlands group. 
Being a member of a county or regional group was the norm for the senior officers 
in each discipline and the groups were viewed as valuable: 
“most of our officers would say that’s a good thing; we do participate 
in those groups”  (Transcript Council J, page 8, line 366). 
But there was no evidence that the role of these groups was to be the drivers of 
performance improvement.  In addition to the County and Regional groups 
respondents mentioned two national bodies that they belonged to that had 
supported professionals in their discipline.  The officer networks covered 
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traditional professional disciplines such as financial officers and Planning officers 
but also Performance Officers a group that from the name would suggest a tighter 
link to performance improvement and benchmarking.  The latter group however 
appeared to follow the same pattern as other professional groups in taking a 
networking role: 
“they all do find that very useful for sharing ideas and picking up 
new ways of working” (Transcript Council J,  page 8, line 366). 
In summary, the interviewees informed that membership of and participation in 
cross county or cross regional officer groups on professional discipline lines was 
the norm, and were clearly valuable as networking and information gathering 
forums.  It was common to share ideas and to learn from that sharing; there was 
no evidence of pooling of metrics but the groups themselves were not exerting 
normative pressures to undertake benchmarking.  The strongest indication towards 
a normative pressure to improve performance was best summarised by a 
perspective on the role of the Planning Advisory Network suggesting a strong 
collaboration between Councils that was focussed on raising the whole profile of 
the sector. 
This analysis reinforced that officers seek the norms from other local authorities 
usually within their own technical discipline and within a relatively narrow 
regional focus.  Potentially normative organisations at national level were again 
within a technical focus such as Housing and Planning and were entirely within 
the public and not for profit arenas.  Belonging to the groups was seen as the norm 
but the groups themselves were not seen as exerting any pressures of compliance.  
Exploring the data revealed that that efficacy of Performance Officers groups was 
not universally strong at delivering benchmarking.  One group would: 
“meet quarterly and bring anything that anybody was doing 
differently…gave us a chance to sort of compare…it was generally 
informal benchmarking, but we did try and formalise some of the 
benchmarking but it didn’t really…..” (Transcript Council M, page 
5, line 149). 
East Midlands councils co-ordinated a performance network in that region known 
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as the 'East Midlands Councils' and which comprised a network of, mainly, 
performance officers.  The East Midlands group encouraged its members to 
benchmark because; 
‘it offers a cost effective and efficient tool for organisations to 
identify best practice and pinpoint innovation’ (‘Benchmarking 
across the East Midlands’- internal report for East Midlands 
Councils members) 
Council O also referred to a Waste Management Group. 
The specific role of Performance Officers in delivering benchmarking is addressed 
in a later section.   
The commonality of attending professional groups and undertaking common 
practices was examined to see if those meetings suggested any conforming or 
converging behaviour with a normative practice.  Clearly there was similarity in 
the practice but that might be interpreted as simply convergence of practice; it was 
the groups themselves setting the norms.  The evidence indicates a mild consensual 
acknowledgement of those groups causing the districts to converge in their 
practices and complying with the normative pressures.  These bodies and groups 
do not exert any formal legal powers over councils or officers to undertake 
benchmarking but exert pressures to practice their trade in a way that meets the 
norms for that group of professionals.  There is no all-encompassing professional 
body for officers in local government.  Officers, particularly at the professional 
and technical level, usually belong to a professional qualification body such as 
RITP or CIPFA.  In addition, there are overarching bodies that represent factions 
within local government either as a professional organisation e.g. SOLACE or 
longitudinally for the local government entity type e.g. Association of District 
Councils (ADC) and within that there are sub groups for professional disciples e.g. 
Association of District Council Treasurers (ADCT).   
5.6.4 Officer Led Networks – Informal 
In addition to the formal professional groups, other informal officer arrangements 
exist to pool and exchange information.  This section addresses how the informal 
arrangements develop and operate and the extent to which officers identify with 
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these groups and follow benchmarking activity that could be described as the 
professional norm for those organisations.   
Officer Led Informal Networks – Benchmarking Partners 
At a more informal level officers collaborated to form their own professional and 
technical groups with peers in other councils.  This took the form of contacting 
colleagues on ad hoc bases for specific service focussed comparisons, or for wider 
benchmarking initiatives.  The groups tended to be based in geographic proximity 
either within county or within region, but also wider groups based on an older 
CIPFA 'family groups' of districts, or self-selected groups both with similar 
characteristics.   
The key requirement for these partners was always similar councils: 
“What we have got is a family group from CIPFA and.......they are 
the most similar authorities to us but they are not a perfect match”  
(Transcript Council B interview (I) page 3, line 55). 
The search for professional or technical partners was usually but not entirely 
restricted to other councils.  For example, Council B had: 
“looked at professions outside of local government where we could 
learn about turning [planning] applications around”  (Transcript 
Council B interview (i), page 3, line 65). 
Council B had also made benchmarking links with the NHS and an RSL 
(Registered Social Landlord).  Informal officer networks collaborated on single 
matter initiatives as a Midland officer explained: 
“looking at telephone calls answered or abandoned [adjacent 
council] are looking to make changes”  (Transcript Council B 
interview (i) page 10, line 208). 
The officer further explained that a questionnaire on methods would be send to 
councils in the group who would share their methods; and suggesting they felt a 
peer group pressure to respond to complete their response promptly. 
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Scope was narrowed to authorities with similar characteristics at a tight level.  One 
authority explained, in connection with Planning: 
“it would be pointless for us to benchmark with authorities who deal 
with minerals applications – things we never touch”  (Transcript 
Council B interview (ii) page 7, line 136). 
As with formal networks, staff in the informal groups felt the benefits of their 
networks and the usefulness of their professional and technical contacts: 
“after a benchmarking exercise.... we’ve kept up communications 
over other matters”  (Transcript Council B interview (ii) page 10, 
line 202). 
Generally, though not invariably, the informal network was with other councils, 
but Housing Associations were contacted by some councils (Council B; Council 
C).  Ad hoc networks were set up to look at practices and specific projects such as 
the Troubled Families Initiative where lead officers from each council in the shire 
county met to decide on best practice for that initiative.  CIPFA Family groups, 
originally an Audit Commission benchmarking comparative group, containing 
authorities that were similar demographically were mentioned as potential 
benchmarking partners.  One council was even tighter in its specification for a 
partner; having established a potential population of 30 similar authorities, they 
selected a small group of 5 that met their specification of having housing stock, a 
direct labour organisation, and a similar level of dependency on government grant.  
The overall aim was for: 
“forming close knit benchmarking groups of truly comparable 
organisations where they can share detailed information”  
(Transcript Council L, page 20, line 619). 
The role of senior management in the effectiveness of information networks was 
important in endorsing the legitimacy of those informal groups.  In one case the 
group was seen as unsuccessful because: 
“there wasn't really enough.....'buy-in' from the top.....and local 
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authorities have tended to just go their own way, now that we don’t 
have a benchmarking regime; it's no longer mandated from the top, 
so people do their own thing”  (Transcript Council M,  page 5, line 
153). 
An explanation for the approach to prospective benchmarking partners restricted 
to the sector was suggested as: 
“we have found.....perhaps being outside of the sector you are trying 
to contact – I don’t know if trust is the right word – but perhaps, less 
of a willingness to share information”  (Transcript Council P,  page 
4, line 126).   
Officer Led Networks – Performance Officers 
One officer reported that there used to be a County Performance Officers group 
but that no longer existed.  That may have been the consequence of the demise of 
the need to collect performance indicators for publication at a national level.  The 
cessation of the national performance indicator set was also met with a more 
personal perspective from a performance officer who felt that the curtailment of 
the number of nationally collected benchmarks would adversely affect job 
opportunities for Performance Officers. 
“no more performance indicators you know Performance officers 
might as well look for another job”  (Transcript Council M, page 12, 
line 395). 
Officer Led Informal Networks - Summary 
Officers felt there was strong value in these cross-cutting groups for a networking 
perspective and for information exchange 
“I’m sure he would share the experience he is going through” 
(Transcript Council R, page 12, line 374). 
And in terms of learning from each other to take back to their own organisations 
 “they are someone they ask them how they are getting on with their 
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budget for this or their efforts on that”  (Transcript Council H, page 
8, line 361). 
This suggesting an implied freedom of information sharing.  So, the professional 
norm of these bodies is to exchange information, however their willingness to 
exchange at a higher level was not universally found at all levels particularly when 
detailed benchmarking was concerned.   
5.6.5 Summary – Normative pressures 
The underlying message from the quoted views of the responses of participants 
was, for some, a hankering after the national data set, but further a desire to set up 
their own regional indicators that had been agreed by officers at that regional level.  
There was no evidence that the LGA were perceived as a normative body or that 
authorities were converging in their approach to benchmarking as a result of using 
the data (except in the sense of fairly comprehensive criticisms of its perceived 
weaknesses but the overall view of this innovation was that its potential could be 
summarised by the following comment: 
“lots of authorities would make the decision to opt out for a variety 
of reasons if it was not legislated by government, I think it would be 
extremely difficult for the LGA to introduce something which is self-
governed in that way.”  (Transcript Council J, page 7, line 338). 
5.7 Mimetic Pressures 
Mimetic pressure is to copy or model other organisations in the same sector and 
drives organisations to mirror those that are successful and worth copying (Hassan, 
2005).  This section examines the extent to which there was evidence that other 
organisations in the sector were perceived as more successful and whether any 
copying of structures or practices had taken place, and the evidence of any research 
trips that had been undertaken to underpin mimetic changes (Entwistle, 2011). 
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Figure 11  Components of Mimetic Isomorphic Pressures 
 
The empirical research did not reveal high levels of evidence of modelling in 
response to mimetic isomorphism.  Whilst Frumkin and Galaskiewitz (2004) found 
evidence of institutions moving towards a more bureaucratic model, the evidence 
of English districts in the sample suggested they are moving in the opposite 
direction with a variety of structures in place.    
Entwistle (2011) observed that visits took place to other organisations and although 
these councils were undertaking visits they were not necessarily copying what was 
happening elsewhere. 
5.7.1 Comparators 
Mimetic isomorphism suggests copying from other organisations and, as Entwistle 
(2011) observed, visiting prestigious organisations or those noted for their high 
performance.  The Beacon council scheme no longer exists but whilst councils 
with better performance were selected for visits: 
“If there was another local authority that was head and shoulders 
above us we'd go”   (Transcript Council B(i), page 14, line 297); 
and the prime driver for comparison was invariably councils seen as having similar 
characteristics: 
“I can discount [adjacent district] because the scale of [that district] 
is completely different” (Transcript Council D, page 7, line 233). 
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5.7.2 Structures 
In terms of political structures two councils were considering a change from 
Cabinet system and returning to a committee system (Council O; Council H) but 
this was not a universal pattern.   
Referring to a neighbouring council, Council D said that Borough T: 
“has a cabinet system and Conservatives lost control at the last 
round of elections and a coalition of Lib-Dems, Labour, UKIP and 
Independents effectively run T council and, whilst in opposition they 
all say the Cabinet system is wrong, you know it negates democracy, 
now they're in charge they don’t seem as keen on changing it.” 
(Transcript Council D, page 21, line 697). 
A more likely scenario was suggested that the nature of local democracy would 
change: 
“I think that will change by getting not necessarily the Parishes, but 
more community groups engaged with how we make decisions” 
(Transcript Council O, page 14, line 286). 
Changes tended to happen in an opportunistic way rather than copying others that 
appeared to be more successful; suggestions were made that changes to structures 
would occur as a pragmatic response to an officer, or Chief Executive leaving, but 
not as a mimetic action arising after following a structure seen elsewhere: 
“If my Finance Director left.....then I would take that opportunity of 
not replacing, doing things in a different way.....we take the 
opportunity”  (Transcript Council O, page 11, line 237). 
There was an expectation that more changes would have to be faced in the near 
future as a result of financial pressures (Council O, Council Q); change of political 
Leader (Council Q) or change of party following an election (Council L), but no 
interviewee suggested overtly imitating a structure they had seen elsewhere as a 
way forward. 
Many Councils share services, usually back office services but this practice is not 
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universally copied, and two smaller districts had considered sharing back office 
with adjacent councils and concluded that there would not have been any financial 
benefits.  One council (Council B), had reviewed the figures and found they would 
have to spend more, rather than make a saving, if they joined the partnership.  
Council A stated that: 
“the cost sharing formula would have to be heavily skewed if this 
council was to achieve a reduction in its costs of management” 
(Transcript Council A, page 10, line 457). 
Pragmatism rather than modelling was driving the changes.  Managerial structures 
did not follow a common pattern and during the empirical research period there 
was no evidence that councils were moving towards similar structures.  Two of the 
councils studied were sharing a Chief Executive; one (Council Q) had changed its 
structure from seven directors to three whilst Council D had changed from six to 
two.  Some shared back office whilst others did not.  Councils on the fringes of 
London, it was suggested, were more likely to have shared management: 
“another important feature would be around the cost of individual 
managers, you know there are some places where management 
salaries are very high....where it's on the fringe of London, easy 
transport into London so they have to pay high salaries....the benefit 
of shared management teams becomes more apparent” (Transcript 
Council A, page 9, line 388). 
Two of the councils had engaged in reciprocal Peer reviews but although there was 
some acknowledgement of high standards and desire to achieve, they had not 
copied each other’s structures.  One officer at Council D confirmed they had 
looked at structures elsewhere but preferred to use the word 'comparison' to 
‘benchmarking’ and thought it useful to see how other similar sized councils within 
the same county had structured their teams.  Similarly, the Planning benchmarking 
exercise had exposed cost savings practices such as extending the work done by 
validations teams - there was no universal adoption of a standard model in running 
the Planning service.  Membership of clubs did not necessarily lead to suggestions 
being implemented: 
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“I'm certainly not committing myself to using information that comes 
out of it”  (Transcript Council I, page 2, line 60). 
In the approach to the technique of benchmarking there was no universal model 
and the chapter on benchmarking practice covers the mixed economy approach to 
using that technique. 
In addition to structures, there was no evidence that operational practices were 
copied or justification for officer proposals to change practices: 
“well, we always worked off a 6 weekly [committee] cycle not a 
monthly cycle so that changes your support for meetings by a third”  
(Transcript Council R,  line 320). 
An important caveat was noted at Council P when the interviewee stressed that 
whilst the main driver for change would be financial pressures, an equal influence 
would be the importance of maintaining service resilience in any revised structure.  
The risk of the ability to continue operating services with fewer resources was 
highlighted with the comment: 
“you lose critical mass rather than gaining anything …..it's almost 
as if we made the savings first and now we need to make the 
improvements to enable us to work with the few people that we've 
got” (Transcript Council B (i) page 18, line 381). 
Staff and Consultants 
Slack and Hinings (1994) observed that mimetic behaviour was achieved by staff 
transferring from one organisation to another and an example of this was found in 
this research at Council R: 
“But in this case you've got your management team, some of whom 
have come from other authorities at different levels, so they will be 
bringing in different ideas or how they did it at other 
organisations...” (Transcript Council R, page 10, line 312). 
Sharing of officers, for example two councils sharing a Section 151 officer or a 
Chief Executive, would be a further example of a mimetic pressure for both 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
160  
councils to follow the practice seen as 'best' from the perspective of the councils 
sharing the officer.  Evidence of the transfer of staff from one council to another 
gave potential for mimetic responses as follows: 
“Many of the staff who work in [County redacted] have worked in 
other [same county] councils“(Transcript Council A, page 4, line 
174). 
And another, writing of a member of staff who had recently joined: 
“he's come from a neighbouring district albeit in different 
county....”(Transcript Council R, page 8, line 254). 
Slack and Hinings (1994) further treated using the same firm of consultants i.e. 
copying suggestions made by consultants who had suggested similar at other 
places, as a form of mimetic pressure.  The role of consultants in transfer of practise 
was noted at council M, though Council A had used consultants and did not copy 
the suggested practices when the consultant reviewed their Revenues and Benefits 
Service: 
“included an examination of the arrangements by [consultants name 
redacted] to see what they thought of it and they thought it works 
very well and suggested we needed more managers.....not with a view 
to reduce costs lower down, but our structures in the Revenues 
partnership didn't meet what they would normally expect”.  
(Transcript Council A, page 14, line 656). 
5.7.3 Service Reviews 
In the terminology used within the districts the exercise of going out and seeing if 
other organisations could deliver a service in a more effective way i.e. learning 
from others, was not described as a benchmarking exercise but was described as a 
service review. 
Five districts (Councils A; D; I; L and P) mentioned the role that benchmarking 
played in preparing for service reviews.  This expression was used for a larger 
exercise of comparison covering a whole service and not just a single process.  The 
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benchmarked information was either used to determine which services should be 
reviewed or to determine priority for review: 
“various budget lines which helped us decide which areas might be 
right for service review” (Transcript Council D, page 25, line 833). 
Benchmarking was closely aligned with service reviews because comparative 
costs and metrics, such as numbers of staff for a payroll function or costs per 
transaction (Council P) were used to inform new service structures. 
5.7.4 Visits 
The targets for visits were councils perceived as higher performers 
“going to visit one of the best performing councils”  (Transcript 
Council D  page 6, line 194). 
Visits, however, were seen as a desirable method of ascertaining how things were 
done elsewhere but seen as time consuming: 
“you don’t have time to go out and see everybody”  (Transcript 
Council O, page 7, line 151). 
Although visits were taking place, the main focus did not appear to be 'passive 
copying of best practice' (Hartley and Benington, 2006) but rather opportunities 
for enlarging networks. 
“It’s really given us strength in our relationships with our 
neighbouring authorities”  (Transcript Council B(ii), page 2, line 
28), 
or for reassurance on own performance 
“[conclusion] when they came back was that they do things pretty 
much the same as we do” (Transcript Council D, page 27, line 195). 
5.7.5 Summary of Mimetic Pressures 
Compared with the evidence of normative and coercive pressures, the evidence of 
pressure from the research was that changes arising from mimetic sources was less 
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strong.  The identified factors for this pressure were Comparators, Structures, 
Visits and Staff.  Mirroring the structures of other organisations who were 
perceived as successful was not identified as a strong pressure, and structural 
change was opportunistic and not undertaken as a positive action to copy others.  
Councils were not seen as converging in their structures, nor particularly 
complying with any mimetic pressure.  Some sharing of staff at service level and 
at senior management level was observed but again this was a weak pressure at the 
time of the research. 
5.8 Benchmarking Culture in Districts 
This section examines the evidence underpinning attitudes towards benchmarking 
based on the impact on their culture of previously imposed regimes.  Within 
Districts there was a distinct culture surrounding benchmarking.  The myths and 
norms that influenced attitudes of players in benchmarking came across as 
negative reasons for not undertaking benchmarking or for treating the results of 
benchmarking exercises with scepticism.  This further sedimentary layer had built 
up within districts following past experiences of benchmarking and the following 
elements were observed: 
Figure 12  Elements of Benchmarking Culture 
 
5.8.1 Negative perceptions 
The predominant view about benchmarking was that it related only to figures, even 
though a Performance Officer held the view of its wider application: 
“sometimes people have got hung up when they hear the word 
benchmarking that it's just figures whereas to me you know you're 
benchmarking yourself against another organisation and it could be 
a process....a vast array of things” (Transcript Council F, page 2, 
line 75). 
This 'hang-up' over numbers pervaded the views of many interviewees in 
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discussions about their practices and the research discovered a lot of negative 
attitudes towards the technique and there was evidence of some practices that could 
be described as dysfunctional.  Negativism covered the difficulties in obtaining 
robust data; the extent of comparable data and the practical difficulties in engaging 
with other councils to share data, and cynicism about the delivered results. 
The difficulty of obtaining comparative metrics was explained by the absence of a 
national figures and the difficulty on getting all local authorities to agree on a 
voluntary set of indicators: 
“I think the more pressing argument is that they're struggling to come 
up with a set of metrics that everyone can agree on” (Transcript 
Council J,  page 6, line 271). 
The end of the time where there was a wide selection of national indicators for the 
authorities to use for comparison was suggested by an interview as: 
“part of the reason that local benchmarking has died a death in 
terms of the metrics”  (Transcript Council J, page 6, line 290). 
5.8.2 Difficulties 
The practical aspects of collating and comparing data with others appeared to give 
some difficulty.  The range of data available was limited, but the informal protocols 
developed within groups sharing non-statutory performance data proved to be slow 
and complex.  The informal protocols were in place regarding data sharing 
whereby groups agreed to provide data only on the basis that it would not be used 
in a competitive manner. 
“when we set up the [county redacted] system we agreed collectively 
that it would not be used in a competitive way....because that just 
inhibits people from providing data in the future”  (Transcript 
Council D page 27, line 894). 
An example of this competitive use of data was explained when an offer to provide 
services to other councils was seen as predatory and not 'playing the game'. 
“Chief Exec...saying to people 'well our such and such service is 
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much better than yours, perhaps I could provide that service and 
save you some money”  (Transcript Council H, page 12, line 536). 
Difficulties were presented as encompassing all facets of benchmarking: 
“there is an issue over finding the right organisation to compare with 
or the right professional body...just sometimes it could be on that a 
straightforward indicator that must be comparable….”  (Transcript 
Council R page 10, line 308). 
The difficulties of finding appropriate partners were outlined at Council B: 
‘Each service should identify partners based on performance and not 
ease of data collection’ (Internal report, Council B). 
Performance staff at that council had some misgivings about the ability of 
benchmarking clubs to supply ‘best in class’ but accepted that the clubs were the 
best chance they had. 
The range of available comparators following the demise of the rigidity of the NIS 
was seen as a problem: 
‘Therefore, authorities are collecting a wider range of data which 
may not be the same and therefore not possible to benchmark with’ 
(Overview and Scrutiny, Council Q). 
However, the East Midlands councils project had addressed the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’  
of benchmark definitions: 
‘The advantages of accessing benchmarking data must be weighed 
against the disadvantages of amending local indicators’ 
(‘Benchmarking across the East Midlands’- internal report for East 
Midlands Councils members) 
The shortcomings of the LGA in providing comparative data were explained as 
“they can only give you what's already been collected by another 
government agency”  (Transcript Council Q, page 9, line 422). 
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Somewhat resigned to the inability of obtaining the sort of information they desired 
“I wouldn't say...that we have yet come to a source of comparative 
data that we think is ideal and I'm not sure we ever will”  (Transcript 
Council A, page 4,  line 155). 
5.8.3 Metrics 
The perceptions of difficulties about the collection, collation, and forensic 
verification of data; in fact, three interviewees referred to being 'bogged down' 
(Council R, Council G and Council D] with the numbers or with defending their 
position.  The practical difficulty in providing comparative data was that no 
authority wanted to appear to be the most expensive, so this led to several iterations 
of numbers before agreement to release the results of benchmarking exercises. 
“instead of having these big variations after the first set of checking 
everything sort of came back to a more middle ground, so nobody 
was sticking their neck out above the pack.” (Transcript Council K 
page 2, line 69). 
Performance Officers tended to see the limitations of benchmarking because it did 
not answer questions about performance.  The word 'flawed' to describe the way 
information was collected at Council B the real issue 'was not how you collect the 
information or how you benchmark with others it's 'now that we know that.....that's 
what we should be looking at’  (Transcript Council B, page 9, line 188) 
 i.e. using the benchmarking information as a pointer to customer satisfaction. 
Difficulties were explained by interviewees in terms of lack of ability to compare 
'like for like'; the time taken to collect comparative data and the non-availability 
of meaningful metrics, together with a frustration that the information obtained did 
not really play a part in improving services to customers: 
“we actually reached that point where there was meaningful debate 
about what was good about those authorities that were doing both of 
those things well”  (Transcript Council H, page 1, line 35). 
The desire for 'like for like' information was frustrated by perceived difficulties in 
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comparisons in a statement that implied metrics: 
“the biggest problem I have with benchmarking, particularly when 
I'm coming from a finance perspective, it is so hard to compare like 
for like”  (Transcript Council I, page 2, line 77); 
“there is often difficulty in getting benchmarking information from 
other people”  (Transcript Council A, page 3, line138); 
“there are often differences in financial treatment for the way costs 
are recorded” (Transcript Council D, page 5, line 139). 
The interviewee went on to elaborate on some of the difficulties such as differing 
ways of allocating management overheads and concluding that it was very difficult 
to identify the 'true' cost of service.  In referring to the national planning exercise, 
the length of time taken in preparing, collating, amending and revising data was 
seen as 'tedious' and when the final; results were released they were not seen as 
beneficial.  However, this view was not universally held, and another interviewee 
suggested 
“You can get too bogged down with the numbers people just have 
lots of excuses why their numbers are different.”  (Transcript Council 
D, page 2, line 66). 
5.8.4 Anonymity and Reciprocity 
Fears of exposure as poor performers amongst peers were strongly felt, and 
anonymity and reciprocity were the internal rules set for informal groups at county 
level or wider regional clubs.  Even within the county groups the results of any 
exercise were expected to be anonymised with councils listed as 'a', 'b', 'c' etc.   
“you can't say we're better than [district redacted] or we're better 
than [district redacted] all we can say is that we appear to be 4th 
across the county”  (Transcript Council D page 27, line 901). 
The consequences of poor performance being 'exposed' in the public domain was 
explained as: 
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“If you're not performing particularly well....well it's potentially 
public name and shame” (Transcript Council Q, page 11, line 502); 
“There are a number of authorities that aren't doing very well I'm 
not sure they would want to publicly demonstrate or even privately 
demonstrate.....they're not doing very well”  (Transcript Council K, 
page 11, line 524). 
The concern of humiliation from exposure as a poor performer meant that figures 
were submitted, circulated as draft and then re-circulated and this extended the 
time scale for providing information. 
“Nobody wanted anything released until they had seen everybody 
else and they wanted the second round debate as well ….measured it 
differently If I measure it that way, then my figures come out like this 
– so I want you to use those instead”  (Transcript Council H, page 
2, line 57). 
Reciprocity was demanded as a member of a group on a simple exchange basis: 
“…...if you give us the information, with everybody’s agreement of 
course we will share it with you.”  (Transcript Council P, page 3, line 
89). 
The level of effort required to provide information was also subject to network 
informal rules on exchange of information.  The work involved in preparing 
figures for a non-statutory benchmarking club or group and in considering the 
range of information to be collected there was an awareness of the balance this 
required between inputs and benefits. 
“It needs to be thought through how that might ….There's got to be 
something in it for the person providing the information.  If it's more 
than couple of hours work, then someone going to want something 
back for it.”  (Transcript Council I, page 3, line 140); 
and there was confidence that the efforts used in providing information to others 
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would be 'repaid' with reciprocal information: 
“so I've been a willing participant in providing the information and 
I look forward to getting a response there”  (Transcript Council I, 
page 2, line 58). 
5.8.5 Game Playing 
Interviewees suggested examples of councils 'playing the system' to show good 
performance.  This was achieved in various ways: 
In the way costs were allocated: 
“Some people are very good at playing the game in terms of how 
they will apportion their overheads how they will allocate their costs; 
and they can find a lot of their costs suddenly appearing in areas that 
aren't benchmarked.”  (Transcript Council E, page 2, line 54). 
Or in the selection of partners: 
“who will find organisations with whom they can compare 
themselves that makes them look extremely positive.”  (Transcript 
Council E, 4, line 112) 
Or, the selective use of statistical comparison: 
“it's fairly easy to say that we've made a 20% improvement in our 
performance this year but that doesn't tell you that last year the 
performance was absolutely appalling”  (Transcript Council E, page 
6,  line 182); 
or in an example relating to housing benefits, taking actions that would distort 
outcomes: 
In referring to their visit to a high performing council, Council D noted that the 
other councils’ methods were similar to their own but 'they count the start date of 
the claim differently' and in so doing were able to deliver better performance 
indicators.  (Transcript Council D, line 197) 
Behaviour designed to meet performance indicators, but not necessarily giving 
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better service to customers, and it was suggested that resources were diverted to 
[Planning] applications that were coming up to target date, whereas less resource 
was applied to cases that had already given over the 8 week target.  (Transcript 
Council H, page 6, lines 252 to 257). 
5.8.6 Evolving Model 
Finally, there were suggestions that the practice of benchmarking was evolving 
and perceptions were changing.  There was evidence that there were now different 
ways of obtaining the information and in a comment that will be addressed in the 
final chapter on the evidence towards compliance and convergence. 
“As your organisation matures and starts to operate in a different 
way, your reliance on external factors like that [benchmarking] isn't 
as great because you've got the professional networks that trigger a 
lot of things you used to get through benchmarking.”  (Transcript 
Council E, page 3, line 75). 
The perception of benchmarking, as filtered by the years of difficulty with CPA 
and anxiety caused by the focus on numbers, is starting to shift as described by 
Council L as  "we're obviously in a state of flux" (Transcript Council L page 1, line 
15), towards the normative model and this echoes the analogy of a journey or travel 
introduced in chapter 3.  There was an acknowledgement that a cultural shift was 
taking place towards a more sophisticated, less bureaucratic model: 
“….it is moving now towards a more method based approach....how 
we can improve how we do things.  Numbers are still there but it is 
more about how we do it rather than what we do.”  (Transcript 
Council O, page 6, line 117). 
5.9 Conclusion 
Benchmarking practice in local authorities was not seen as driving further 
improvement but aspiring to the average and only bringing councils up to a 
minimum level.  The nature of changes from benchmarking has changed since the 
days of CPA when councils were not seen as delivering good performance but now 
the emphasis has altered: 
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“ we were above national targets for all our indicators, the focus is 
on something completely different.” (Transcript Council K  page 7, 
line 323). 
The process was not seen as regular and systematic but undertaken on an ad hoc 
basis where one council decides to do a review of a particular service e.g. payroll 
(Council P) or a Crematorium (Council H) then they will contact peers to ask for 
predominantly financial information e.g. prices.  At a district level, membership of 
the formal benchmarking clubs was not seen as especially beneficial as it was 
expensive, only covered a narrow range of metrics and, where the annual variations 
were small, not seen as warranting the resource cost of annual membership. 
Whilst the outputs from benchmarking had limitations, the interviews brought out 
the hidden benefits of the benchmarking activities that were not shown in 
published metrics but brought valuable non-quantifiable gains to the way councils 
worked.  Operational officers had built networks that shadowed those in place at 
the elite level, and interviewees spoke of the value of these in paving the way for 
inter-organisational assistance on implementation of new legislation, or handling 
problems they had not met before.  The comparative analysis undertaken in 
exploring preliminary figures to check for ‘outliers’ had proved useful exposing 
errors in data interpretation and manipulation.  The forensic examination of 
methods and calculation of figures for councils that appeared to be high 
performance, sometimes supported by site visits, gave feelings of reassurance 
when the methods behind those figures were found to be very similar to those of 
the benchmarking authority.  The use of comparative metrics was widely used as 
a tool to determine priorities for service reviews.  The most valuable legacy of 
sedimented benchmarking would appear to be its continued value as a learning 
tool. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
6.1 The Approach to Benchmarking 
This section examines the research questions and probes the way in which the 
fieldwork was able to explain the approach to benchmarking.  It examines the 
extent to which the approach to benchmarking in district councils is converging 
and whether it is also complying to a range of isomorphic pressures and can thus 
be said to be explained by Neo-institutional Theory.  Each of the elements of Neo-
institutional theory will be examined to determine the extent to which this theory 
explains the observed approaches. 
6.1.1 Shortcomings 
A range of benchmarking practices were observed in the research group and 
shortcomings were expressed in the practice of benchmarking.  Cynicism about 
the metrics delivered by other councils was common, and views were expressed 
suggesting that gaming took place.  There were difficulties in expressing the 
parameters for data collection and variables to be chosen and there was reluctance 
to divulge figures to the public domain, or from the councils' perspectives to the 
party-political domain, until officers were certain that the results could be 
explained.  The use of benchmarking for comparison of production and cost 
functions is well developed in areas such as public utilities (Berg, 2007), but less 
clearly observed in areas where the modes of delivery are more heterogeneous.  In 
some sampled cases, benchmarking was used as a comparison of benchmarks as 
reinforcement of the views held about performance or it was used as a tool to 
compare metrics with others and to obtain internal reassurance that the councils’ 
performance was within reasonable parameters or to inform and prioritize service 
reviews.  This view was summarized as: 
“my interpretation of it is that benchmarking in itself is not especially 
important......that what we are doing isn't way out on a limb, that 
there is a control procedure, so benchmarking forms part of an 
overall forming of an opinion, as opposed to being perhaps a 
forerunner” (Transcript Council I, page 1, line 39). 
There was no evidence in this study that councils were using the benchmarking 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
172  
activity to strive to deliver ‘best-in-class’ by comparing with other others, 
regardless of industry or sector  The current practices still reflected the conclusions 
of Bowerman and Ball (2000a) that the councils were taking a pragmatic approach 
and doing what was achievable.  Councils were, however, keen to be in the upper 
quartile of performance, and researched performance within the sector, e.g. 
“going to visit one of the best performing councils” (Transcript 
Council D, page 6, line 202) 
but this was constrained by perceived costs of achieving higher performance: 
“we were aiming to move as many into first or second quartile as 
possible consistent with an economic way of doing things” 
(Transcript Council D, page 10, line 306). 
The interpretation of ‘Best’ for the councils was tempered by the values of the 
council and an awareness that what appeared to be ‘best’ could be inappropriate 
for their customers or their policies; meeting the needs of customers was seen as 
paramount: 
“What works best for people that we’re meant to be looking after and 
serving”  (Transcript Council F, page 14, line 655). 
Examples were given of services by private or third sector providers that, 
superficially, appeared to deliver superior performance but the results were often 
treated with caution or scepticism.  One council had compared performance to a 
private sector provider who was performing highly but then found this had been 
achieved at additional cost and did not pursue changes.  Another council had 
looked at debt recovery and found that other providers had achieved better figures, 
but had used collection methods that the council considered ‘aggressive’ and not 
transferable to their operation.  In Planning, delivering sound decisions was seen 
as providing an overall better service than simply delivering within the target 
weeks and having more work to do on subsequent appeals.  
The phenomenon of not looking beyond the sector to learn from best in class was 
not surprising as it had been identified by Francis and Holloway (2007) who 
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considered that the impact of public sector league tables directed them [councils] 
towards intra-sector comparison. 
In the following extract, reputation could be interpreted as 'high' reputation 
suggesting that it is comparative performance against others that is important.  
Although interviewees did not use the phrase 'legitimacy', if 'reputation' is used as 
a proxy for moral legitimacy, the value of the practice of benchmarking was seen 
as a: 
“constant battle...in the public sector to keep your reputation so I 
think it's often...what performance and reviews and benchmarking is 
all about”  (Transcript Council M, page 14, line 437). 
The activity of undertaking benchmarking was not seen as evidence to signal 
legitimacy to stakeholders, but was a means to inform efficiency reviews.  There 
was evidence that, even though councils had participated in a benchmarking 
exercise, they did not necessarily apply the information gained from that exercise 
(van Helden and Tillema, 2005; Council I).  There was a desire for external 
assessment of performance, particularly of metric performance indicators (Council 
N; Council Q; Council K), and this confirms the research by Walker (Contributor: 
Economic and Social Research Council and Forum of Federations, 2013) who 
considered that benchmarking couldn't be successful without some form of quality 
assurance provided by an experienced audit body.  The end of CPA meant that 
councils lost a means to communicate their performance to stakeholders and an 
opportunity to signal legitimacy. 
6.1.2 Legitimacy of Voluntary Benchmarking Schemes 
The question of whether benchmarking conducted on a voluntary or regional basis 
could provide sufficient legitimacy compared to a national regime with 
accompanied audit reassurance exposes some complex issues.  In the context of 
comparing benchmarks as a tool of measurement (rather than assessment), a 
voluntary scheme would require several elements to provide legitimacy.  Firstly, 
the organisation conducting the benchmarking i.e. determining the benchmarks, 
collecting, verifying, and presenting the comparators, would need to satisfy 
stakeholders of its legitimacy.  In this situation, stakeholders could be regulators, 
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citizens, elected members, and elite and operational officers.  Secondly, the 
benchmarks collected would need to cover the salient issues, such as financial 
resilience; community development, as well as transactional data.  In addition, the 
stakeholders would need to be satisfied with the authenticity, accuracy, and 
sufficiency of presented figures.  By its nature, a voluntary scheme will not have 
regulatory backing and will not automatically attract a full set of comparators and 
would have to rely on moral or cognitive legitimacy for councils to supply non-
statutory figures.  Sufficiency might therefore be limited to those indicators that 
are already in the public domain e.g. from statutory government returns and which 
are currently subject to audit reassurance.  These potential limitations suggest that 
a scheme such as LG Inform, could be seen as legitimate provided it could deliver 
sufficient scope and coverage.  This research indicated that elite officers wanted a 
measure to assess their performance against others and an incomplete set of 
benchmark comparators would not be a legitimate response to their requests.  The 
question is complex and suggests a need for further research on attitudes towards 
the legitimacy of a non-regulatory scheme. 
6.1.3 Supply side or Demand Management 
Evidence from the research suggests that the practice of benchmarking is firmly 
focussed on the supply side of public services; significantly on metrics and the 
costs of providing services.  Although there was a strong focus on customers as 
part of the observed organisational culture, this did not feed through to the aims of 
benchmarking practice.  Benchmarking was narrow in its focus and was post facto 
cost analysis or other service metrics rather than comparing methods or styles.  
This reinforces the view that benchmarking as a means of improving efficiency 
belongs in the managerial paradigm of the balanced scorecard and quality 
management (Hansen, 2011) as a feature of NPM.  As councils move through 
austerity and start to manage with new tools (Dalton, 2016), such as demand 
management – or service reduction within the new NPG discourse, the traditional 
approach to benchmarking as a measure of metrics appears to be of less value. 
6.2 Environmental Turbulence 
The environment in which the councils exist could be described as turbulent and 
they are affected by political pressures, technological change and increasing 
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customer demands.  Bovaird and Loffler (2002) add the pressures from a 
differentiated civil society; exposure to the global economy; and a more 
sophisticated approach to media.  This view of the environment is summed up by 
the following statements from a professional report that sought the views of Chief 
Executives: 
‘a new norm that is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous’ 
(Zurich Municipal, 2016, p. 3); 
and a view reinforced by a chairman of the District Councils 
Network: 
“….recognizing the many challenges that lie ahead as funding 
reduces, demand rises and expectations grow”  (Buckle, 2013). 
In addition, there is a need to take action towards a time when there will be 
considerably less central government funding and the ratios between funding 
sources will be changing.  To continue providing services, district councils will 
either have to seek additional funding sources, significantly reduce demand or 
severely curtail services at the same time as managing changing models of 
collaboration with partners and agencies and developing strategies to sustain 
services into the future (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002).  The financial pressures facing 
local authorities are severe and a study by (Grant Thornton, 2013a) suggested that 
by 2016 69% of councils in the South West and Midlands expected to face a 
'tipping point'.  The pressures were not felt equally across England and no districts 
in the South East expected to reach that level of severity.  The report from Grant 
Thornton considered that 'some form of re-organisation, statutory or otherwise, 
will be a necessity for many authorities' (Grant Thornton, 2013a, p. 7).  Further 
significant funding changes will arise from the Fair Funding Review (DCLG, 
2017b) and an examination into the potential for local authorities to retain 100% 
of business rates (DCLG, 2017a). 
6.2.1 Exogenous Isomorphic Pressures 
The research responses were analysed to evidence the exogenous pressures on 
councils and these were analysed according to the types identified by DiMaggio 
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and Powell (1983).   
The vertical coercive pressures (Villadsen, 2013), mainly from direct central 
government regarding funding, regulatory framework and judicial framework 
exerted strong influence but has not led to consistent homogeneous changes in the 
approach to benchmarking though the fiscal measures were seen as impacting on 
strategy.   
“more of a stick.....because you're bending your strategy to achieve 
purely what the government wants”  (Transcript Council A, page 7, 
line 327). 
The councils were all subject to vertical coercive pressures to review their 
operations, in the form of reducing government funding, though some were subject 
to pressures to fund their operations without any government grant earlier than 
others.  Observed compliance with the isomorphic pressures was not consistent 
between councils nor was the extent of compliance the same for each of the three 
types of isomorphic pressure and this phenomenon matches research in Denmark 
where it was discovered that: 
‘municipalities can exhibit isomorphism in one area whilst being 
divergent in another’  (Villadsen, 2013, p. S68). 
This coercive pressure was clearly felt and was a driver for changes in practices 
and structures, but the councils were not changing in the same way. 
Although there was clear evidence of both vertical and horizontal (Villadsen, 2013) 
isomorphic pressures taking place, these were not the only determinants of changes 
in behaviour towards benchmarking. Two further factors, organisational culture, 
and benchmarking culture were dampening or acting as a filter that controlled the 
strength of the impact of the isomorphic pressures 
Similarly, the horizontal normative isomorphic pressures (Villadsen, 2013) from 
professional bodies and peer networks were impacting on the councils but not 
causing similar changes to practices.  Neo-institutional theory suggests that these 
institutions should start to homogenise, but evidence suggested to the contrary.  
Further, the mimetic pressures to act in a similar way to other councils was present 
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but not universal – some councils were acting and changing in the same way, but 
it was not true to say that all the councils were all morphing in the same direction 
in their structures and practices.  This supports the evidence from technical 
publications (Grant Thornton, 2013b; Zurich Municipal, 2016) that councils are 
moving apart in their structures and practices. 
There were no references in the interviews to using the expression 'benchmarking' 
to compare financial strategies. 
6.2.2 Endogenous Cultural Pressures 
The content of the interviews suggested that the approach to benchmarking in the 
current turbulent environment could not be solely explained by the three 
isomorphic pressures suggested by DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and that further 
cultural issues were proving to be further filters impacting on the scope and 
coverage of benchmarking.  In a view that is at variance with Villadsen (2013) who 
noted that 'public organisations in a given field typically have to solve the same set 
of tasks, are subject to the same regulation, are funded in the same ways, and share 
important historical patterns' (Villadsen, 2013, p. 568), the councils in this study 
emphasised that they were unique and could not necessarily compare with other 
councils.  They did however tend to share these 'important historical patterns' 
which included the legacy of the CPA benchmarking regime which was both 
compulsory and tightly regimented and not felt to have led to performance 
improvement. 
6.3 Evidence of Sedimentation 
Evidence from literature has shown that new systems and practices layer and 
sediment over existing ones (Christensen, 2012; Hyndman et al., 2014); suggesting 
that, although the need for compulsory benchmarking has passed, the previous 
benchmarking characteristics remain and have not been replaced.  This empirical 
evidence supports the metaphor from Pollitt and Bouckaert in explaining public 
sector reform that 'new brooms hardly ever sweep entirely clean' (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000, p. 12).  Evidence from the empirical research noted a similar 
effect with benchmarking appearing to be sedimented in the councils' culture.  The 
reasons why the councils were not all converging towards the same benchmarking 
practice rested with the ameliorating impact of both the district cultures and 
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benchmarking cultures.  The normative pressures were mitigated by the impact of 
the culture of an organisation.  One reason why the councils were not adopting 
benchmarking as a tool for comparison or improvement of structures and 
governance was that the tool has become inextricably linked with the unpopular 
CPA and is seen as a tool for measuring metrics rather than enhancing all activities.  
A comparison of benchmarks is sought after as a comfort that the metrics of service 
delivery were not out of line with a narrow set of self determined peers and could 
be seen as check against minimum standards.  This reinforces a view that 
benchmarking is associated specifically with delivery of services rather than the 
wider expectations of place shaping and setting local priorities.  In converging 
towards this common belief of the role of benchmarking the councils could be seen 
as responding to the normative pressures. 
Councils used Peer Reviews to challenge their thinking on future developments 
and these were seen as useful, but interviewees found that they were seen as giving 
reassurance that the council was “heading in the right direction” (Transcript 
Council L, page 15, line 474) rather than a tool for improving performance.   
6.3.1 ‘Hollowing Out’ of Corporate Centres and Sedimentation 
Under the Best Value regime considerable resource was required to produce the 
information for central assessment (Wilson and Game, 2011) and this was 
evidenced in the sampled councils, e.g.  
“…. with people, three or four people, two to three people full time 
employed on collecting all sorts of performance data….” (Transcript 
Council G, Page 3, Line 128) 
Although interviewees were not questioned specifically about any ‘hollowing out’ 
of their corporate centres, there were examples in their responses suggesting that 
in the previous performance assessment regime more staff were employed and 
currently resources were more limited.  Sedimentation in this research uses 
Hyndman et al’s (2014) interpretation that it is ‘ideas and concepts’ that sediment 
and then influence current practice.  The Best Value and CPA legislation and their 
expectations of benchmarking had sedimented into the organisational cultures and 
had consequently impacted on the resource employed.  The magnitude of the 
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sedimentation was predicated directly on the influence of the legislation, rather 
than indirectly on the numbers of staff employed in the activity. 
6.4 Evidence of Compliance and Convergence 
Research suggested that councils were responding to the isomorphic pressures but 
in differing ways.  Councils were not converging in their benchmarking practices.  
One council had decided not to undertake benchmarking at all preferring instead 
to adopt a Systems Thinking approach (Seddon, 2012).  Evidence showed that 
some were enthusiastic participants in geographical clubs, though these tended to 
be in the north of the research area where one council was providing some resource 
to organise the activity, whilst others eschewed clubs.  Some councils had taken 
up the LGA offer of a Peer Review whilst others had not; the results of Peer 
Reviews were not universally published on the Internet (Downe, Martin and 
Döring, 2014).  Two of the councils in the sample had continued a mutual review 
arrangement but that practice was not repeated across the sample. 
6.5 Norms and Legitimacy 
Isomorphic pressures, imitation and legitimacy seeking behaviours are suggested 
as drivers for organisations to adopt structures and practices that are the norms in 
the field (Bowerman, 2002; Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007), but there was 
no clear 'norm' for either structures or practices arising from this research.  
Governance structures were not universally the same across the sample, where 
some had Cabinet and others a committee system.  Managerial arrangements also 
varied; there were examples of a shared Chief Executive, shared s.151 officer, 
shared service managers, shared accommodation, and fully shared services.  Some 
councils had co-location with other agencies (e.g. Police; County Council 
departments; Department of Works and Pensions – Job Centres) but this was not 
consistent across all councils. 
Strategies for dealing with the coercive economic and funding pressures have 
changed over time and new strategies are now seen as legitimate, such as this 
example of an investment strategy: 
“If we had told our members 10 years ago that in 2016 they would 
be the proud owners of a petrol station, a supermarket, a former 
working men's club and an upmarket office block and be planning to 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
180  
develop and own their own hotel we would have been met with 
expressions of disbelief........”  (Policy Officer Sevenoaks District 
Council quoted in The Guardian 30 November 2016) 
The evidence that benchmarking was undertaken for the purpose of legitimacy 
rather than efficiency (McNair and Watts, 2006) was weak.   
“the authority isn't trying to buck the trend and disagree with the 
government – it's important for members....I don't think it's seen to 
be important by local people”  (Transcript Council O, page 16, line 
332). 
There was no evidence that the Peer Review was used a communication to external 
stakeholders as a tool of legitimacy management.  This suggests that the concept 
of legitimacy is now more fluid than seen by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who 
wrote of the constraining power of isomorphism and has evolved into a post Neo-
institutional era where there is a much wider spectrum of legitimate behaviours 
beyond structures and now more likely focussing on financial strategies and the 
requirement for the local authority to engage in place shaping and maintaining 
organisational viability.   
6.6 Conclusions 
The evidence of compliance but not convergence concurs with the findings of 
Ashworth et al (2007) who found substantial evidence for compliance but less 
evidence of convergence.  Villadsen takes this further suggesting that 'only about 
half of the examined organisational practices were local governments convergent 
and becoming more similar over time' (Villadsen, 2013, p. 865).  Whilst this 
research into benchmarking was concentrating on a specific process rather than 
overtly examining structures, it was observed that the structures were changing but 
not all moving in the same direction.  This suggests that councils now find that a 
spread of structural norms can be legitimate.  The route to legitimacy is no longer 
to simply adopt similar structures, as outlined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
but a mixed economy of models e.g. shared management, shared services, merged 
councils, can all be perceived by stakeholders as 'legitimate'.  The act of 
undertaking benchmarking was not seen as an endorsing behaviour conferring 
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legitimacy. 
Neo-institutional theory would suggest that entities move from initial stasis by 
complying with isomorphic pressures and converging their structures and 
processes into a new stasis.  With district councils that are generally expected to 
provide a similar range of services (though not necessarily to deliver them), receive 
funding in a similar way and are subject to similar judicial framework there might 
be an expectation that they would unfreeze from a very similar set of structures 
and re-freeze, over time, to a new but different set of similar structures and that 
varying structures, strategies or cultures, would be perceived as non-legitimate.  In 
practice the researched councils were selecting from an array of structures and 
following different strategies and implementing these modifications over different 
time scales influenced by political changes and the length of time for 
implementation.  A council explained that, following the Peer Challenge: 
“we gave ourselves 12 months to actually implement any of the 
recommendations.”  (Transcript Council L, page 16, line 498), 
explaining that they were in the mid-term review of their corporate plan and were 
preparing for changes following their election in the year. 
The research also confirms the work of Villadsen (2013), writing about Danish 
local government, who suggested that entities may wish to display differences to 
attract customers.  This suggests that the requirement to have a continuing future, 
i.e. survival, supersedes other legitimacy requirements.  He describes it thus: 
‘even organisations not operating in the competitive marketplace are 
likely to desire elements of idiosyncrasy which make them different 
from the population of organisations in which they exist.’  (Villadsen, 
2013, p. S64). 
Idiosyncratic is not an adjective that is commonly associated with English District 
Councils, but using it in the context of differentiating a council from other similar 
councils i.e. 'distinctiveness', it may an advantage to a council to be perceived as 
different from others or to be seen to have a unique identity; as in Denmark, 
'municipalities compete to attract business to their jurisdiction' (Villadsen, 2013, 
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p. S65).  Villadsen goes on to the explain a potential performance gain arising from 
increased legitimacy because of 'a better ability to attract and retain quality 
personnel' (Villadsen, 2013, p. S66).  In an era where the only funding sources 
available to councils are from council tax and business rates, they will be keen to 
attract businesses into their areas because they bring in tax revenue and potentially 
employment.  In the UK, councils have shown a variety of initiatives to attract new 
business or growth of existing into their areas.  The LGA have some case studies 
of the way they have assisted councils in attracting business and increasing visitors 
for cultural activities (Local Government Association, 2015, 2017a).  Common 
attributes presented by councils to support and attract businesses and to display the 
differences that their location offers are connectivity by road and rail; a skilled 
workforce; proximity to centres of excellence such as Universities or research 
facilities; and quality of life with attractive housing, leisure facilities and good 
schools.  Smaller authorities will emphasise fast broadband; small business start-
up facilities and have websites supporting businesses to find grants and funding 
opportunities.    
In these new fiscal circumstances, councils have freedom to adopt a new range of 
strategies and structures because 'legitimacy' now spans a wider spectrum than in 
previous decades and the requirement to have a continuing future may supersede 
previous legitimacy expectations of homogeneity.  Paradoxically, Villadsen (2013) 
continues by suggesting that municipalities therefore face pressures to conform to 
normative standards and be isomorphic which suggests a more homogeneous set 
of districts without differentiation. 
6.7 Revised Conceptual Framework 
The conclusions drawn from the exploratory fieldwork suggest that the initial 
conceptual framework was simplistic and other factors need to be introduced to 
make sense of the approach to benchmarking in district councils and the following 
conceptual framework is proposed: 
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Conceptual Framework – revised 
 
 
Figure 13  Revised Conceptual Framework 
This revised conceptual framework builds on the original framework (Figure 3) by 
recognizing that organisations are still in a turbulent environment particularly from 
a fiscal and political perspective but introduces new components to reflect the 
findings from the research and shows how the activity of benchmarking, as 
undertaken in the districts, feeds into the changes that are taking place.  The 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) still exist but the changing 
legitimacy continuum is introduced to show the movement from the NPM 
paradigm and, with it, the coercive regime from central government on 
benchmarking and performance, towards a shift in the direction of a New Public 
Governance model (Osborne, 2010; Hyndman et al., 2014) that continues to bring 
isomorphic pressures but of a different nature to those under NPM.   
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Components of the Conceptual Framework 
In the framework, the turbulent environment is shown as component (a).  In 
particular this acknowledges the turbulent funding environment and the changing 
ratios of funding sources faced by district councils.  The isomorphic pressures are 
still present and shown as component (b); the downward arrows indicate that the 
isomorphic pressures continue over time and in practice the pressures from 
coercive, normative, and mimetic sources will ebb and flow with each 
experiencing changing priorities over time.  The original legitimised organisation, 
component (c), is indicated on the left and is symbolically shown as a rectangle; 
the activity of benchmarking, as practised in councils, is suggested by arrows out 
from the organisation to other organisations; the information flowing in both 
directions reflecting the exchanging of information especially metrics.  The 
experience of benchmarking is laid down as part of the historical culture of the 
organisation and so forms part of the sedimented culture of the organisation and is 
included as component c(iii).  Some of the information derived from 
benchmarking activities (e.g. councils referred to benchmarking informing their 
service reviews) is used to inform the changes to organisational structures and 
processes (diagram component (d)).   
The centre of the framework representing the organisational changes (d) that take 
place is separated on the diagram into three sections.  The first two are as expected 
from the initial conceptual framework being compliance (component d(i)), and 
convergence (component d(ii)).  Convergence is suggested by arrows of differing 
sizes acknowledging that councils are changing but at different paces and to 
different extents and not simply converging towards homogeneity.  The structures 
of some Councils are adopting shared arrangements but that is not the pathway for 
all councils; there was evidence to suggest that councils were becoming more 
heterogeneous in their structures, strategies, and practices.  The third component 
of organisational response is described as Conformance (component d(iii)) and this 
illustrates the organisational changes arise as a response to the two-way dialogue 
(e(i)) that takes place as councils hear and react (e(ii)) to changes in their strategies 
to meet the attributes of the various legitimising forms (e(iii)).  The collection of 
types of legitimacy form the ongoing legitimacy paradigm (e(iv)).  This conformity 
to the legitimacy paradigm is shown as a separate response to suggest it is an 
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endogenous response to fit the new paradigm.  Component (e(iv)) continues across 
the whole framework because it is dynamic and continually evolving.  
Significantly the practice of benchmarking does not feed directly into the 
Legitimizing attributes.  Symbolically, no arrows are shown from the organisation 
block to the legitimacy block. 
Following the organisational changes, the new organisational structure emerges as 
Legitimized Organisations #2, component (f).  The new structure(s) for 
organisations, symbolically shown as a rounded rectangle to reflect the fact that 
organisational changes can be subtle rather than major, continue to undertake 
benchmarking by sharing information and ideas (conveyed by the two arrows).  
The new organisational structures note the information from benchmarking 
activities and these too become sedimented (downwards arrows) in the 
organisational culture and influence future changes in the organisational structures.  
The new structures continue to be influenced by isomorphic pressures (component 
b) and the changing public sector paradigm and, beyond the range of the diagram, 
continue to make evolutionary changes. 
Organisations continue to comply with the isomorphic pressures, as they did in 
response to government pressures to act in a more commercial manner under NPM, 
but now there are different pressures such as the emphasis on governance (CIPFA 
and SOLACE, 2017), ethics and increasingly attitudes to risk.   
The changing way in which services are delivered including the increasing move 
from direct delivery to co-delivery through partnerships is influencing views on 
risk within the wider local government sector with Chief Executive Officers 
saying: 
‘oversight and governance of partners as critical and aligned risk as 
essential…’  (Zurich Municipal, 2016, p. 3); 
‘I worry about the fragility of partner relationships and the fragility 
of partner organisations’  (ibid 2016, p. 3). 
These new structures and partnerships will bring new legitimacy challenges and 
added risk to an organisation if one of its partners loses legitimacy or chooses to 
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manage legitimacy in a different way.  In addition to these exogenous pressures, 
the impact on the organisation and responses to pressures under the previous 
legitimacy regime have become sedimented (Cooper et al., 1996) in the culture of 
the organisations and begin to exert further pressures on the way organisations 
change.   
The act of undertaking benchmarking activities continues in the councils because 
that previous requirement has sedimented into the culture of the organisations; but 
it has ceased to be a response to a coercive pressure e.g. from central government 
or the Audit Commission but more of a response to the normative pressures from 
professional colleagues (e g. Planning benchmarking or officer clubs). 
The visual manifestation of organisational change of unfreeze - move - freeze 
(Lewin, 1947) has been modified to reflect a continuum of changes to structures, 
overlapping changes in practices and suggesting a continuous response to external 
pressures.  The structural change is represented in a more nuanced way to reflect 
smaller changes e.g. incremental sharing of services or management (examples in 
Council K; Council E; Council A) rather than a solid state changing to very 
different solid state.  Continuing the refrigeration metaphor, the councils did not 
show evidence of freezing into new solid states but continually modifying and 
adapting to ongoing pressures.  The key research questions from the LGA Peer 
Challenge reinforce the need to plan how they can continue to be viable under 
these pressures. 
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7 Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
7.1 Contribution to Theoretical Knowledge 
This research explored the approach to benchmarking in district councils in 
England and examined the pressures to undertake benchmarking and the 
consequences of that activity.  The research began by examining benchmarking 
through the lens of Neo-institutional theory and empirical study has provided 
evidence to show how the practice of benchmarking has been influenced by 
external coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures.  Factors making up these 
pressures in the district councils have been identified with evidence from practical 
examples.  From this study a new conceptual framework (as shown on page 183) 
has been developed which synthesises three existing theoretical positions and 
explains how these operate in the current local government environment.   
Evidence suggests that previous isomorphic pressures, particularly the pressure to 
undertake benchmarking from a previous compulsory regime, have sedimented 
into the current culture of the organisations, and, further, this research has shown 
how those organisations are responding to pressures as the legitimacy paradigm 
changes.  The revised conceptual framework observes that districts are still in a 
turbulent fiscal environment and moving through a gradually changing legitimacy 
continuum from NPM to the new organisational paradigm of NPG.  However, the 
change is gradual and, as with other sedimented ideas, the factors that brought 
legitimacy under NPM still exist.  The theoretical change response of organisations 
to change their state by unfreezing and refreezing into a new form was not 
observed in this research, but rather changes were constant, and continuous with 
little evidence that the studied organisations were settling into new structures and 
remaining in a solid state. 
The research returned the following evidence to the specific research questions. 
Q1  Are Districts undertaking benchmarking or [just] comparing benchmarks? 
All but two of the sampled districts said they undertook benchmarking and 
described the actions they were taking.  Work in collaborative groups or formal or 
informal clubs, or comparison with wider comparators using the sector led LG 
Inform, appeared to be comparison of metric benchmarks as a means of checking 
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that their metrics were close (or where they were not close, could be explained) to 
those of a narrow number of other districts which confirms the findings of 
Bowerman and Ball (2000b).  The exercise gave a feel of comfort to ongoing 
practices.  There was no evidence of active process benchmarking; if that activity 
was taking place it would not be described as 'benchmarking' – being the term 
reserved for numbers and metrics.  Some comparison of benchmarks was 
undertaken as a means of highlighting working practices that could be reviewed to 
see if better performance could be obtained by examining the way those services 
were delivered.  These service reviews were based on metrics, rather than 
qualitative assessments of how the services were meeting customer demands.  One 
of the councils that did not undertake benchmarking explained that they were using 
Systems Thinking (Seddon, 2012) to focus on what their customers actually 
wanted, rather than copying practices from elsewhere.  A couple of councils 
mentioned comparing practices with other organisations such as Housing 
Associations, but this was done by comparing metrics rather than undertaking 
wider functional benchmarking. 
Q2  How are District Councils changing their approach to benchmarking during the 
period of localism; 
Within the districts the predominant approach to the activity described as 
benchmarking was as a metrics tool; information was exchanged on numbers and 
amounts and not practices or methods.  Exchanges or comparisons were preferred 
between councils perceived as very similar in nature to themselves and it was 
common to hear that figures could not be compared because councils were 
perceived as unique.  Different practices were employed; some councils belonged 
to clubs whilst others did not.  The Midlands councils had an active regional club, 
but there was not a similar organisation in the South or East, though councils in 
the larger shire counties tended to undertake metric benchmarking with councils 
in their county.  Weaknesses were seen in the LG Inform tool in that it only covered 
a limited range of district level services.  Overall, the approach to benchmarking 
was focussed on service delivery. 
Q3 Are district councils 'converging' and 'complying' in their practice of 
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benchmarking; 
There is no longer any government or Audit Commission requirement to undertake 
benchmarking, so councils would not be complying to that pressure; the evidence 
for complying with isomorphic pressures was stronger for normative pressures 
than for mimetic (Appendix L).  Councils were not converging in their practice of 
benchmarking; some were using LG Inform and some were participating in the 
national CIPFA benchmarking clubs but there was no uniformity of practice, nor 
was there strong evidence that they were all moving in the same direction.  The 
evidence of benchmarking culture across the councils confirms the findings of 
Ashworth et al (2007) who found that the level of impact of isomorphic pressures 
was stronger on cultures than on structures and processes. 
Q4 Are District Councils 'converging' in their practices; 
Evidence suggested that the strongest of the pressures was coercive.  This research 
supports the findings of Ashworth et al (2007) in that there was greater evidence 
for compliance to isomorphic pressures than there was evidence of convergences 
in behaviours and structures.  Although it was not described as 'benchmarking' – a 
term reserved for comparison of metrics – there was evidence that councils were 
converging in their practices particularly in terms of sharing arrangements, but 
there was no uniformity in the way that the sharing was taking place.  Some 
councils mentioned that they shared a service officer or service team with other 
councils but not all councils were sharing the same services; one council was about 
to share a Chief Executive, but this was not common across the sample.  There was 
no obvious movement towards a homogeneity of structures; different councils had 
different managerial and political structures.  There did, however, appear to be 
some common cultural themes identified within the sample such as leadership, the 
need for innovation and the culture of customer focus. 
Q5 Has the impact of previous isomorphic pressures sedimented into current cultures 
and what impact does this have; 
Previous compulsory requirements to benchmark as part of the CPA regime, with 
the impact on overall scores, still resonated in the councils and was still impacting 
on the way in which benchmarking was undertaken supporting the view of 
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Hyndman et al (2014) on sedimentation.  Although there was a desire to have a 
checking mechanism to judge comparative performance and to provide assurance 
that the authority was doing well and to offer evidence of legitimacy, the current 
benchmarking practices were not filling that need. 
Q6 What does the concept of legitimacy mean in the district council context and how is 
their approach to benchmarking helping to achieve this. 
Legitimacy in local councils is not a constant and is moving along the continuum 
from the NPM to NPG.  All the councils studied in this research had been in 
existence for some years and none were in crisis measures, so in terms of 
Suchman's (1995) legitimacy types they would be expected to be maintaining their 
legitimacy.  Within the era of NPM, legitimacy was gained by conforming to the 
commercially oriented targets and external assessments of CPA, and gaining 
kudos, amongst peers, from achieving a successful score.  Participation in the 
activity of benchmarking is no longer required to confer legitimacy and the 
research challenges the findings of Watts and Mead (2005) that legitimacy (in 
additions to isomorphic pressures) was the driver for benchmarking.  The new 
activities to which councils use to conform to the changing legitimacy are those 
related to governance, transparency and sustainability (Osborne, 2006; Hyndman 
et al., 2014), and the Peer Reviews were assisting councils to change their 
strategies and practices to deliver these.  Actions delivering legitimacy are now 
more focussed on citizens and gaining confidence of the public (Andrews, 2008; 
Boyne et al., 2009) and metrics benchmarking was not perceived as a tool for 
delivering or measuring these components. 
7.1.1 Summary 
In conclusion, this research has contributed to theory by supporting the work of 
Ashworth et al (2007) in providing evidence that the levels of response to 
isomorphic pressures were stronger on cultures than on structures.  It has also 
supported the work of Hyndman et al (2014) in providing evidence of 
sedimentation of old coercive pressures into the organisational culture of the 
councils, but has, to some extent, challenged the work of Watts and Mead (2005) 
with evidence suggesting that benchmarking is no longer only undertaken to show 
legitimacy. 
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This research has also contributed to theory by investigating the extent to which 
neo-institutional theory can be used to explain the approach to benchmarking in a 
sample of district councils in the English public sector.  The theory has proved a 
popular and common theory particularly in public sector accounting research 
(Jacobs, 2012) and this work provides evidence of the extent of suitability and 
utility of this theory pre-selected for contemporary public sector organisational 
research. 
Neo-institutional theory offered a disciplined approach with which to guide the 
research and to extract and analyse the components of isomorphic pressures on the 
selected public sector organisations.  The theory required a focus on the 
environment in which the organisations were acting and this facilitated analysis of 
the elements leading to fiscal turbulence.  In addition, it also gave structure to the 
aggregation of evidence of factors that were found to be sedimented in their 
organisational culture.  The theory aided the development of the revised conceptual 
framework which models the actions of benchmarking within the turbulent 
environment and legitimacy paradigms in which change is taking place.    
The research also synthesised the theoretical 'unfreeze – freeze' explanation of 
organisational change from Lewin (1947), to inform the conceptual frameworks, 
but empirical evidence has contributed to theory by showing that the organisations 
in this study were not freezing into stasis in new models but rather constantly 
adapting suggesting that contemporary organisations change at a faster and 
incremental pace than those observed by Lewin. 
There were weaknesses in the reliance on neo-institutional theory as a construct 
for analysing the approach to benchmarking.  With regard to study of exogenous 
isomorphic pressures, the theory is generalist and does not offer tools to focus at a 
level of granularity that would be required to explain the velocity or comparative 
volatility between the three types of isomorphic pressures.  In practice it was found 
that the dominance of individual isomorphic pressures varied over time, with 
coercive pressure predominating at the time of this research.  It did not provide the 
theoretical support for explaining differences arising from political and legislative 
changes or attitudes towards risk.  In this respect the research has supported the 
findings of Covaleski and Dirsmith who criticise neo-institutional theory for 
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failing 'to explain the role of power and interest based behaviour' (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1995, p. 148).  The research also found that the impact of the pressures 
and consequential responses varied between organizations (e.g. responses to 
coercive pressures for shared services) in both range and intensity of approach 
between councils.  Whilst general coercive pressures were exerted by central 
government to make changes, councils did not all respond to the same extent (e.g. 
invitations to apply for hypothecated Transformation Challenge Grant funding; 
spread of shared services). 
Whilst neo-institutional theory provided a framework for analysing the exogenous 
isomorphic pressures, the research found that additional endogenous and 
sedimented pressures also had a significant effect on organisational cultures and 
the theory did not provide tools to facilitate understanding of the ways in which 
endogenous cultural pressures were impacting on cultural change.  The 'macro' 
nature of neo-institutional theory has been identified and this research confirms 
that the theory lacks 'endogenous explanations for processes of stability and 
change' (Suddaby, Seidl and Lê, 2013, p. 331).  Neo-institutional theory does not 
differentiate between the turbulent environment and the external legitimacy 
paradigm, again reinforcing the argument for theoretical pluralism and supporting 
the view of Jacobs (2012) who noted that some authors had blended different 
theoretical insights to better make sense of the complexity of public sector activity.   
In summary, the research found the use of neo-institutional theory valuable in 
setting the research framework but evidence from this study supports the findings 
of Greenwood et al (2014) who determined that the theory was a simplistic one. 
7.2 Limitations and further research 
This section discusses the limitations to the study that were identified both before 
and during the field research, together with suggestions for further research. 
The limitations of geography, politics and Localism were recognised before the 
work began (as Appendix K).  During the research and writing up period more 
limitations were exposed, and these are also explained.   
7.2.1 Case Location 
This study of district councils was limited to a geographical area and was 
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undertaken at a time of reducing government financial support.  The research only 
explored cases in the South, East, South East, East and West Midlands.  Although 
some regional differences were exposed between the Midlands and the other 
regions, the approach to benchmarking in the North and North West regions was 
not captured.  Similarly, the research was limited to district councils and did not 
cover Unitaries or County Councils who may have different approaches. 
Further research covering a wider area or from a time period after government 
support is withdrawn would provide further information on the responses to 
isomorphic pressures.   
7.2.2 Political Risk 
The interviews took place with Officers and not with politically elected members 
and as a consequence didn't capture member views on whether they understand by 
benchmarking and what they expect their officers to be doing and whether 
benchmarking means performance assessment.  Further study encompassing the 
views of elected members, or specifically Cabinet members (or Chairman) with 
responsibility for performance, would determine the extent to which they found 
the benchmarking they received, or metrics they saw at a national level as 
legitimizing.  
The political control of the case sites was not part of the original selection criteria 
though the coverage (see Appendix D as similar to control of districts in the 
selected region.  Further study could determine if there were differences in 
perception of benchmarking or comparison of benchmarks between local 
authorities with different political control, particularly where the local control 
differed from national government.  
7.2.3 Legitimacy 
This study observed more evidence of impact and influence from coercive and 
normative pressures to make changes, but less evidence of mimetic forces leading 
to changes, however the research focussed on the precise tool of benchmarking 
and further research would be useful in determining the extent to which the three 
isomorphic pressures exert pressures on the organisations to make changes on 
other strategies and processes.  In particular the extent to which the influence of 
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the sector led improvements drive is changing performance.   
Normative pressures to undertake benchmarking and participate in benchmarking 
clubs appeared to be greater in councils in the East and West Midlands than it was 
in the South and East and further research would establish the reasons for this.   
Further research could investigate a hypothesis that perceptions of benchmarking 
legitimacy improve with wider participation in clubs. 
With the observed changes in the legitimacy paradigm towards NPG there is a need 
for further research to ascertain how councils now understand legitimizing 
behaviours.  The question guidelines for the semi structured interviews only 
included one question about legitimacy.  The word is not in common usage within 
district councils and the research did not probe the ways in which councils were 
managing or demonstrating their legitimacy at any of the levels described in 
theory.  Further research could be undertaken into the methods used to manage 
legitimacy in times of austerity and how councils are indicating their forms of 
legitimacy.   
Further work could be undertaken into investigating which factors predominate as 
current isomorphic pressures and how previous coercive pressures may have 
themselves morphed into normative pressures and, further, to examine which 
bodies are exerting those pressures.  As new structural models develop, such as 
shared services and shared management, there is potential to investigate 
management actions and use of signalling tools in councils as they manage 
individual legitimacy within the new environment. 
7.2.4 Professional Disciplines 
The research questions did not probe for membership of any professional groups 
either at national level or within the shire counties for Performance Officers.  It is 
a limitation that the professionalisation of these officers was not explored,  though 
there is no national body conferring a qualification specifically for that discipline.  
The professional disciplines of interviewees fell into three categories; Elite officers 
(here Chief Executives and s.151), Operational officers (i.e. service management) 
and Performance Officers.  There were differences in perspective and content for 
each of those groups.  For example, Performance Officers spoke in detail of their 
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relationships with benchmarking partners in clubs and the practical issues they 
faced using LG Inform,  the frustrations of preparing accurate figures and the need 
for reciprocity in sharing data.  They were also more likely to go into detail about 
Performance indicators.  Elite interviewees did not cover those details and were 
less likely to mention LG Inform because they had less day to day experience of 
it.  However, the Performance Officers were not unaware of the ‘bigger picture’ 
especially if their council had been involved in a Peer Review.  The number of 
service officers was small, and it was not possible to generalise from their input 
across all the cases.  In discussion on the strategic issues such as Localism there 
was similarity across levels with an interpretation that it was about local residents 
and providing the services they felt were important 
Comments about the roles of political [party] groups came across from all levels 
as did references to the Officer-Member relationship, though only a Chief 
Executive used the expression ‘my councillors’.  Interviewees at all levels were 
politically aware but only elite interviewees mentioned the need for discussions on 
future policies with opposition members prior to an election. 
Further research into both the professional discipline of Performance Officers and 
their perceptions of the value of benchmarking, and the comparative views of other 
disciplines would be useful. 
7.2.5 Multiple Interviews 
Interviews were originally requested to be with Chief Executives, and two Chiefs 
did agree to be interviewed.  In other cases, the interviews took place with a variety 
of senior officers (s.151 officers), service, and performance officers.  It is a 
limitation that there were not interviews at each of these levels at each site to 
facilitate a full multiple comparison.  Further studies might benefit from 
undertaking interviews with separate layers of staff in each case to provide extra 
analysis.  An hypothesis for future research could be that perceptions of the 
legitimacy of benchmarking activity are greater for performance officers than for 
other professional disciplines. 
7.2.6 Staffing 
The study did not address changes in staffing size or mix from the time of dealing 
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with best value and CPA to the present.  This would have given useful background 
to the phenomenon of ‘hollowing out ‘ of the corporate centres.  Future studies on 
this topic could compare the extent and pace of staff changes dealing with 
performance, or specifically benchmarking, compared with perceptions of 
legitimacy from peer councils or elected members. 
7.2.7 Changes since Original Study 
The field research was carried out in 2014-15 and was completed before the 
General Election in May 2015 which saw the end of the Tory-LibDem coalition.  
This section discusses the probability that if the research were to be repeated in 
2018/19 there would be a difference in response,  
The overall financial environment is now even more uncertain than in 2014 and 
the period of austerity has continued beyond the expected five years.  Central 
government grant has reduced as expected and the future of finance from business 
rates is subject to changes on business rate retention, and the consequences of the 
Fair Funding Review effective in 2020 (Sandford, 2018).  Financial incentives for 
new housing  (New Homes Bonus) are still short term.   
There are no new central government assessment regimes, but there are changes 
within the sector.  New comparative financial indices have been developed from 
within the sector that were not available in 2014 e.g.  a Financial Resilience Index 
proposal (CIPFA); a financial strength index from a Treasury adviser (Marrs, 
2018);  an economic vibrancy index (Grant Thornton, 2018), suggesting increased 
interest in comparative performance. 
Participation in benchmarking activity is continuing.  The sector led LG Inform 
which was in its infancy at the time of the field study has reached a level of 
maturity and, working with East Midlands councils, and, in contrast to the 
government imposed BVPIs, is developing a voluntary basket of local metrics that 
are introduced on a democratic basis if voted for by at least 30 members.  The LG 
Inform offer is the sectors own free benchmarking tool and the ‘bottom up’ 
selection of indicators may attract more participants to benchmarking.   
The impact of benchmarking and BVPIs may be receding, and CPA may also have 
sedimented.  The early rounds of CPC began in 2011 and included Localism as 
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one of the themes forming the focus of the early challenges (Local Government 
Association, 2013) and that too is likely to have sedimented as it is not in the core 
components for 2018/19 (Local  Government Association, 2018).   
Legitimacy, particularly as conferred by other professionals, has also seen 
marginal changes since 2014 with increased emphasis on Financial Resilience and 
Place.   
Whilst all of these changes are fairly subtle they do suggest that if the research 
were to be repeated in 2019 there would be nuanced differences in responses and 
findings. 
7.3 Contribution to Professional Practice 
This research has exposed several issues that will be of benefit to practice.  At a 
simplistic level, practitioners will be interested to observe the practices and 
attitudes of their peers regarding benchmarking as it relates to performance 
improvement; but the research has shown issues at a deeper level both in the 
practice of benchmarking and the lessons for organisational change. 
Regarding benchmarking practice, the work has revealed that districts perceptions 
of benchmarking is that it relates only to metrics benchmarking as a measure of 
comparative efficiency between peers.  It is used as a comparison or resource to 
determine areas for further research ('service reviews') rather than process 
benchmarking with a desire to improve specific processes.  Metrics benchmarking 
clearly had a role in the times of NPM where there was a focus on efficiency in the 
direct delivery of services.  In the post NPM era a greater emphasis is required on 
benchmarking for effectiveness in meeting users’ needs and ensuring progress 
towards future goals – rather than a simplistic comparison as in the past.  
Benchmarking as practised tended to be 'backwards facing' and concentrated on 
outputs rather than outcomes. 
The study has confirmed the value of officer networks for the exchange of 
information and ideas.  The benchmarking club offer from the professional group 
CIPFA was criticised as being expensive for districts, and there was general 
mistrust of figures with a suspicion of game playing to improve comparative 
results.  Further, the volatility of the figures was seen as insufficient to warrant 
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annual benchmarking.  There would appear to be a need for officer bodies to 
review their offer of collaborative comparisons to meet the new needs post NPM. 
At an organisational level this work has exposed valuable information about the 
way historical influences and practices sediment into the organisational culture and 
influence future activities.  The effect of CPA, National Performance Indicators 
and the requirements of Best Value are still having an impact on the way these 
organisations make their decisions and organisational changes 
The research suggests that officers were enthusiastic in collecting benchmarking 
information, but effort was consumed in data manipulation in presenting figures 
that ensured the results of metrics were shown as close to an 'average' and avoiding 
extremes of reported performance; it was not clear whether performance was 
reviewed after reporting in order to change practices and improve performance in 
order to deliver better performance.  The benchmarking emphasis was on practices 
and service delivery rather than structures and policies and this suggests that the 
efforts employed on the task focus of benchmarking could be better directed on 
needs facing research. 
The research has identified several actions that councils could do to improve the 
effectiveness of benchmarking and clubs and the following ideas are suggested: 
• Develop means of sharing good practice.  The main benefit of club activity 
was the opportunity for learning and information exchange and initiatives 
that encourage sharing of innovation and good practice e.g. by presentation 
of case studies and network meetings   
• Adjust performance indicators to the sector norm.  There is likely to be 
greater benefit from being able to select from wider comparators, rather 
than choosing to modify and personalise performance indicators.  
• There may be potential in investigating the LGA offer.  After initial 
technical issues, LG Inform has become more sophisticated and it likely to 
increase in both usefulness and legitimacy with a wider participation.  
Unlike some clubs and commercial benchmarking organisations, there is 
no subscription fee, and the LGA has now introduced the opportunity for 
new performance indicators if sufficient councils (over 30) would like to 
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include them.  
7.3.1 Assessment 
Interviewees wanted a means of comparing their performances without the 
pejorative history of the CPA.  They presented a need to understand how well they 
were doing compared to others, but it is difficult to see how comparative data could 
be published without the downsides felt about CPA.  In promoting the sector led 
offer, Sawyers (2015) writes of the sector led improvement as 'allowing local 
government to show central government that it can maintain standards and 
improve performance, without needing to be burdened with resource-sapping 
hoops to jump through' (Sawyers, 2015, p. 23), however this suggests a single 
facing focus to the sector led improvement regime in providing evidence to central 
government and so reinforcing a coercive perception of central government 
assessment.  This ignores the pressures from peer to peer assessment – which might 
be called normative assessment, but more importantly brings into question the 
driving force behind assessment which under Localism should be the electorate or 
recipients of services.  With the changing ratios of funding sources in local 
government with reductions in funding from central government to local 
government and increasing importance of funding from locally raised finance, 
there is a corresponding shift in the status of assessment regimes. 
The Sector led 'Peer Review' or LGA Corporate Peer Challenge was liked as a 
means of assessment because it was specific to the district and its perceived needs.  
It was particularly praised because it involved members and was not simply officer 
to officer assessment.  It is worthy of mention here that the results of the Peer 
Challenge were not a 'score' or league table position but rather the output was a 
narrative report specifically focussed on future actions to help the district meets its 
own needs.  The Corporate Peer Challenge was optional and not all districts took 
up the offer. 
7.3.2 Conclusions 
This research will better enable practitioners to apply benchmarking resources 
within their organisations with the knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks 
experienced by others.  It provides a candid insight into the current operational 
practices of benchmarking and that will inform future initiatives and clubs.  It also 
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provides an insight into how past influences on benchmarking remain in 
organisations after the original compulsion has passed.  The sector led initiatives 
have been explored and this report provides feedback on how these have been used 
and how they could be improved and gives feedback on perceptions of their 
usefulness.  During NPM there was a strong focus on cost, but post NPM there is 
now a greater need to match councils’ activities to areas and issues that are specific 
to the mix of populations and their needs; to ensure that efforts are focussed and 
forward looking. 
In summary, the benefits felt by practice are a need for benchmarking clubs to 
revise their benchmarking offer, and for the sector led improvement offers to 
continue. 
  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
201  
8 Appendices 
8.1 Appendix A  Local Government Information 
Appendix A (i) Local Government Responsibilities 
      
      
  
Metropolitan 
Districts 
London 
Boroughs 
Unitary 
Authorities 
County 
Councils 
District 
Councils 
Education ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Highways ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Transport Planning ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Passenger Transport     ✓ ✓   
Social Care ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Housing ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Libraries ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Leisure and Recreation ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Environmental Health ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Waste Collection ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Waste disposal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Planning applications ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Strategic Planning ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Local tax collection ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
        
  
Source: DCLG Local Government Financial Statistics England No.25 2015  
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Appendix A (ii) Changes in Government Funding to authorities 2010-11 to 2015-16. 
There is variation in the level of funding reductions across different authority 
types. 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department of Local Government and Communities data 
 
Notes 
1 Chart includes government funding component of revenue spending power data 
published annually by the Department.  Public health grant and the Better Care Fund are 
excluded. 
2 Chart shows annual change in a weighted index.  See methodology available at: 
www.nao.org.uk/report/impacts-funding-reductions-local-authorities/  
3 Individual bands show annual change as a percentage of funding in 2010-11, rather than 
year-on-year percentage change.  Individual bands are summable to produce total change 
from 2010-11 to 2015-16.  
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Appendix A (iii) Government Regions 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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Appendix A(iv) UK Counties and Unitary Authorities 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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8.2 Appendix B  Districts receiving Nil Revenue Support Grant in 2017/18 
Class Local Authority 
Settlement 
Funding 
Assessment 
Revenue 
Support Grant 
     
SD Bromsgrove 1.63 0.00 
SD Chiltern 1.39 0.00 
SD East Dorset 1.29 0.00 
SD Elmbridge 2.17 0.00 
SD Epsom and Ewell 1.33 0.00 
SD Maidstone 3.04 0.00 
SD Mole Valley 1.20 0.00 
SD North Hertfordshire 2.55 0.00 
SD Reigate and Banstead 2.23 0.00 
SD Sevenoaks 2.15 0.00 
SD Spelthorne 1.80 0.00 
SD Surrey Heath 1.46 0.00 
SD Tandridge 1.36 0.00 
SD Tonbridge and Malling 2.15 0.00 
SD Woking 1.99 0.00 
 
Class SD = Shire Districts 
Settlement Funding Assessment is £m 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/key-information-for-local-
authorities-final-local-government-finance-settlement-2017-to-2018 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
206  
8.3 Appendix C  Case Study Protocol 
Case Study Protocol  after Yin (2009) 
A  Introduction to the case study and purpose of the protocol   
The basic question for the research is 'What approach are English District Councils 
taking towards benchmarking for performance improvement? 
The theoretical framework for this research is as follows: 
Aims 
The aim of this research is to examine the approach within English Local 
Government to benchmarking for performance improvement after the Localism 
Act. 
Objectives 
The Objectives will be to: 
• Investigate the extent to which comparison with other organisations is used 
to drive improvements in performance; 
• Assess the impact of benchmarking activities on district councils’ 
practices, structures, and policies; 
• Analyse how the results of benchmarking activities are used in the 
organisations; 
• Understand the drivers behind decisions to undertake benchmarking; 
• Assess the extent to which benchmarking is perceived as a legitimising 
activity under Localism. 
• The research problem can be summarised as 'Can the approach to 
benchmarking under Localism be explained by Neo-institutional theory?' 
This protocol sets out the process of the research and acts as a guide for all the 
steps that will be followed to complete the research.  The study, analysis and 
writing up will be conducted by the researcher in person, however this protocol 
could act as a record of exactly how the research is undertaken such that a repeat 
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piece of work could be undertaken under the same set of procedures. 
B Data Collection procedures 
Data will be collected from interviewees at 18 district councils.  The interviews 
are front loaded in the research and the precise numbers in each tranche are loose 
to allow for workload pressures.  The exact sites will be selected in the following 
way: 
• Initially a purposive sample of 5 representatives from district councils who 
are already members of the LGA knowledge hub group on benchmarking 
and performance management.   
• 3 interviews will be selected from members of specific benchmarking clubs 
and 2 or 3 interviews from other districts.   
• The remaining set of district level interviews will be taken from officers or 
members from district councils with roles in performance improvement. 
• Two further interviews will be planned with academic members of the 
Knowledge Hub to act as part the triangulation exercise. 
 
Data Collection Plan 
The type of evidence that will be collected is recordings of semi-structured 
interviews with officers (and academics and members) who are knowledgeable 
about the impact of benchmarking in their organisation and its role in performance 
enhancement 
Expected preparation prior to site visit: 
• Location map. Contact phone numbers 
• Check recording equipment 
• Back up pen and paper 
• Consent letter as Kingston Research protocol 
• List of questions as Appx C 
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The evidence to be collected prior to each interview will be: 
• officer and governance structure at location; 
• latest audit report for district councils (showing the value for money and 
resilience opinion from external auditors for at least one year (depending 
on timing of interview); 
• latest set of final accounts or annual report for district – for background 
and to see any particular plans for changes to structures; new policies or 
plans to improve performance; 
• results for districts from previous CPA /use of Resources scores; 
• latest budget reports (for indication of financial stress). 
C Outline of Case Study report 
The case study report will comprise; 
• Understanding of benchmarking and comparison to literature e.g. indicator 
or ideas benchmarking. 
• Perceptions about Coercive benchmarking from Audit Commission, 
government, and regulatory regimes 
• Mimetic behaviours and their impact on structures and processes 
• Professional (normative) view of benchmarking as a performance tool 
• Conclusion of views  
• on the implementation of benchmarking as a legitimising tool 
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8.4 Appendix D  Transcription Sources and Archival materials 
(i) Transcript References 
Transcript 
Reference 
Region in 
which 
Council is 
located 
CPA Score 
2009 
Officer (s) Interviewed 
A South West Fair Chief Executive 
B East Midlands Fair Performance Officer and Service Officer 
C East Good Performance Officer 
D East Good Finance Officer s.151 and Performance Officer 
E East Midlands Weak Service Officer 
F South East Excellent Performance Officer 
G East Fair Finance Officer s.151 and Performance Officer 
H South East Excellent Finance Officer s.151 
I South East Good Finance Officer 
J South West 3 star (Non 
district) 
Performance Officer 
K South East Excellent Service Officer 
L South East Fair Finance Officer and Performance Officer 
M West Midlands Excellent Performance Officer 
N West Midlands Excellent Performance Officer 
O East Midlands Excellent Chief Executive 
P East Midlands Good Performance Officer 
Q East Midlands Fair Performance Officers (2) 
R East Excellent Performance Officer 
 
Political Control of Sampled Councils as at May 2014 
  No of Districts % of sample 
Conservative 13 72 
Labour 2 11 
Lib-Dem 1 6 
No Overall Control 2 11 
  18 100 
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Appendix D (ii)   Transcript References and Archival materials 
 
Council 
Transcript 
Reference 
Materials available in Public Domain Material provided by 
interviewees that is not 
available in the public 
domain 
(Note c) 
Statutory Financial 
Documents 
(Note a) 
Other material in 
Public Domain 
(Note b) 
A 4 5 - 
B 4 5 2 
C 4 6 - 
D 4 8 - 
E 4 6 22 
F 4 5 - 
G 4 7 2 
H 4 2 - 
I 4 6 1 
J 4 11 7 
K 4 5 - 
L 4 6 - 
M 4 6 - 
N 4 12 - 
O 4 8 - 
P 4 8 - 
Q 4 4 - 
R 4 9 - 
Total 72 113 34 
 
Notes 
:a):  Explanatory foreword from Annual Statement of Accounts; Audit findings 
report (IAS 260); Annual Audit Letter; Annual Governance Statement. 
b):  Documents from public sources e.g. management structures, professional 
magazine articles written by interviewees; Corporate Plans; Committee reports 
providing performance management information; Local Government Association 
Peer Challenge Reports. 
c):  Documents offered by interviewees that are not available in public domain i.e. 
not reported on council websites, e.g.  reports from Benchmarking clubs; items 
from subscription services. 
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8.5 Appendix E  Ethical Approval from Kingston University 
Approved electronically by Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
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8.6 Appendix F  Declaration for Interviewees RE5 
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8.7 Appendix G  Outline Question sheet for Interviews 
 
Questions for semi-structured interviews  #### District 
Introduction 
• Could you please explain how you see your role In Performance 
Improvement here at ##### 
Questions about benchmarking 
• What do you understand by the term 'benchmarking? 
Probe: benchmarks or indicator benchmarking, and best practice or 
ideas benchmarking 
Probe: metrics; 
methods 
Structures 
Was bm involved in this #### 
 
• .How important is it to your Members that your authority participates in 
benchmarking activities or Clubs? 
• I’ve heard only about 1 in 6 Councils participate in BM clubs – why do 
you think that is? 
Questions about Comparative Performance 
• Under CPA, (Comprehensive Performance Assessment) the relative 
performance of local authorities was assessed by the Audit Commission; . 
How effective do you think that regime was in driving up performance? 
• Under Localism we no longer have CPA, how important is it to you and to 
your members to compare the performance of this authority with others?`` 
• Could you explain some of the practical mechanisms you are employing 
here at #####…...district to drive up your performance? 
• How do you or members know if you are ‘achieving’ or ‘cruising’ 
• How do local authorities now assess their performance compared to others? 
Questions about Professional Groups/Organisations 
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• What role do you think officer groups at county level (e.g. County 
Financial /Planning/ CEO) officers) play in improving the performance of 
local authorities. 
• Can you give an example of changes that you have made to your practices 
as a result of this kind of officer networking? 
What about the impact of country wide groups 
• What impact do the national officer groups such as District Councils 
Network; SOLACE, SOCITM, SDCT (as appropriate to interviewee), have 
in terms of performance improvement? 
• What is your view of the usefulness of organisations such as APSE in 
helping this authority to improve its performance? 
The impact of Localism 
• How does your council measure citizen satisfaction under Localism? 
The role of (coercive?) bodies in driving changes in performance 
• What role do you think central Govt. is playing in helping local govt to 
improve performance? 
• What do you see as the role of your auditors in performance improvement 
here and at regional level? (Refer to their assessment in latest vfm report) 
• (Refer to any comments in last auditors report) - Have you made any 
changes to your longer term strategies or practices following the comments 
in your most recent audit report? 
• (Refer to audit report on financial resilience).  Have you used the latest 
audit report to compare their assessment of your resilience with other 
authorities?   
• Which was more effective in driving up performance – CPA or the new 
privatised audit reports; why was that? 
• Is Transformation Challenge money carrot or stick? 
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Role of the Local Government Association 
• What is your opinion on the effectiveness of LGA Peer Review in 
enhancing performance improvement 
• What difference would it make to the Peer Challenge if it was only officers? 
• Are you familiar with LG INFORM as a tool to improve performance?  
Could you tell me how you have used it? 
Changes to structures 
• What is the biggest influence that would cause this organisation to change 
its structure (management or governance)  
I'd to read you a quote from the Municipal Journal and ask you to give me your 
view on it 
'you don't need to relinquish localism to have the same basic structure as a dozen 
other councils across the country' (Jameson 2013). 
• How do you think local authorities might be changing their structures in, 
say, the next decade? 
• What shared services/shared management do you have here – 
• Why do you think some authorities have shared/joined – whilst others have 
not?  (e.g. Suffolk; Dorset) 
Finally - Questions about legitimacy3 
• How important do you think it is for local authorities to be seen to be 
sharing services, or senior management, or undertaking benchmarking?  
Why? 
and the future?? 
  
                                                 
3  reputation was used at [redacted] 
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8.8 Appendix H  Additional information provided to interviewees 
 
PROJECT TITLE:  Benchmarking in Local Government 
 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 Introduction 
 
I am currently undertaking research into Benchmarking for a Doctorate in Business 
Administration (DBA) with Kingston Business School.  I would like to invite you to 
participate in this research. 
 
My research will examine documents in the public domain such as web sites, 
annual reports, and reports from professional organisations, as well as undertaking 
interviews with people who are directly involved in benchmarking or other 
performance improvement activities. 
 
 
How will the results be used? 
 
The data from this research will be used for research purposes only in the following 
way. 
• DBA thesis 
• Academic research papers and presentations 
• A summary report to be circulated to all interested participants or 
participating organisations. 
Please indicate on the consent form if you would like to receive a summary of the 
results. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This study seeks to examine the approach within English Local Government to 
benchmarking for performance improvement after the Localism Act.  I propose to: 
• investigate the extent to which comparison with other organisations 
is driving improvements in performance; 
• examine the impact of benchmarking activities on district councils 
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practices, structures and policies; 
• understand the drivers behind decisions to undertake benchmarking. 
 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study?   
 
I propose to interview people who: 
• have participated in work undertaken by the Local Government Association 
Knowledge Hub 
• are involved with one of the CIPFA Benchmarking clubs 
• are involved with the Capita Benchmarking club 
• Have a role concerned with performance and improvement 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, you do not have to participate. You can withdraw at any time during the 
interview without giving a reason. 
 
 
What will my involvement require? 
 
If you take part, I would like to ask you some questions about your personal 
attitudes towards benchmarking and performance improvement in local 
government.   This will take approximately one hour.  The answers to the questions 
will be audio recorded. 
You will be given the opportunity to review the transcript of the interview and you 
will able to delete/modify or elaborate on any of your responses 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
I do not consider there to be any disadvantages to you or to your organisation from 
participation in this research. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that there will be a direct benefit to your authority, but at the completion 
of my study I will be in a strong position to identify the ways in which councils can 
improve performance, and how benchmarking clubs or other improvement groups 
can work most effectively. 
 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
 
At the end of the study I will produce my dissertation for Kingston.  If you would 
like a copy of this, I would be pleased to send it to you, alternatively I will be 
producing a lay summary of my findings and plan to have this available by January 
2016. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with 
during the course of the study will be addressed by the Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee; please contact the Research Administrator Valerie Thorne 
(V.Thorne@kingston.ac.uk)  in the first instance. 
 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. People’s names or job titles or their authority will not be included in reports.  
All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports 
from the research will not know who has contributed to it.   
 
 
Contact details of researcher and, where appropriate supervisor? 
 
My work contact details are: 
Helen.Martin@Sevenoaks.gov.uk:   
Daytime telephone:  01732 227483 
Address:  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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xxxxx 
xxxxx 
xxxxxxxx 
 
The supervisor of this project is Kent Springdal.  His contact details are: 
 
K.Springdal@Kingston.ac.uk 
Daytime telephone:  020 8417 9000 Ext. 65241 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research is self funded 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
 
The study has been reviewed and received clearance from Kingston University 
Research Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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8.9 Appendix I  Final Nodes used in NVivo  - Analysis by Interview Transcripts 
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Appendix I   Final Nodes used in NVivo continued 
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8.10 Appendix J  Coding references in Interview Transcripts by Professional 
Discipline 
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Appendix J   Coding references by Professional Discipline continued 
 
 
Note:  interview with S151 Officer and Performance Officer together is coded here 
as Senior and Service. 
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8.11 Appendix K  De-limitations 
De-limitations 
The delimitations of the project are detailed by the following scoping exercise 
 
Sector:   English Local Government at district council level. 
Time frame:   Post implementation of the 2012 Localism Act 
Language:   The research will be conducted in English 
Geography:   The data collection will be focussed on the East and South of 
England 
Sources:   Information will be obtained from published sources in the public 
domain 
Use will be made of data available from the national data set which covers the 
period up to financial year 2010/11. 
 
Limitations 
The research limitations in this context are weaknesses or potential deficiencies in 
the research (Collis, 2009). 
Location of Interviews 
The research will be conducted at district council level only and will exclude 
county, metropolitan, unitary and London Borough councils.  There is risk that 
practices at these tiers will be dissimilar from districts however it is not in the 
nature of this qualitative research to be able to generalise to other tiers of 
administration. 
Political risk 
Interviews are proposed with paid officers and not with politicians.  This carries a 
risk that different perceptions from politicians will not be taken into account. 
A general election is scheduled for 2015 and local elections may take place at target 
councils during the course of the study.  This may mean that prospective 
interviewees are unwilling to undertake interviews at that time; or that behaviours 
change as a result of political decisions.  Time will be built into the work schedule 
to allow for non-availability of interviewees by scheduling the interviews over a 
longer period of time. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
230  
Professional risk 
The researcher is a local government officer and responses from interviewees may 
be slanted to impress or 'show the best side' of their authority to a person from a 
similar organisation; they may choose despite, clear offers of confidentiality to 
conceal factors that present their authority in an unfavourable light.  The 
professional discipline of any interviewees may impact on their responses and may 
introduce bias to the interviews. 
Legislative impacts 
The research will take place in early years after the enactment of the Localism Act 
during a period of significant fiscal uncertainty and flux which may be atypical of 
organisational practices after the legislation has been embedded. 
Language risk 
The interviews will be conducted in English which is the normal language of 
business in local government; the researcher is employed within the sector, so the 
risk of misunderstanding of language or industry jargon is expected to be low.  It 
is probable that the gender and ethnic background of the researcher and some of 
the interviewees will be different; however, as the questions are business related 
this is not expected to influence the outcome of the interviews (Heijes, 2011). 
Interviewee Bias risk 
The interviewing is based on a philosophical assumption of honest responses from 
respondents.  But there is a risk that actors may provide biased responses to reflect 
a better position of their organisation, or an individual view that may be at variance 
to the views and policies of the council where they are employed but these risks 
are inherent in surveys as well as interview methods.  The risk of self-serving bias 
is reduced by guaranteeing the interviewees anonymity in the research output. 
Interviewer bias risk (also referred to as experimenter bias) 
The interviewer will see the research through the lens of a career within local 
government and therefore may run the risk of approaching the research with more 
subjectivity.  Any bias in the initial set of questions could embed bias within the 
results.  This risk will be handled by recording the results of the interviews and 
discussing the initial interviews coding with a third party. 
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'Moderator' risk 
The interviewees may view the interview with the expectation of learning more 
about other council's practices from the researcher and try to take the interview 
slot to enhance their own councils learning.   
Reflexivity Risk 
The interviewees may respond with what they think the interviewer wants to hear 
(Yin, 1994; Tellis, 1997b, 1997a).  
Health and Safety Risks 
Interviews are expected to be carried out on interviewee's premises.  National and 
any local health and safety requirements will be observed. 
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8.12 Appendix L  Analysis of Coding Reference analysed by Isomorphic Pressures 
 
 
Council 
Transcript 
Reference 
Coercive 
References 
Mimetic 
references 
Normative 
References 
Council A 15 4 8 
Council B 9 9 25 
Council C 1 0 2 
Council D 9 5 14 
Council E 7 4 8 
Council F 4 0 5 
Council G 5 0 4 
Council H 4 3 7 
Council I 8 3 8 
Council J 6 6 25 
Council K 6 2 10 
Council L 6 4 17 
Council M 4 4 10 
Council N 11 1 20 
Council O 7 7 20 
Council P 10 4 18 
Council Q 9 2 22 
Council R 7 6 4 
Grand Total 128 64 227 
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